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Preface 
 
 
 
 
The Austrian Association of East Asian Studies was founded as to support 
scientific studies of contemporary East Asian, to increase scholarly activities, 
and to stimulate the exchange of experience and knowledge about Asia.  
 As to achieve these objectives the association organises conferences 
and summer study programmes for students, and publishes books and jour-
nals. This book comprises four articles written by scholars from Europe and 
Asia and should help students and others interested in East Asian politics to 
better understand current political trends in Mongolia, South Korea, and 
Taiwan.  
Heike Hermanns focuses on South Korea’s party system, electoral 
processes, and the national and local elections of last few years. Christian 
Schafferer analyses the national and local elections held in Taiwan between 
2001 and 2002. Hollis S. Liao takes a close look at the transformation of 
Mongolia’s society. He tries to give the reader a clear picture about Mongo-
lia’s opposition parties, current political issues, and national elections. Kay 
Möller analyses current international and regional approaches on how to 
prevent possible military conflicts in East Asia and projects different scenar-
ios of future relationships between the involved countries. 
 I am indebted to thank Chang Chi-ming of the Graduate Institute of 
National Development, National Taiwan University, for helping the associa-
tion to obtain financial support from the Yi Ho Foundation for Culture and 
Education (Taiwan). 
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1 
Local and National Elections in South Korea 
Heike Hermanns 
 
 
In 2002, Japan and the Republic of Korea (South Korea) jointly hosted the 
Football World Cup. The South Korean team was one of the surprises of the 
event when they became the first Asian team to reach the semi-finals in the 
history of the competition. The successful organisation of one of the largest 
sports events in the world also showed how much Korea had progressed 
economically and politically over the last few decades of the twentieth cen-
tury. This was the second major sporting event Korea had hosted; the 
Olympic Games were held in Seoul in 1988. When Seoul was chosen as the 
host city for the Olympics in 1981, South Korea was a newly industrialising 
economy governed by an authoritarian regime that had come to power in a 
military coup the previous year. By 2002, South Korea had become a de-
mocracy with regular, free elections and changes of power from ruling party 
to opposition. Furthermore, the country weathered a major economic crisis 
in 1997-98, holding on to its position among the fifteen largest economies in 
the world. 
 Since liberation from Japanese colonial rule and the division of the 
peninsula in 1945, South Korea underwent rapid socio-economic develop-
ment but also experienced political turmoil for several decades. During the 
First Republic (1948-1960), President Syngman Rhee created a soft-
authoritarian, anti-communist regime. After severe election rigging in 1960, 
student-led demonstrations forced Rhee to step down and go into exile. In 
the newly established Second Republic (1960-1961) Chang Myon was 
elected as prime minister, but factionalism and internal fighting crippled the 
government. Demonstrations and unrest continued on the streets. 
 In May 1961, a group of officers under the leadership of General Park 
Chung-hee decided that the nation’s security was endangered by the unrest 
and staged a military coup. Park eventually retired from the military and, as 
a civilian candidate, was elected president in 1963. He then launched the 
export-led industrialisation strategy that saw Korea’s dramatic rise to be-
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come the twelfth biggest economy in the world within 30 years. In 1972, 
Park tightened his regime with the so-called Yushin (‘revitalisation’) Consti-
tution, which effectively made him president for life (Fourth Republic, 
1972-1979). The head of the Korean secret service assassinated Park 
Chung-hee in October 1979. 
 With the end of Park’s authoritarian rule there were hopes for more 
democracy in South Korea. However, these were soon crushed when Gen-
eral Chun Doo-hwan overthrew the interim government in a two-stage coup 
in December 1979 and May 1980, establishing another authoritarian regime 
(Fifth Republic, 1981-1988). There were large-scale demonstrations against 
the coup in the southwestern city of Kwangju in May 1980. The uprising 
was brutally subdued by military force with substantial numbers of civilian 
casualties (between 200 acknowledged by official sources and 2000 accord-
ing to opposition sources). 
 Under Park Chung-hee the country underwent substantial socio-
economic changes: many Koreans moved from the countryside to cities for 
better education and employment opportunities. Smaller flats in cities un-
dermined the traditional larger family units living together and most Kore-
ans soon lived in nuclear families. Since the 1960s, the overall income and 
standard of living had increased greatly. Per capita income rose from US$ 
100 in 1960 to US$ 10,000 in 1995.1 With growing urbanisation, rising 
levels of education and greater availability of information, an increasing 
number of Koreans began to question the authoritarian rule and expressed 
concern about the lack of democracy in Korea. Traditionally, students and 
workers were the hotbed of opposition but gradually in the 1980s, new pres-
sure groups such as environmental organisations developed and joined the 
increasingly vocal opposition against the authoritarian regime. 
 President Chun Doo-hwan (1981-1988) was an unpopular president, 
partly due to circumstances surrounding his coup but also because of the 
lack of economic growth during his tenure. In addition to internal pressures, 
external factors also had some influence on the situation in Korea in the 
1980s. Since the mid-1970s a ‘wave of democracy’ (Huntington, 1991) had 
moved around the globe and by the mid-1980s had reached Asia’s shores. In 
the South China Sea, another of the four ‘Asian Tigers’, Taiwan, had begun 
to introduce political changes. In the Philippines, popular protest led to the 
overthrow of the Marcos regime, encouraging demonstrators in Korea. The 
events in the Philippines also exposed a change in the attitude of the United 
States toward non-democratic regimes. It sent a signal to Seoul that the 
regime could not count on American support for prolonged military rule and 
a violent settlement to end the demonstrations (as in 1980). Furthermore, 
Seoul was to stage the Asian Games in 1986 and the Olympic Games 
in1988, hoping to display to the world their new economic power (following 
the example of the Tokyo games of 1964). The government and the opposi-
tion were aware that political instability would have had a negative impact 
on this image. 
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Given these pressures Chun initiated some measures to liberalise his regime 
and sanctioned a degree of political activity by opposition politicians in 
1985. A new opposition party was founded only a month before the Na-
tional Assembly elections in 1985. Despite this, opposition parties per-
formed surprisingly well and gained over a third of the seats in the National 
Assembly. In 1986 and 1987, students and labour were the main initiators of 
further demonstrations for a democratic constitution. Under mounting public 
pressure, the government began negotiations about a new constitution fol-
lowing the end of Chun’s term in 1988. A breakthrough came in June 1987 
when Roh Tae-woo, a protégé of Chun, made a declaration accepting most 
of the opposition’s demands. Roh called for direct, fair presidential elections, 
the rehabilitation of 'political criminals' (including leading dissident Kim 
Dae-jung), the restoration of the freedom of press, the relaxation of restric-
tive labour controls and respect for the autonomy of local governments and 
universities. Negotiations between leading opposition politicians and gov-
ernment representatives started again and a new constitution was agreed 
upon in autumn 1987 (to form the Sixth Republic, from 1988). Representa-
tives of labour and students were, however, not included in the negotiations.  
 In the autumn of 1987, the opposition split into two factions, under the 
leadership of Kim Dae-jung and Kim Young-sam respectively. Each of the 
two politicians thought it was his right to stand as opposition candidate and 
both eventually formed a party of their own. Due to this split, the opposition 
lost the election to Roh Tae-woo, the third major candidate who was elected 
with only 37% of the votes in December 1987. Roh was a retired general 
who had supported the 1980 coup. His inauguration was the first peaceful, 
orderly transfer of power in the Republic’s history and placed Korea firmly 
among the new democracies of Huntington’s ‘third wave of democracy’ 
(1991). Roh’s government (1988-1993) was a transitional one, leading from 
military rule to a democratic government. Highlights of his administration 
were the successful Olympic Games of 1988 in Seoul, the admission of both 
Korean states to the United Nations in 1991 and the establishment of diplo-
matic relations with China, Russia and other former Communist countries. 
 In 1993, Kim Young-sam was inaugurated as president, the first office 
holder in over 30 years without military connections. During his presidency, 
Kim introduced measures to change the financial system to achieve more 
transparency and easier detection of corruption not only in the economy but 
also in politics and society. In order to qualify for joining the Organisation 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Kim Young-sam also 
initiated other economic reforms to lessen the influence of the government 
of economic decision-making. Moreover, Kim reduced the influence of the 
military on politics by abolishing an influential association of high-ranking 
officers. New appointments in the military leadership replaced officers asso-
ciated with the previous governments of Chun and Roh.  
 During Kim Young-sam’s presidency, Korea endured several tragedies. 
Hasty construction and lack of control by officials in the years of economic 
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boom were exposed when several buildings and bridges collapsed, killing 
hundreds of people. Numerous corruption scandals, including one implicat-
ing the president’s son and other cabinet ministers, showed that the intimate 
connection between industry and government, a legacy from authoritarian 
days, continued to influence economic decision-making. When the Asian 
financial crisis reached Korea in autumn 1997, the government reacted too 
late and inadequately. The low point of Kim Young-sam’s presidency came 
in November 1997 when the government had to ask the International Mone-
tary Fund (IMF) for a bailout package of US$ 57billion to avoid defaulting 
on foreign debts.  
 During the turmoil of late 1997, presidential elections were held and 
Kim Dae-jung, running for the fourth time, won by a small margin over the 
ruling party’s candidate Lee Hoi-chang. Accordingly, the first transfer of 
power from the ruling party to the opposition took place in February 1998, 
showing the progress of democracy in South Korea. Although many prob-
lems remained, in particular due to the lack of institutionalisation of political 
parties, South Korea was often mentioned as a positive example of a democ-
ratic transition by both general observers and scholars of democratisation.2  
 During his term Kim Dae-jung concentrated his efforts on the relation-
ship with North Korea. He pursued the so-called ‘sunshine policy’ of engag-
ing North Korea in dialogue to reduce tensions on the peninsula. These 
efforts were rewarded with a summit meeting of the two Korean leaders, 
Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-il, in Pyongyang in June 2000. This summit 
was the highpoint of Kim Dae-jung’s presidency. Kim’s popularity in South 
Korea rose to over 90% and international recognition followed later that 
year when Kim was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. However, the lack of 
real progress in the North-South dialogue in the following years and North 
Korea’s admission of the continuation of its nuclear programme in late 2002 
reduced enthusiasm for the sunshine policy among Koreans. The United 
States also took a far more reserved position regarding engagement after the 
inauguration of George W. Bush in 2001. In the following year, President 
Bush included North Korea in his ‘axis of evil’ speech, denouncing North 
Korea for its efforts to produce and export weapons of mass destruction.  
 While concentrating on inter-Korean relations Kim paid less attention to 
domestic politics. Kim failed to pursue political reforms to rid the country of 
corruption and regionalism. His success in economic policies was also che-
quered. In 1999, the economy grew by more than 7% and Korea was the 
first country to recover from the Asian Crisis, repaying the IMF loan fully in 
2001, earlier than scheduled. Kim’s reform drive lost its momentum in the 
latter part of his presidency, partly because of the quick recovery but also 
due to resistance against reforms by large companies. Recurring financial 
scandals in the following years were a reminder that problems within the 
economic system remained unsolved. The opening of Korean markets for 
more foreign investment and products, as stipulated by the IMF, was faced 
by resistance among the population and administration. After an initial surge 
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at the end of the 1990s, the number of foreign companies investing in Korea 
levelled off.  
 In December 2002, Roh Moo-hyun, a former human rights lawyer, won 
the presidential elections on a ruling party ticket. Only 56 years old at the 
time of his election, Roh promised a generation change in Korean politics, 
which was marred by many legacies from the authoritarian past. Younger 
voters hoping for more radical change in the conservative establishment 
were Roh’s main support base. During the election campaign, the presence 
of US troops in the country and a general feeling of anti-Americanism 
among the younger generation were major topics. Once elected, Roh had to 
balance these feelings with the security needs of South Korea. 
 Since the 1950s, South Korea has undergone dramatic political and 
socio-economic changes. The country developed from a war-torn, agricul-
tural economy to the twelfth biggest economy in the world, from a succes-
sion of authoritarian regimes to a democracy. However, one constant re-
mained: the national division and confrontation with North Korea. While the 
Cold War ended in Europe with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the 
stand-off continued on the Korean peninsula; a Stalinist system facing a 
capitalist and democratic country along the 38th parallel. The economic 
situation in the North deteriorated in the 1990s, when the country was 
stricken by natural disasters. With the demise of the Soviet Union and other 
Communist countries, North Korea lost its main allies and sources of sup-
port and raw materials, leading to a severe crisis in the country’s industry. 
Regardless of these problems the North pursued a programme to develop 
long-range missiles and nuclear weapons. The regime regarded this as a 
security measure to avoid an invasion by the USA. The nuclear programme 
was also used as a bargaining tool for fuel, food and the delivery of a power 
station in 1994. In late 2002, the crisis flared up again, with the USA under 
George W. Bush taking a hard-line stand. The issue remained unsolved at 
the time of writing (November 2003). Despite all the progress made in poli-
tics and economy in South Korea, the country thus remained at the centre of 
international attention for reasons beyond its direct control. 
 
The Electoral System and Elections in South Korea  
 
In December 2002, South Korea elected a president for the sixteenth time 
since the Republic’s establishment in 1948. It was the fourth round of presi-
dential elections under the constitution of the Sixth Republic. This made the 
current constitution the most enduring Korea had up to this date. Free and 
relatively fair elections at the presidential, parliamentary and local level and 
a peaceful and orderly transfer of power have become regular occurrences in 
the country since 1988. 
 While democratic procedures seemed firmly established, maturity was 
lacking in other areas of democracy such as elite behaviour, confidence in 
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the constitution and the representativeness of the electoral system. The atti-
tudes and behaviour of the political elite remained rooted in their experi-
ences under authoritarian rule and showed little changes even after a decade 
of democracy. Political parties were short-lived, personality centred and 
lacked real programmes and ideological convictions, obstructing the con-
solidation of democracy. The electoral system and district magnitude re-
mained objects of discussion, showing a lack of respect for the constitution. 
Discussions continued regarding a change in the governmental system with 
suggestions to change the balance of power from the presidency into the 
hands of a prime minister and parliament, with the president in a purely 
representational role. 
The evolution of democracy and the electoral system in Korea are the 
main reasons for these shortcomings in democratic development. This chap-
ter therefore first looks at the development of the electoral system and the 
frequent changes in the election rules for the three election types, presiden-
tial, parliamentary and local elections, over the last fifty years. Then, prob-
lems in the current electoral system are explored. These include a great 
variety in district magnitude and volatile political parties. Further interven-
ing variables are the personalistic nature of Korean parties and the preva-
lence of regionalism among Korean voters and parties. The Constitutional 
Court made several rulings regarding seat allocation and district size that 
made changes in the electoral rules prior to the 2004 parliamentary elections 
necessary. The implementation was slow and no solution decided on six 
months prior to the election date. Political parties approached these changes 
with their own short-term advantages in mind, neglecting considerations of 
institutional efficiency and endurance. A later section explains in more de-
tail the problems political parties pose for Korean democratic consolidation, 
followed by a description of the role of regionalism in South Korea.  
The second part of the chapter deals with last rounds of elections in 
each of the three tiers, beginning with the National Assembly election of 
April 2000. The run-up to the presidential elections of December 2002 over-
shadowed events in the year 2002, including the local elections, therefore 
this chapter analyses the events leading up to the presidential elections first 
and then turns to the local elections of June 2002. The chapter concludes 
with a short summary and outlook. 
 
Evolution of Election Rules and Systems 
From the foundation of the Republic of Korea in 1948 until the beginning of 
the 21st century, the country experienced six republics and nine constitu-
tional amendments. Although ruled by a succession of authoritarian regimes 
until 1987, there have been regular elections for the presidency and the 
National Assembly. These were often ineffectual and prone to vote-buying, 
bribery and government interference. Elections at the local level were less 
frequent but have become an integral a part of the Sixth Republic (1988- ). 
Until the last 1980s, elections and electoral systems were often used to se-
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cure the ruling regime’s power rather than as a means of political competi-
tion. Apart from regular voting citizens had few opportunities for political 
participation and a democratic culture had little chance to develop. This 
deficit influenced the consolidation of democracy at the end of the 20th cen-
tury. A historical overview of the development of democracy and elections 
is useful to understand this phenomenon. 
 Korea had very little experience with democracy until the foundation of 
the Republic of Korea in 1948. Traditional Korea was ruled by a royal dy-
nasty and administered by the aristocracy, the Yangban. Under Japanese 
colonial rule (1910-1945), a limited number of Koreans were granted some 
rights to vote for - quite powerless - local assemblies if they paid enough 
taxes to qualify. Neither Koreans nor Japanese in Korea had the right to vote 
for the Japanese Parliament, the Diet. In 1948, a democratic constitution 
based on the American model was introduced, granting universal suffrage to 
Koreans over 21 years of age. In contrast to other countries, there had been 
hardly any struggle for electoral franchise in Korea. As a result, no culture 
of democracy had developed in Korea prior to 1948.3 The majority of Kore-
ans did not understand the concepts of democracy, political representation 
and participation. Given the lack of experience with democracy, the confu-
sion and chaos in the following years was hardly surprising. 
 
The Presidency 
With the exception of the short-lived Second Republic (1960-1961) South 
Korea had a presidential government system. Only the First Republic (1948-
1960) also provided for the position of a vice-president. Several methods of 
election had been used, both direct elections by the population and indirect 
elections either by the National Assembly or electoral colleges. The first 
president, Syngman Rhee, was elected by the National Assembly in 1948. A 
vice-president was elected separately. In 1952, however, Rhee pressured the 
National Assembly to change the constitution so that the president (and the 
vice-president) could be elected directly. In 1954, Rhee also abolished the 
two-term limit of the presidency to allow further terms in office. In the 
presidential elections of 1960, the government manipulated the results to its 
advantage, initiating large-scale student protests. Rhee was eventually 
forced to step down and go into exile. The Second Republic adopted a par-
liamentary constitution in which the president was a symbolic figure, 
elected by a bicameral National Assembly. The power in the country rested 
with the National Assembly and Premier Chang Myon. 
 After Park Chung-hee’s military coup in 1961, the country was ruled by 
the interim ‘Supreme Council for National Reconstruction’ for two years. In 
late 1962, Park resurrected the presidency and, after resigning from the 
military, was elected in direct elections in 1963 and 1967. Like Rhee, Park 
changed the constitutional limit of two terms to stand again in the 1971 
elections. Following a narrow victory over opposition candidate Kim Dae-
jung in these elections, Park introduced a new constitution that provided for 
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indirect presidential elections by the ‘National Council for Reunification’. 
The council was comprised of approximately 2,500 members selected by 
Park who then duly elected him. After Park’s assassination in 1979, prime 
minister Choi Kyu-hah was chosen as interim president by the same method 
but he was soon ousted in General Chun Doo-hwan’s coup. Chun himself 
also used the same collegial system to take over power officially in August 
1980 but then introduced a new constitution for the Fifth Republic (1981-
1988). Under the new rules, an enlarged ‘Presidential Electoral College’ 
with about 5,000 members elected the president for a seven-year term in 
1981.  
 The governmental system was under discussion during the negotiations 
about the constitution for the Sixth Republic in 1987. Each side argued for a 
system that they considered more favourable for their own success. The 
opposition favoured a presidential system with direct elections, expecting an 
easy victory for their candidate. The ruling party supported a parliamentary 
system where coalition building would have been easier, as they feared they 
would gather fewer votes in the elections. The constitution eventually pre-
scribed a return to direct elections and a singular five-year term for the 
presidency. Ten years later, the discussion about the governmental system 
started again when Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-pil formed a coalition for 
the presidential elections in 1997. They agreed that in case of a victory by 
Kim Dae-jung, the constitution would be changed after two years to a prime 
ministerial system. Although Kim Dae-jung won, these changes were not 
followed through. Disagreements within the coalition and a lack of the nec-
essary majority in the National Assembly made change impossible. The 
discussions showed the lack of commitment by leading politicians to the 
existing constitution. In political circles the debate continued, mostly on 
how to improve the chances of electoral victory for certain candidates or 
parties.  
 Under the Korean constitution, most of the political power was vested 
in the position of the president, the executive, while the National Assembly 
had few powers to check the executive. The presidency was the highest 
prize in Korean politics and personalised political competition. In the Sixth 
Republic, the minimum age for the presidency stood at 40 years and the 
contestant had to be a resident in Korea for five consecutive years.4 A can-
didate could stand on a party ticket or as an independent. An independent 
candidate needed the support of 2,500 to 5,000 voters, with no more than 
500 living in the same city or province. Public officials had to resign at least 
90 days before the elections in order to be able to register as a candidate to 
avoid a collision of interests. 
 
The National Assembly 
Although over the decades, the National Assembly had been in a weak posi-
tion vis-à-vis the executive and often little more than window-dressing, 
there have been regular parliamentary elections with a variety of electoral 
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systems. The first elections took place in the southern half of the peninsula 
in May 1948 and led to the eventual separation of the two Korean states. In 
1948, 200 representatives were elected for four years by plurality in single-
member districts to form the first National Assembly. The election system 
was modelled on that of the United States, but with only one chamber. With 
parties still in the process of formation and consolidation, a large number of 
parties were represented (17) and independents were the largest bloc in 
parliament (85). In the following elections of the First Republic, the number 
of parties decreased but the number of independents remained relatively 
substantial (over half in 1950, more than a third in 1954).  
 In the Second Republic the voting age was lowered from 21 to 20 years. 
The constitution provided for a bicameral National Assembly. Members of 
the House of Representatives were elected every four years in single-
member districts. The members of the smaller House of Councillors, the 
‘upper chamber’, were chosen by a proportional system, where Seoul and 
each province elected two to eight members. This experiment was short-
lived, ending with the coup in 1961. In 1963, the constitution of the Third 
Republic (1963-1972) returned to a unicameral system. The size of the Na-
tional Assembly was reduced by nearly a quarter (to 175) and one third of 
the seats was allocated to national district candidates according to a propor-
tional system. The allocation system favoured the stronger parties, in par-
ticular the ruling party. In 1963 for example, the ruling party won only a 
third of the votes but was allotted half of the national seats and thus had a 
two-third majority in the Assembly. Candidates could only register by party 
nomination, thus eliminating independent representatives. Elections in the 
Third Republic were contested and the opposition managed to gain a sub-
stantial amount of seats despite government interference in the elections. In 
1972, the National Assembly was dissolved and its functions taken over by 
an emergency cabinet for a year.  
 The Fourth Republic (1972-1979) only saw two rounds of elections, in 
1973 and 1978. The electoral system was changed so that in each of the 73 
districts two members were elected. The President appointed the last third of 
representatives to fill 219 seats. Due to this scheme, the government was 
guaranteed a majority, even when the opposition gained more votes in the 
elections, as in 1978. The National Assembly had little role to play but con-
tinued to be a source of opposition. After Park’s assassination, a committee 
was set up to draft a new constitution but was cut short by another military 
coup under Chun Doo-hwan’s leadership. In the Fifth Republic, some of the 
election rules were changed again. The number of seats increased by 16% to 
276 and independents could stand again. In each constituency, two members 
were elected, and one third of the seats in the National Assembly were allo-
cated along proportional lines. 
 During the negotiations about the new election system for the National 
Assembly in 1987 and 1988, the ruling party and one of the opposition par-
ties favoured multi-member constituencies but another opposition party 
Heike Hermanns 
 
 
10
demanded a single-member system. This system promoted parties with a 
strong regional bloc, an important consideration given the regional basis of 
Korean political parties. The other two parties eventually agreed to single-
member districts. A survey found that many Koreans also preferred the 
latter system (Brady and Mo, 1992: 412). In the Sixth Republic, the system 
thus reverted to single-member constituencies. The number of legislators 
was reduced from 299 in 1988 to 273 in 2000. In 1988, one quarter of the 
seats was allocated proportionally using closed party lists (75). Their num-
ber was reduced in 1992 and again in 1996 down to 46. In order to qualify 
for proportional allocation a party had to gain either five direct seats or 5% 
of the votes nationwide. Seats were allocated in relation to the percentage of 
gained seats rather than votes, thus favouring the larger parties (Kim, Kim 
2000: 57-58). In 1996, the proportional system was changed to provide a 
more equal allocation, in line with international models. The threshold was 
lowered to 3%. In July 2001, the Constitutional Court ruled that this system 
was unconstitutional, A new system will be introduced for the 2004 elec-
tions but as of November 2003 the nature of the system was still undecided.  
 In 1988, the government found itself for the first time in a minority 
position in the National Assembly, with three opposition parties comprising 
the majority of seats. This phenomenon of a small ruling party and large 
opposition was known as yoso-yadae in Korean. The competing executive 
and legislative majorities led to administrative gridlock. Only a party merger 
of the ruling party and two other parties led to a government majority in 
1990, allowing for most government-supported legislation to pass through 
the National Assembly without difficulty. In 1998, President Kim Dae-jung 
faced a similar problem that was only solved after several months, when 
enough independents and members of other parties had joined the ruling 
party. Although the opposition Grand National Party (GNP) won more 
seats in the 2000 elections, the ruling party (Millennium Democratic Party, 
MDP) secured a majority in the parliament when it renewed its collation 
with the smaller United Liberal Democrats (ULD). Furthermore, the MDP 
attracted three members from other minority parties and an independent 
lawmaker. After by-elections in 2001, the ruling party lost the majority 
again, making the final years of Kim Dae-jung’s presidency (1998-2003) 
difficult. 
 In the Sixth Republic, the minimum age for candidacy as representative 
in the National Assembly was 25. Independent candidates needed to be 
supported by 300-500 voters. Until 2001, contenders had to deposit a sub-
stantial amount (up 20 million won in 2000 - about US$ 19,000). The de-
posit was returned if candidates received a certain number of votes, obtained 
by dividing the total number of votes by the number of candidates. This 
practice had been declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court in 
July 2001, as it prevented many citizens from registering. A new system for 
the 2004 elections was still under discussion in November 2003. Govern-
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ment officials with intentions to stand in the elections had to resign at least 
90 days in advance of election day. 
 
Local Elections 
The division of Korea into several provinces began during the Choson Dy-
nasty (1392-1910). Over the years, provinces were divided into northern and 
southern parts and the largest cities became separate administrative units. 
The administration was divided into three tiers in the municipalities and four 
in the provinces. The regional administration consisted of the provinces and 
municipalities. Below this level were cities and counties in provinces and 
districts in municipalities. In some counties, bigger cities were additionally 
divided into districts. At the lowest level were urban and rural districts, 
dealing with the day-to-day administration.  
 The First Republic provided for elected councils at the provincial level. 
Heads of the administration were to be appointed by the president but the 
Local Autonomy Act of 1949 granted the elected councils the right to dis-
miss them through a non-confidence vote. Due to the Korean War (1950-53) 
elections took place only in parts of the southern peninsula in 1952. In early 
1956, prior to the next scheduled local elections, Syngman Rhee changed 
the regulations. Rhee introduced the direct election of administrative heads, 
hoping to weaken the power of the opposition politicians in the National 
Assembly. At the same time, the councils lost their right to remove the head 
of administration through a vote of non-confidence. The term for a council 
was shortened to three years and the number of councillors and council 
meetings was reduced. Two years later, in 1958, the Local Autonomy Act 
was changed again to quell the power of local councils where a number of 
opposition politicians were active. Rhee reverted to presidential appoint-
ments that replaced direct elections of administrative heads.  
Following the overthrow of Rhee in 1960, the Second Republic intro-
duced direct elections for all local heads, down to the lowest level of urban 
and rural neighbourhoods. Elections were held in December 1960 but within 
months the whole system was abolished in the aftermath of the military 
coup. Under the Park regime local autonomy was postponed until ‘the unifi-
cation of the country’, as the constitution stated. In the Fifth Republic, local 
autonomy remained postponed until local authorities had reached some 
(unspecified) degree of financial self-reliance (Hinton, 1983: 203).  
 In 1988, a new Local Autonomy Act for the Sixth Republic was prom-
ulgated and amended several times in the following years. The Act pre-
scribed elections at two levels of subnational administration. The higher 
level comprised municipalities and provinces while the lower level included 
counties, cities and districts. In spring 1991, elections for councils at both 
levels were held. In addition, the position of governor and mayor at higher 
level and mayor and head of county or ward also became subject to direct 
elections and thus accountable to the population. Elections were scheduled 
for 1992 but postponed for three years.5 In June 1995, provincial and local 
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councils, governors, mayors and the heads of wards and counties were 
elected. The first term of full-fledged local government lasted for only three 
years until June 1998. From then on, four-year terms were scheduled, so that 
local elections were held within a two-year interval to National Assembly 
elections. Party endorsement was allowed only in elections at the higher 
level, while the lower level elections were to be non-partisan.  
 When local and regional councils were established the power structure 
of the National Assembly was repeated. The head of the administration 
(district head, mayor or governor) was in a strong position in relation to the 
councils, which had no possibility to remove the head. Although a decen-
tralisation process had been taking place, local authorities remained re-
stricted in their independence from central government. National regulations 
still influenced the number of personnel and the allocation of funds. Fur-
thermore, financial provisions for many authorities were inadequate so that 
they depended on contributions by central government. Within this frame-
work, councils had a limited scope to influence decision-making decisively. 
 Critics questioned the need for the lowest level of elections but after 
three rounds of elections in 2002, the rules were not changed. Local elec-
tions had yet to develop a role for themselves as independent institutions. 
They tended to be influenced by national politics and were regarded as a 
popularity test of the government, rather than as a ballot concerned with 
local issues and decisions. Apart from the contest for the mayoral positions 
in the big cities and role of provincial governor, campaigns were followed 
with little interest by the media and the population. 
 In the 2002 local elections, 16 posts at gubernatorial level and 232 at 
the lower level were contested, in addition to 682 council seats at the higher 
level and 3485 at the lower level. The number of seats in the councils has 
been reduced by about a quarter since 1991. Following the example of the 
National Assembly, the councils at gubernatorial level provided for candi-
dates elected by proportional lists. This number was reduced over the last 
decade; in 2002, 73 seats were allocated by proportional lists (10.7%). The 
proportional seats were allocated in accordance with the percentage of the 
vote each of the party’s candidates received. Following the above mentioned 
ruling of the Constitutional Court in July 2001, a new system was used for 
the first time in June 2002. In these elections, voters had a separate vote to 
voice their support for a party. The result determined the proportional allo-
cation of local council seats among parties that won more than five percent 
of the total votes cast in each district. But in case a single party secured the 
bulk of the vote, and all other parties won less than five percent, seats were 
still be awarded to unsuccessful parties, regardless of their qualifications. 
The extra ballot brought the number of voting slips in these elections to five, 
confusing many voters.  
 Any resident over 25 could register as candidate for local elections, 
with the provision of a deposit that ranged between 2 million won up to 50 
million won prior to 2002 (US$ 1,667-41,667). As with the parliamentary 
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elections, this deposit was paid back when a candidate reached a certain 
amount of votes, similar to National Assembly elections.6 In higher-level elec-
tions, party members needed a letter of support from their party and letters of 
recommendations with a certain number of registered voters were required for 
independent candidates. Candidates for lower level elections also needed let-
ters of recommendation. Again, public servants who planned on standing had 
to resign from their office, but with a shorter period of at least 60 days in 
advance of the election.  
 Apart from the above-mentioned elections the constitutions provided 
for referendums that were used on occasion, usually to seek approval of a 
new constitution. The constitution of the Third Republic was brought before 
the population and accepted in 1962. While the referendums in 1972 and 
1980 with a similar topic were conducted under martial law, the 1987 refer-
endum to approve the new constitution was held in without government 
interference. At local level, there was a provision for referendums to include 
citizens’ wishes in administrative decisions. 
 
Problems with the Current System 
The role of the elections is to give expression to the intentions of voters. An 
election system that communicates these intentions accurately and without 
distortion is a vital prerequisite for a democratic system. This transmission 
depends on the size of the parliament, constituencies and the ballot structure. 
The size of the Korean National Assembly fluctuated from 175 (Third Re-
public) to nearly 300 (1988-1996). In 2000, the number was reduced to 273, 
partly reflecting the general trend of downsizing in many companies at that 
time. In international comparison, this is a very small number of representa-
tives given the size of the population (see Table 1. 1). 
Table 1. 1 International comparison of constituency sizes7 
  
Population 
Number of represen-
tatives (lower house) 
Number of voters 
represented by 
one legislator 
United Kingdom 59,778,000 659 90,710 
Italy 57,715,000 630 91,612 
Taiwan 22,548,000 225 100,213 
France 59,766,000 577 130,580 
Spain 40,077,000 350 114,506 
Germany 83,252,000 603 138,062 
South Korea 48,324,000 273 177,010 
Source: CIA World Factbook 2002, at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook (July 
2003), author’s calculations 
 
It is widely agreed that plurality single-member districts are one of the most 
disproportional election systems (Lijphart, 1999).8 Korean National Assem-
bly members were elected by a simple plurality, i.e. the candidate who re-
ceived the most votes was elected. This disguised differences in the elector-
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ate's preferences and a (sometimes large) minority might feel not repre-
sented. To overcome this problem in Korea, a certain number of seats were 
allocated by proportional party lists. The number of proportional seats was, 
however, relatively low, with one quarter of the seats being the highest 
number in the early days of the Sixth Republic. Furthermore, the allocation 
system favoured the larger parties and therefore did little to change dispro-
portional representation. The Korean National Assembly was thus lacking in 
representativeness.  
The malapportionment of constituencies was also a problem for fair 
representation. The size of each district should be determined by an equal 
proportion of the population in each district in relation to the total national 
population. The ratio of the largest district size to the average shows the 
representativeness and proportionality of the system. Malapportioned dis-
tricts in a single-member districts lead to significantly unequal voting popu-
lations. Korea had rapidly urbanised over the last decades of the 20th century, 
but the electoral districts had changed little, thus leading to substantially 
unequal voting populations. Under authoritarian regimes, rural areas were 
far more likely to vote for the government while urban areas favoured the 
opposition. For this reason, the government used to neglect the re-zoning of 
constituencies (gerrymandering). In the mid-1990s, one particular constitu-
ency was more than five times the size of the national average. In the 1996 
elections, over 20% of districts seats were allocated in a way violating the 
‘one person, one vote’ rule, placing South Korea second in a comparative 
study about the malapportionment worldwide (Samuels and Snyder, 2001: 
659; Table 1. 2). 
Table 1. 2 Lower Chamber Malapportionment 
 % of seats malapportioned 
South Korea (1996) 20.75 
Tanzania 29.19 
Ecuador 20.4 
France 6.95 
Japan 4.62 
United Kingdom 4.56 
Germany 3.44 
United States 1.44 
Netherlands 0 
Source: Data adapted from Samuels and Snyder, 2001: 661 
 
A few weeks before the 2000 National Assembly Elections, a law was 
passed to reduce the number of constituencies by nearly ten percent. The 
changes in constituencies affected mostly rural areas where the number of 
voters had declined. Despite this belated and hastily designed move, the 
difference in district sizes remained considerable: in Seoul one legislator 
represented over 228,000 voters, while in Cholla-namdo it was only 165,000 
(Kang, 2002: 95). Since then, the Constitutional Court ruled that this ratio 
Local and National Elections in South Korea 
 
 
15 
had to be reduced a maximum ratio of three times the national average. 
Further changes in district magnitude were discussed since 2000 but at the 
time of writing (November 2003) it seemed likely that another last-minute 
compromise would be negotiated in early 2004. 
 The negative effects of relatively few and disproportionate constituen-
cies were exemplified by the differences in the percentage of a party’s vote 
to the party’s seats. This was re-enforced by the election system: a plurality 
system in single majority constituencies favours the strongest party. It also 
manufactures a majority for the strongest party. In countries with a system 
of proportional representation, the percentage of disproportionality was 
comparatively lower (Lijphart, 1999: 163). In Korea in 2000, the largest 
party (GNP) won 39% of the votes, but nearly 49% of the parliamentary 
seats while the second largest party (MDP) won 36% of the votes and 42% 
of the seats. Although a percentage of parliamentary seats (17%) were allo-
cated by proportional lists, this was not enough to correct the negative influ-
ence of the election system. In addition, as mentioned before, the allocation 
system favoured larger parties and was declared unconstitutional by the 
Constitutional Court in 2001. To alleviate this problem, a new system was 
trialled in the local elections in the following year whereby voters had an 
extra, separate vote to express their preference for a party. This did not, 
however, address the wider problems with the election system. 
 International studies show that plurality systems tend to favour the 
evolution of two strong parties (Lijphart, 1999: 165; Duverger, 1964: 217). 
In single member constituencies smaller parties experience difficulties in 
winning seats, hence leading to a concentration in the party spectrum. In the 
case of the Sixth Republic of Korea, most National Assembly and presiden-
tial elections usually had three larger parties that gained a larger share of the 
votes and several smaller parties that competed unsuccessfully. While there 
were four successful parties in 1988, the number declined to three in the 
following parliaments. The spatial distribution of electoral support was 
responsible for the persistence of a smaller, third party under a plurality rule 
in Korea. Lacking an ideological and programmatic stance, political parties 
relied on regionalism as distinguishing feature during the 1990s, based on 
the home region of the respective party leader. Three regions formed the 
bases for regional parties, Honam in the southwest, Yongnam in the south-
east and lastly, the Chungch’ong provinces in central Korea. 
 
Political Parties 
 
Political parties remained the Achilles’ heel of Korean politics during the 
first decade of the Sixth Republic. In a democracy, political parties ideally 
serve as the central organisational connection between the state and society 
and the representation and mobilisation of citizens. Furthermore, parties 
play a central role on policy formulation and interest aggregation. Under the 
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authoritarian regimes, Korean parties had little chance to fulfil these roles. 
Until the 1980s, elections were semi-competitive. Opposition candidates 
competed in the elections but the election system was designed to provide a 
majority for the ruling regime, with two-member seats and the proportional 
allocation seats favouring the strongest party (see above).  Following the 
establishment of the Sixth Republic, political parties showed little sign of 
change toward the role expected in a democratic system but continued to 
perpetuate the attitudes and behavioural patterns used under authoritarian 
rule. The political party system survived the democratic changes almost 
intact and remained personality-orientated, regionally based and lacking in 
an ideological or programmatic basis. Korean parties thus failed to fulfil 
their role in democratic consolidation in an appropriate manner.  
 The fluidity of the party system obstructed its institutionalisation. Insti-
tutionalisation has been described as the ‘process by which organizations 
and procedures acquire value and stability’ (Huntington, 1968: 12). In order 
to institutionalise, a party has to develop an identity beyond that of its leader 
and survive a change in leadership so that the organisation is set apart from 
its momentary leaders (Janda, 1980: 19). Furthermore, it needs a structure to 
deal with inner-party conflict.9 Korean parties showed deficiencies in all 
these prerequisites throughout the history of the Republic of Korea.  
When democracy was introduced to Korea in 1948, there was little ex-
perience with democratic procedures. Under Japanese rule, no political 
parties or groups could be formed, although some Communist groups had 
been formed in exile. Korea lacked the experience of party development that 
western democracies had gone through. Apart from school groups, there was 
no tradition of associations, no professional groups and no religious or class 
cleavages strong enough to serve as a basis for party formation, as they did 
in western societies. In South Korea from 1948 onwards, many parties were 
created around a charismatic personality to serve as their personal support 
base.10 Until 2003, all ruling parties were centred on the President and did 
not survive the end of his rule. The MDP was the first party to survive a 
change in power at the presidency but factional fighting and discussion 
about a realignment continued over several months after the elections, partly 
due to President Roh Moo-hyun’s weak support base within the party. In 
September 2003, a faction of Roh-supporters left the MDP and created their 
own party, the Uridang (‘our party’). 
Under authoritarian rule, politics had become a zero-sum game, where 
the opposition faced the government as one bloc. Once this uniting factor 
disappeared the opposition broke up into several factions (most visibly in 
1987 when both Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung stood as presidential 
candidates, thereby allowing Roh Tae-woo to win). The factions could eas-
ily break away from one party to form a new party or merge with another. 
Parties split over personalities rather than principle. This lack of coherence 
within parties was also an indicator for the lack of institutionalised parties in 
Korea (Janda, 1980: 154). Another sign of the lack of institutionalisation 
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was the number of independents elected to the National Assembly. From 
1988 onwards, the number of independent candidates elected to the National 
Assembly remained stable at about ten percent, rather than showing a de-
crease, as could be expected in a consolidating democracy. Some of the 
representatives without a party membership, however, often joined a party 
group after the elections, usually the ruling party.11 
 During the 1990s, political parties were not consolidating at the same 
pace as other democratic institutions. A large number of parties have been in 
existence but many failed to become permanent and relevant. Between 1981 
and 2002, 19 parties reached more than 3% in elections.12 On average, the 
lifespan of a party in the Sixth Republic stood at just under 39 months.13 
The group of political actors remained relatively stable since parties often 
did not dissolve but changed their name and/or merged with other parties.14 
Both Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung, for example, were members in 
ten or more political parties in their political careers spanning five decades. 
The cycle of party creations, dissolutions and realignments seemed to slow 
down in the late 1990s. At the time of the presidential elections in 2002, two 
parties had survived long enough to participate in more than one round of 
National Assembly and presidential elections respectively. The oldest party 
was Kim Jong-pil’s United Liberal Democrats (ULD), founded in 1995. The 
Grand National Party (GNP) was formed in 1997, to mark a break from the 
New Korea Party’s (NKP) previous leader Kim Young-sam. At the time of 
writing in November 2003, it seemed likely that a new round of realign-
ments would take place before the parliamentary elections in 2004, as all the 
parties were riddled with factional fighting.  
Given the low party cohesion in Korea, election campaigns in single 
member constituencies tended to become personalised, with the individual 
being more important than party affiliation. Voters were more likely to 
identify with their representative rather than with a party. Korean elections 
were in this respect closer to American primaries than European parliamen-
tary elections.15 The lack of support from the party centre in terms of fi-
nance and personnel also reinforced personalised campaigns. Furthermore, 
media coverage neglected party platforms and concentrated on candidates’ 
personalities and their personal programmes, reducing the role of political 
parties in election outcomes. This trend towards personality orientation in 
election decisions was confirmed by surveys among Korean voters; in 1992 
for example, 42% of Koreans claimed that they chose candidates solely on 
basis of personal character rather than party affiliation or policy commit-
ments (Shin, 1999: 188).  
 In the late 1990s, most Korean parties were mainly ‘caucus parties’, 
serving as election vehicles but being largely invisible at other times and 
failing to recruit active members.16 The traditionally centralised and hierar-
chical structure of Korean society encouraged the development of personal-
ised parties. Generally, personalistic leaders could contribute at the initial 
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stages of party formation but they seriously inhibited party institutionalisa-
tion in the longer run. The development of independent party organisations 
and branches was neglected, not the least because this diminished the power 
of the party leader. Inner-party democracy was virtually non-existent. Par-
ties served as little more than a procedural device to formalise candidates for 
elections, in particular for the presidency. Party leaders exerted one-man 
control over party affairs and were influential in selecting candidates for the 
parliamentary and local elections. Local branches had little say and often 
saw candidates parachuted in to campaign there, using their own support 
teams. Places on the proportional lists in parliamentary elections were allo-
cated by personal preference or in accordance to the donations given to the 
party. At the lower level of local government, candidates were required to 
stand without a party affiliation, further hampering the development of local 
party bases. 
 As a result of weak party structures, the existing local party branches 
were thus usually little more than personal support organisations for repre-
sentatives. Local branches were often staffed by friends and relatives rather 
than party members. In times of economic hardship (as in 1997), local 
branches were the first to be closed when a reduction in party expenditure was 
needed. In 2003, a reform proposal suggested the closure of all local branches 
to avoid corruption. The lack of a membership base created a problem for 
party finances. Until the late 1980s, big conglomerates supported political 
parties with their ‘contributions’ that were often regarded as ‘quasi-taxes’ 
since non-payment would have negative effects for the respective company 
(see also Park, 1995: 178). The money from industry became less in the 
1990s but the larger part still flowed to the ruling party. In 2000, the ruling 
MDP received 70% of the contributions by industry (Choi, 2002: 107). In 
the Sixth Republic, a government agency, Central Election Management 
Commission, allocated financial assistance to political parties in accordance 
to the number of seats in the National Assembly. This became an increas-
ingly important source for party finance (see also Park, 1995). Lastly, par-
ties relied on their elite members for financial contributions. The higher the 
rank within the party hierarchy, the higher was the expected contribution.17  
 Some parties tried to increase the input of party members in order to 
overcome the lack of inner-party democracy. Formal selection processes for 
candidates were introduced, given local chapters more influence. The ruling 
MDP instigated a primary-style selection process for its presidential candi-
date in 2002. This involved not only party members but also members of the 
public, thus reducing the role of rank-and-file members. In a second round 
of selections, as described in detail later, the party used the results of two 
telephone polls, rather than deciding within the party. This showed the im-
portant role that polls had come to play in Korean politics. As a result of 
increasing reliance on poll results, populism among politicians increased.  
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Regionalism 
 
From the early days of the Republic, the ideological spectrum of Korean 
parties was conservative and orientated to the right. The American military 
government started a policy of persecuting ‘communists and socialists’, a 
policy that intensified in the First Republic, in particular after the Korean 
War. Even slightly ‘leftist’ or progressive ideas were outlawed. The Na-
tional Security Law restricted the range of possible political advocacy in the 
name of ‘national security’ and was often used to subdue unwanted opposi-
tion. Due to these restrictions, an ideologically and programmatically plural-
ized party system did not develop in South Korea. Most parties had a con-
servative outlook but little more to offer in terms of political programme. 
The names of the numerous parties over the years usually were variations 
involving ‘democratic’, ‘liberal’ and ‘Korea’ in their name. In the Sixth 
Republic, more radical parties have been formed, in particular after 1998 
with the abolishment of the law that banned unions from political activities. 
More radical parties, however, failed to gain a lager share of voters’ support. 
In the local elections of 2002, the Democratic Labour Party (DLP) for the 
first time had an impact when it gained 8% of the national vote and came 
close to winning the position of mayor in the southeastern industrial city of 
Ulsan.18 In times when both the number of industrial workers and the un-
ionisation rate are falling, it remains to be seen whether the DLP can estab-
lish a permanent presence in the Korean political landscape.19 
 With little ideological diversity, parties had to rely on other identifiers 
and regionalism became the most observable. Regional interests became 
personified in charismatic leaders, although parties claimed to represent the 
whole country. 20  The regionalist feelings built on emotional identities, 
prejudice, historical grievances and uneven economic development. There 
have been regional differences throughout the cultural and social history of 
Korea but only in modern history have they played a role in politics. The 
division can be traced back to the era of the Three Kingdoms (57BC-668AD) 
when the kingdom of Paekche was established in the southeastern part and 
the Shilla-kingdom in the southwestern corner of the peninsula. This ex-
tended to the division of the Honam-area (the Cholla-provinces and 
Kwangju in the southwest) and the Yongnam-area (the Kyongsang-
provinces, Pusan, Taegu and Ulsan in the southeast). Since the 1960s, the 
two regions developed along different trajectories. President Park Chung-
hee showed a clear preference in terms of administrative appointments and 
economic development projects for his home province in the southeast, 
while Honam remained a largely agricultural region.21 From 1960 to 2000, 
Honam lost about 12% of its population while Yongnam’s population in-
creased by nearly 63%.22 Yongnam produced nearly 27% of the national Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), Honam just under 10% in 2001, again showing the 
lower level of industrial development in the southwest. 23 
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Regionalism as the focal point in elections was first used in the 1971 presi-
dential elections when Kim Dae-jung, based in Honam, challenged Presi-
dent Park Chung-hee who hailed from Yongnam. Honam already had the 
reputation as a hotbed of opposition, exemplified by the candidacy of Kim 
Dae-jung. Regional conflicts were thus overshadowed by the confrontation 
of government and opposition. The policy of preferential treatment for 
Yongnam was continued in the Fifth Republic and into the Sixth Republic 
with the presidencies of Chun, Roh and Kim Young-sam who also hailed 
from Yongnam. Kim Dae-jung was the first president from Honam, bearing 
great expectations of his party and home region. He promised a policy of 
regional reconciliation and appointed more government members from his 
home region. While Honam saw this as a just move, many in Yongnam 
claimed that the government was showing regional preferences despite 
claiming the opposite (Korea Times, 27.09.2000). The conflict was not 
resolved during Kim’s presidency and regionalism continued to play an 
important role in the next round of presidential elections in 2002. 
 Since 1988, political parties orientated themselves along these regional 
lines, with a third party representing central Korea (the Chungch’ong prov-
inces). Voters in Seoul and the surrounding areas (Inch’on and Kyonggi 
Province), often recent migrants to the area, voted along the lines of their 
regional origin. The results of the last elections all fell into this pattern. In 
2002, for example, the western half of the peninsula voted in majority for 
the MDP’s Roh Moo-hyun while the eastern half voted for the GNP’s Lee 
Hoi-chang (see Figure 1).  
Although Yongnam’s share of the population is larger than Honam’s, it 
was not large enough to provide a locally based party a majority of votes in 
national elections. Voters in Seoul and Kyonggi Province usually cast the 
deciding votes in presidential elections since 1987. In the four rounds of 
presidential elections of the Sixth Republic, there were three main candi-
dates and several outsiders. Given the higher number of candidates around 
40% of the votes or even less were enough for electoral victory. Coalition 
agreements proved to be useful to accumulate enough votes for one candi-
date. Kim Young-sam was elected after his party merged with two others in 
1990, resulting in a large ruling party that gave Kim electoral success. In 
1997, Kim Dae-jung was victorious after forming a coalition with the con-
servative ULD, based in central Korea. The ULD was led by Kim Jong-pil, 
who was a co-conspirator of the 1961-coup and later prime minister and 
head of the Korean secret service under Park Chung-hee. This coalition of 
two former adversaries could only be explained by considerations of power 
and the chances of winning the elections. In the run-up to the 2002 elections, 
the ruling party again formed a coalition with another contender (see below) 
and was successful. In the National Assembly elections of 1992 and 1996, 
the then ruling GNP from Yongnam came close to an overall majority with 
over 48%. The ruling party was able to build a majority in the National 
Assembly by enticing independents and some opposition politicians to join 
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their party. In 2000, the MDP from Honam achieved a majority of seats in 
the National Assembly by a coalition with the ULD and in addition by at-
tracting independents and members of other parties. 
Figure 1. 1 Election Results in Yongnam and Honam, 2000-2002 
Yongnam                                  Honam
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
NA local pres NA local pres
others
MDP
GNP
NA= National Assembly elections in April 2000, local= local elections in June 2002, pres= 
presidential elections in December 2002. 
Source: National Election Commission, www.nec.go.kr, various pages and access dates. 
 
A majority in the National Assembly was important for the ruling party so 
that the executive could pass legislation and appointments easily. In the 
framework of the Korean constitution, the executive was endowed with far 
more power than the legislative, a phenomenon sometimes referred to as 
‘imperial presidency’. As members of the ruling party would unreservedly 
support legislation from the executive, a legislative majority allowed the 
government to pass legislation without much debate. The opposition often 
resorted to demonstrations outside the National Assembly to show its disap-
proval of policies. The deadlock was usually solved by a meeting of the 
president with the opposition leader. 
 The National Assembly had not developed a culture of negotiation and 
compromise necessary for a consolidated democracy. Parliamentary culture 
also lacked communication, co-operation and constructive engagement. 
Political parties tried to improve their profile by taking a clearly outlined 
position rather than seeking a workable compromise. In times of a yoso-
yadae situation, the opposition used its majority to block government legis-
lation and the appointment of important governmental positions. In 1998, it 
took six months before the Prime Minister was accepted by the National 
Assembly, while in 2002 two candidates for the Premier’s post failed to be 
accepted in National Assembly hearings, showing the power of opposition 
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barriers. Under authoritarian regimes, the ruling government passed legisla-
tion several times when the opposition was absent from the National As-
sembly. Democratic presidents have also resorted to this method to pass 
controversial legislation, much to the anger of the respective opposition 
parties and civil groups. Kim Young-sam in January 1996 and Kim Dae-
jung in 1999 both showed their lack of respect for the National Assembly 
when they resorted to this method to push through unpopular legislation.24  
 In the Sixth Republic, changes in party affiliation of representatives 
were frequent occurrences and were a result of the lack of institutionalised 
political parties. For the individual politician personal considerations could 
be more important than party membership. A good example was Rhee In-je, 
once a labour minister under Kim Young-sam and member of the NKP. 
When he failed to win the party’s presidential nomination race for the (by 
then renamed) GNP, Rhee established a new body, the New People’s Party, 
to support his bid in the 1997 presidential election. Following his defeat, 
Rhee and his party joined the new ruling party (MDP), but in December 
2002 he left this party and joined forces with the ULD, based in Rhee’s 
home region of Chungch’ong. On occasion more than personal ambition 
played a role in the change of affiliation. The methods used by parties to 
entice a change to the opposite faction were sometimes controversial. The 
ruling party (whether the GNP or MDP) resorted to using the threat of a 
persecution by the National Election Commission (NEC) or the tax authori-
ties to ensure a change. Once the politician had changed sides, the charges 
were quietly dropped (Kim, 2000: 895).   
 The NEC was founded in 1962 to organise and oversee electoral cam-
paigns, elections and vote counting. The NEC was an independent constitu-
tional agency with several thousand sub-national commissions. As election 
legislation was tightened, the NEC played an increasingly important role in 
guaranteeing free and fair elections that remained within a certain financial 
framework. In order to control campaign-spending candidates had to submit 
their financial details to the NEC at the time of their registration and their 
expenses claims after the elections. Furthermore, the NEC also began to 
disclose personal information including criminal records and tax payment 
over the last three years.  
 Since the 1970s, elections in Korea had become very capital-intensive. 
Campaign costs spiraled during the Sixth Republic, despite legislation to 
limit spending. While vote buying was prevalent in the 1970s and early 
1980s, in the Sixth Republic methods were somewhat subtler when votes 
were attracted by free drinks, gifts or other types of entertainment. In 2000, 
a widespread assumption concluded that at least 3 billion won (US$ 2.5 
million) were necessary to win a seat in the National Assembly while 2 
billion (US$ 1.67 million) would be insufficient to assure election victory 
(Pai, 2000: 65). According to official data from the NEC, successful candi-
dates spent on average 86.6 million won (US$ 72,167).25 In 2000, about 
30% of successful candidates were suspected of election fraud but only a 
Local and National Elections in South Korea 
 
 
23 
small number actually lost their seats after the NEC brought their case to the 
courts.  
 Several measures were undertaken to curb the rising cost of election 
campaigns. This included the reduction of the campaign period to 15 days. 
Furthermore, a limit on the number of outdoor rallies (where attendees were 
often paid) was introduced and to some degree replaced by television de-
bates. Moreover, the number of aides and volunteers and the financial retri-
butions they received were limited, but the system remained open to fraud. 
In addition, TV-appearances encouraged the personalisation of the cam-
paign, neglecting party representation over parties. This method was quite 
successful in presidential elections but in parliamentary elections the useful-
ness was restricted, as only the leaders of the big parties had a chance to 
participate.  
 
Political Effects of Historical Experience 
 
Democracies depend on widespread and continuous support from their citi-
zens. This support is crucial for the legitimacy and effective performance of 
a democratic system. In Korea, the historical experience with elections and 
their changing rules had severe effects on the Sixth Republic. Until the 
1980s, elections were largely staged to confirm the ruling regime. The gov-
ernment often interfered in the election process to guarantee its victory. 
Voters as a result were disillusioned, showed little interest in elections and 
did not feel that their involvement made any difference. In the Sixth Repub-
lic expectations for the new election system therefore were high, as was 
voter turnout. The increasing costs of election campaigns, corruption, bro-
ken promises and continued reports of election irregularities led to the disil-
lusionment of many citizens who turned their back on politics and elections 
(figure 2). In some by-elections, voter turnout fell below 30%. The Korean 
government is planning to introduce e-voting in elections from 2005 to 
entice more citizens to vote, despite doubts about the security and reliability 
of the new technologies involved in e-voting. 
In a consolidating democracy, citizens should support a democratic sys-
tem not only as a theoretical construct but also a working democracy with 
its possible failures and shortcomings. In the Korea Barometer surveys, 
political scientist Shin Doh-Chull measured the attitudes and feelings of 
Koreans concerning democracy since 1988. During this period, the overall 
commitment to democratic ideals remained high but the number of support-
ers had fallen, especially since the economic crisis of 1997. While in 1996 
70% of Korean considered ‘democracy always preferable to any other kind 
of government’, the number dropped steadily to 45% in 2001 (Shin et al, 
2002: 17). This showed that Koreans have problems distinguishing between 
the legitimacy of democratic institutions from the performance of the gov-
ernment itself (ibid: 24). 
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Figure 1. 2 Voter Turnout in Elections since 1987 
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Under the Confucian rules of the Choson Dynasty (1392-1910), the king 
was a moral leader, ruling by virtue not laws. By the same token, modern 
Koreans expected politicians to be virtuous in their personal life and charac-
ter. With politicians under scrutiny, numerous issues of contention occurred, 
including corruption cases, illegally acquired funds, changes in party affilia-
tion and questions regarding dual citizenship.26 In 2002, three quarters of 
Koreans saw corrupt political leaders as the top national problem, a far more 
important problem than moral decline and poor drinking water (38% respec-
tively; PEW, 2002: 32). Many Koreans engage in some sort of corrupt be-
haviour, such as handing over envelopes with money to teachers so that 
their children receive proper attention and care, but they expect their leaders 
to act morally (Helgesen, 2002: 82). Given the frequency of scandals, trust 
in political institutions was low; in 1997, only 20% of Koreans trusted poli-
ticians while 47% showed little trust and 32% did not trust them at all (Shin, 
2000: 8). The National Assembly did not fare much better in the same sur-
vey: 22% of Koreans had some trust in parliament, 45% expressed not much 
trust and 32% had no trust at all in the National Assembly (ibid). 
 The lack of trust in political institutions is explained by the lack of 
reform among the political class since the introduction of the democratic 
constitution in 1988. Politicians continue to adhere to informal rules estab-
lished under authoritarian rules. These include the creation of parties as 
personal power bases and the perception of politics as a zero-sum game for 
power with no room for compromise. The constitution has remained open to 
discussion as it suits the needs of politicians, including the fundamental 
question of a presidential or prime ministerial governmental system. Follow-
ing the long tradition started by Syngman Rhee, Korean politicians use 
changes in the election system mainly to their own advantage. The discus-
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sion about possible changes is not led by objective criteria such as institu-
tional efficiency and inclusiveness but by self-serving interests, i.e. politi-
cians’ and parties’ chances under the new system. A typical example is the 
changes in the size of the National Assembly and constituency in early 
2000 – both were last-minute compromises that were not thought through 
but needed further adjustment in the future. The same is expected to happen 
again in early 2004 – a hastily constructed set of laws to accommodate the 
rulings of the Constitutional Court with regard to electoral district size and 
proportional allocation but no long-term changes in the set-up of the elec-
tion system. 
 An essential component of a democracy is a party system featuring free 
competition among multiple parties. Survey findings showed, however, that 
a substantial number of Koreans still needed to be convinced of the advan-
tages of political competition. In 1993, just over half of the population fa-
voured a competitive multi-party system while 15% thought no or only one 
party would be sufficient (Shin, 1999: 171). Due to the short lifespan of 
political party Koreans developed little sense of attachment to a party. At 
grass-root level, parties remained virtually invisible, as parties made few 
efforts to support the establishment of offices and branches at lower levels. 
The frequent name changes did not encourage party identification, so that 
only one in three Koreans identified with a political party in 1995 (Shin, 1995: 
33). Political parties in Korea clearly had to change their behaviour to support 
the deepening of democracy in the country. 
 The importance of personalities in politics increased during the Sixth 
Republic. Asked about factors affecting the vote in National Assembly 
elections, there was a relatively even spread in 1988, with 30.2% of Koreans 
saying personality was important, while 31.8% put political parties first and 
24.4% policies. In 2000, the importance of personality was most significant 
for 59.3%, but the importance of party identification and policy issues fell to 
22.7% and 6.2% respectively.27 As a candidate’s personality became more 
important to the voters, contestants used campaigns to advertise the negative 
points of their opponents rather than expounding upon their own pro-
grammes and policies.  
Since political parties did not fulfil their role in transmitting citizens’ 
preferences and interests, other ways of gauging public opinion had to be 
found. Public opinion polls have played an increasing role since the mid-
1990s. The media frequently published polls on a large variety of topics. 
Politicians used poll results to formulate public policy to the point where 
polls began to lead public opinion. In 2002, the candidate of the ruling party 
for the presidential elections was ultimately decided on the results of two 
telephone polls after a television debate. No party support was needed for 
this. 
 The increasing role of civil groups in Korean politics was another con-
sequence of the underdeveloped functionality of political parties. Civil soci-
ety in Korea underwent a dramatic change since the 1980s. During the 
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1970s and early 1980s, most activity was confrontational, anti-government 
and pro-democratisation. These groups were mostly based in the working 
class. With the transition to democracy, the number of civic groups in-
creased rapidly as did their diversity and scope. Civil society groups cover 
all important areas of political, economic, social and cultural issues. At the 
same time, the middle-class began to dominate civil society. The new 
groups were more co-operational and aimed at reforming state policies and 
consolidating democracy. By 2003, there were well over 4,000 civil groups, 
a steep increase from 1987. The vast majority of environmental and human 
rights organisations were founded after 1987 (Han, 1997: 92). 
 The rapid quantitative expansion and qualitative transformation of civil 
groups was not without problems. Many groups were founded by intellectu-
als based in Seoul and had a small membership base. The majority of civil 
groups had less than 500 members, few local branches and only a small 
number of members of staff. Only the biggest groups made a conscious 
effort to establish a broad network of local branches. In the early 21st cen-
tury, the combined membership in civil groups was estimated at about 1.5 
million but only half of them were active duty-paying members (Moon, 
2002: 493). Groups rooted in traditional values, in particular fraternal asso-
ciations were popular among Koreans, with nearly two thirds being a mem-
ber in one on 1994. Membership rates in modern types of civic association 
such as social, cultural or economic groups, however, failed to reach ten 
percent (Shin, 1999: 107-108). Most Koreans remained passive and left 
activities in social movements to a handful of campaigners. In 1997, over 
80% of Koreans had never participated in voluntary services (NSO, 1997: 467). 
Korean citizens have not yet grasped the importance of participation in politics 
and society for the deepening of democracy in their country. 
Given the low membership numbers the financial base of many groups 
tends to be weak. Membership fees covered only some of the costs running 
a civil group and, although many of the highly motivated and often well-
educated staff work for little remuneration, most groups have to look for 
other sources of income, including financial contributions from businesses. 
Subsidies by the Korean government were introduced in 1998, but remain 
much lower than in other countries and reach only a limited number of or-
ganisations (Yeom, 2003: 10). In their lack of broad membership bases and 
financial support civil groups are actually comparable to political parties.  
Given the inability of political parties to generate clean politics and a 
generational change civil groups intervened in the 2000 National Assembly 
elections and published a list of candidates who, for a variety of reasons, 
were considered unsuitable as representatives. The results of this interven-
tion are described below.  
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The 2000 National Assembly Elections 
 
The 2000 National Assembly elections were seen as a mid-term assessment 
of the Kim Dae-jung administration, its reform drive and its policies regard-
ing North Korea. The voter turnout of 57.2%, the lowest in the history of 
parliamentary elections in Korea, was a sign of voter apathy and dissatisfac-
tion with the current system, corruption, frequent scandals and inter-party-
bickering. The ruling MDP suffered a setback and did not win a majority in 
the National Assembly. The opposition GNP gained 39% of the votes and 
133 of the seats, four shy of a majority; the ruling MDP 35.9% and 115 
seats. Compared to the previous parliament, both parties gained more votes, 
at the expense of the minor coalition partner ULD. This party only achieved 
9.8% of the votes and 17 seats and performed poorly in its traditional home 
region of Ch’ungch’ong. The ULD thus initially failed to reach the neces-
sary 20 seats to form a parliamentary negotiating group. Regionalism again 
played a major role in the elections. The GNP won all seats in Yongnam, 
bar one that went to an independent (64 out of 65 seats). Similarly, the GNP 
did not gain any seats in Honam, where the MDP gained 25 out of 29 possi-
ble seats. The four independent parliamentarians from Honam later joined 
the MDP.  
 In order to gain a majority of seats in the National Assembly, the MDP 
had to renew its coalition with the ULD. In addition, they enticed several 
independents and members of other parties to join the ruling camp. The 
position of the ULD was strengthened when four members of the MDP 
joined the ULD ‘per forma’ to allow the party to form a parliamentary nego-
tiating group. In protest of these manoeuvres the GNP brought all work in 
the National Assembly to a standstill for four months. The ruling-party 
majority was lost again when the GNP was successful in several by-
elections in the following year. 
 The election brought changes to the National Assembly; newcomers 
took up more than 46% of the seats, while nearly half of the incumbents 
who stood again lost their constituencies. The MDP brought in more new 
representatives than the opposition GNP. Women nearly doubled their share 
from three percent to 5.86% and their success rate as direct candidates in-
creased from 9% to 15%. A small group of candidates in their thirties was 
successful, representing the so-called 386-generation (those in their thirties, 
who attended university in the 1980s and were born in the 1960s). It was 
hoped that they would bring a fresh approach to the National Assembly but 
this small group could not bring lasting changes to Korean politics within 
their first few years in parliament.28 In several constituencies, the elections 
were a very close race; in nine cases a margin of less than 350 votes was 
decisive, and in a further six less than a thousand. The ruling party had tried 
to recruit leading members of civil groups to broaden their appeal. Kim 
Dae-jung appointed several leaders of civic groups as ministers and gov-
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ernmental advisers. 29  While some accepted the offer, most civil groups saw 
this as an intrusion into their work and criticized the converts.  
 During the election campaign the ruling party’s North Korea policy was 
contested. While Kim Dae-jung promoted his sunshine policy of engage-
ment, the opposition decried it as ‘sell-out’ and appeasement. It promised a 
much harder stance towards the northern regime. Six days before the elec-
tion date in April, the Korean government announced the date for a summit 
meeting in Pyongyang where President Kim Dae-jung was to meet the 
North Korean ‘Dear Leader’, Kim Jong-il. The opposition criticised this 
announcement as timed to influence the election results, claiming that the 
ruling party was ‘abusing a national issue to better its pressing situation’ 
(Korea Herald, 11 April 2000). The move was seen as an attempt to attract 
votes from citizens with family ties to the North. In 2003, it emerged that a 
group of the Hyundai conglomerate had remitted a large sum to the regime 
in Pyongyang prior to the announcement, a move the opposition was soon to 
condemn as an arrangement by the government in return for an agreement 
about the summit and better election results.  
The most noteworthy event of the elections was, however, the increased 
role of civic groups in the elections. In the run-up to the elections, 475 civic 
groups united to observe the elections and report irregularities. This group, 
established in January 2000, called itself Citizens’ Alliance for the 2000 
General Elections’ (CAGE, Ch’ongson yondae). Prior to the nomination 
sessions of the main parties, CAGE drew up a list of over 300 politicians 
they judged inappropriate as candidates. These politicians were considered 
‘tainted’ because they had been in prison, convicted of offences against the 
election law or other criminal offences, suspected of corruption, evasion of 
conscription, or collaboration with previous authoritarian regimes. The most 
prominent name on the list was Kim Jong-pil, leader of the ULD, for his 
connections with the 1961 coup and the Park Chung-hee regime. This list 
was published on the Internet first and reproduced later in newspapers. 
Other civic groups also published negative lists. This negative campaign 
proved to be quite successful, in many cases listed individuals were not 
nominated. Out of the 86 candidates who stood for office despite being 
blacklisted, only 27 were elected. In Seoul and the surrounding area, only 
one candidate overcame the stigma of being blacklisted but in Yongnam 
voters were more forgiving and voted for these candidates despite their past. 
Regionalism thus limited the success of the campaign. The black list cam-
paign was criticised for being negative rather than contributing to political 
change positively. Eventually, it was also declared unconstitutional by the 
courts. The campaign was, however, very popular among younger voters. It 
showed the power of civil society and its determination to reform politics, 
even against the will of political parties.  
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The 2002 Presidential Elections 
 
The preparations for the presidential elections in December 2002 began in 
the previous spring with the nomination races in the large parties. The GNP 
held a closed party conference to select its candidate. The ruling MDP at-
tempted to make the process more open and democratic and introduced a 
system comparable to primaries in the USA. In spring 2002 they invited 
70.000 participants to their nomination contest. Party members made up one 
half of the participants while the rest were randomly selected citizens. This 
move showed the importance party leaders gave public opinion, giving their 
party members only limited influence on the results. The surprise winner 
was Roh Moo-hyun (56), a poor farmer’s son from southeast Korea without 
a large support-base in the party. After teaching himself law at night to pass 
the bar exam, Roh gained a reputation as a liberal lawyer. He worked on 
human rights cases in the 1980s and served time in prison as a result of his 
activities. In the 2002-election campaign, Roh’s main concerns were clean 
politics, the eradication of corruption and an end to regional rivalries. He 
also pledged to reduce the gap between rich and poor and increase social 
welfare. Roh expressed an independent view regarding Korea’s relationship 
with the USA and favoured a ‘more equal’ relationship between the two 
countries. These promises attracted the support of younger voters who were 
fed up with the old-style ‘money politics’ that benefited mostly politicians 
and business and also dissatisfied with the American military presence in 
the country. Roh also had a younger campaign team that used television 
advertisements and the Internet to their advantage. Their new and fresh 
strategies made a special effort to reach out to the younger generation.  
  In April 2002, Roh’s popularity rating stood at 55% but in June 2002, 
the MDP experienced an overwhelming defeat in both local elections and 
parliamentary by-elections. Many party members blamed Roh for the bad 
results and demanded another nomination race. Roh resisted pressure to step 
down but his popularity ratings continuously declined during the summer, 
dropping to 20%. This drop reflected the disappointment among Koreans 
with the ruling government that was entangled in corruption scandals. Roh’s 
anti-American comments upset the more moderate parts of the population, 
fearing a withdrawal of US forces. 
 Roh’s main challenger was Lee Hoi-chang (67). This was Lee’s second 
attempt to win the presidential elections, after narrowly losing to Kim Dae-
jung in 1997. Lee had entered politics relatively late after a career in the 
country’s judicial service. He had a reputation of honesty and integrity with 
conservative values while others called him dry and boring. Lee tried to 
overcome his dull image by wearing more casual clothes and dyeing his hair 
brown. His family hailed from North Korea, so he was not directly con-
nected to either of the two rival regions. Lee pledged clean politics and 
support for market economy. His campaign was not without scandals, 
mostly concerning his two sons who were accused of avoiding military 
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service by loosing weight before the necessary examination. Lee criticized 
Kim Dae-jung’s engagement policy with North Korea harshly and promised 
a more hard-line course with the northern regime, closer to the policy of 
American President George W. Bush. He was also seen as pro-American, an 
issue that evolved during the election campaign when several anti-American 
rallies were held in Seoul. Lee was supported by the ULD, although this 
party had previously formed a coalition with the MDP. 
 A third strong contender emerged over the summer of 2002. Polls found 
that an independent member of the National Assembly, Chung Mong-joon, 
achieved higher popularity ratings than Roh. Chung (51) was the manager of 
Hyundai Heavy Industries, a son of the founder of one of the largest chaebol 
(large conglomerates) in Korea. He was also a FIFA-vice president and 
involved in the organisation of the Football World Cup in Korea earlier that 
year. The success of both the event organisation and the Korean team 
brought him a wave of support. Seeing Chung’s popularity, members of the 
MDP demanded the withdrawal of Roh and the selection of Chung as the 
MDP candidate. This was another example of the populism driving Korean 
parties: Chung and Roh had rather different programmes and came from 
different backgrounds. While Roh came, as described, from a farming fam-
ily with little formal education, Chung belonged to the clan owing one of the 
largest chaebol and held a PhD from an American university. Roh was run-
ning on a progressive reformist programme, whereas Chung was a moderate 
middle-of-the-roader. The only purpose they shared was their desire to beat 
Lee Hoi-chang and the GNP. 
 Rather than joining the MDP, Chung announced his own bid for presi-
dency in September and founded a new support party, National Alliance 21, 
in November 2002. Some MDP-members joined the new party. Chung’s 
programme remained vague, promising clean politics and national reunifica-
tion. During the autumn, Chung’s popularity began to wane, while Roh’s 
increased. Again Chung’s entry into the presidential race split the vote of 
more liberal voters, while Lee had the full support of conservative voters. 
This situation resembled the pattern of previous elections, where the victor 
had benefited from a split opposition.30 Realising that only a joint bid would 
give them any chance to beat Lee, Roh and Chung agreed on a coalition in 
November 2002. The two candidates participated in a television debate and 
independent companies conducted two telephone polls. In these, Roh gath-
ered 46.8% of the votes while Chung achieved 42.2%. Roh was thus chosen 
as presidential candidate, to be supported by Chung. On the day before the 
election, Chung suddenly withdrew his support of Roh, thus losing his in-
fluence in the future government. The National Alliance 21 seems unlikely 
to survive to the next parliamentary elections in 2004.  
 Beside the two main candidates, there were several other minor candi-
dates. Kwon Young Ghil was the most prominent contestant, making a 
second attempt after 1997. Kwon stood as a candidate of the Democratic 
Labour Party (DLP) and was well known as the leader of the Korean Con-
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federation of Trade Unions (KCTU), a radical alliance of trade unions. In 
2002, Kwon won 3.9% of the vote, an increase from 1.2% in the previous 
election. Former home-minister Lee Han-dong represented the small 
Hanaro National Union. Kim Young-Kyu stood for the radical Socialist 
Party of Korea. Lastly, the Buddhist monk Kim Kil-su campaigned for the 
Hoguk Dang (‘Party for the Defence of the Fatherland’). 
Like the previous elections, the 2002 campaign was dominated by 
regionalism. The MDP’s support basis was firmly in Honam but, by 
choosing a candidate from Yongnam, the party hoped to become more 
acceptable to voters in that area. This plan did not succeed; voters in 
Yongnam continued to support the GNP and shunned the MDP. Roh 
claimed over 90% of the votes in Kwangju and the surrounding Cholla 
Provinces, while Lee was supported by over two thirds of the Yongnam 
voters. The regionalist trend was weaker among the voters under 40 years 
who were more likely to vote for Roh. 
 During the election campaign, the presence of American troops in the 
country became a major issue. In a tragic accident in summer 2002, a US 
military vehicle killed two Korean teenagers. The Korean public was un-
happy with the American response (the drivers were acquitted in a court 
martial) and demonstrations outside the US embassy in Seoul and military 
installations were staged during the autumn. Throughout his campaign Roh 
favoured an independent stance towards the USA but after his election Roh 
had to tone down his criticism given the security needs of South Korea. 
 After his second defeat Lee Hoi-chang retired from politics while Roh 
Moo-hyun had to deal with a party that was riddled by factional in-fighting. 
By September 2003, the MDP split in two factions and the rump-MDP dis-
tanced itself from Roh Moo-hyun. The smaller group of Roh-supporters 
formed a new party in November 2003, the Uridang (‘our party’). In Sep-
tember 2003, a close aid to the president was involved in a corruption scan-
dal that severely damaged Roh’s credibility. His popularity dropped below 
30% within six months of his presidency. Roh relied on a populist image 
and promised to hold a referendum to let the people decide on his fate. The 
constitutionality of this step was doubted, as referenda were reserved for 
questions of national importance, so the issue remained unresolved at the 
time of writing (November 2003).  
 
The 2002 Local Elections 
 
In June 2002, while the Football World Cup was staged in South Korea and 
Japan, local elections were held in South Korea. The voter turnout reached a 
low 46.4% as many voters preferred to watch the World Cup Football 
matches or use the public holiday granted for the election for leisure activi-
ties. The conservative GNP won a landslide victory by winning 11 of the 16 
gubernatorial positions, including the position of mayor in Seoul. The defeat 
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of the ruling party was attributed to voters’ disappointment with the MDP 
and its achievements so far. In particular, corruption scandals involving two 
of the President Kim Dae-jung’s sons gave the party a negative image. The 
loss threatened the position of Roh Moo-hyun as presidential candidate for 
the MDP.  
 These events after the election showed how little the local elections 
were appreciated in their own right. Local issues played only a minor role in 
the campaign where national policies, personalities and the upcoming presi-
dential elections played a major role. Observers accused candidates of being 
generally indistinguishable and of making unfeasible promises. Many can-
didates seemed to have spent more money than in previous years in order to 
attract attention (Chosun Ilbo, 9 June 2002). The reported instances of cam-
paign irregularities were higher than in previous elections in 1998. Prior to 
the election, the NEC stated that already the number of reported vote-buying 
incidents was four times higher than in 1998 (Korea Herald, 14 June 2002). 
The mayor of In’chon and the governor of Jeju-do were the most high-
ranking suspects accused of violating the election law (Korea Herald, 14 
October 2002).  
In the local elections, candidates used party tickets only at the regional 
level while at lower levels, there was no party endorsement. In the selection 
process, little progress was made in making the process more transparent 
and democratic. In the case party conventions were held, local members 
often only approved of lists already decided on by the leadership. Newcom-
ers who had no support base within the organisation found it difficult to be 
selected. Although they paid lip service to a 30%-quota for women, both of 
the big parties nominated less than that and rejected two thirds of possible 
female candidates in the nomination process. In the elections, women candi-
dates were successful in increasing their share of seats, from 5.9% to 9.2% 
in the higher councils. The majority of these women came into the councils 
on the proportional lists rather than directly elected seats. In the lower level 
councils, women increased their share from 1.6% to 2.2% of seats. At re-
gional level, 3.8% of positions went to independent candidates.  
 The most interesting contest was for the position of mayor in Ulsan, an 
industrial town with a high percentage of workers among the voters. In 
surveys in the run-up to the elections the DLP candidate was in the lead but 
in the end he was beaten by a GNP candidate by a 10% margin (53.1% to 
43.6%). The DLP had a strong showing in Ulsan, attracting over 28% of the 
votes. Nationwide, the DLP won over 8%. The GNP managed to win over 
60% of the council seats nationwide, but the distribution represented each of 
the parties’ regional strongholds. In the two Kyongsang provinces, Pusan, 
Taegu and Ulsan, the MDP was totally unsuccessful. In two Cholla Prov-
inces and Kwangju, on the other hand, the GNP did not win any seats. The 
GNP also gained overwhelming majorities in Seoul, Inch’on and Kyonggi 
Province. In Seoul, the MDP had selected a 38 year-old candidate who had 
been involved in the pro-democracy movement in the 1980s, but the 61 
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year-old candidate of the GNP defeated the younger candidate. More than 
half of the chief executives—both at regional and local level—were new-
comers. It remains to be seen whether these novices can bring changes to 
local government, as their opportunities to initiate changes remains very 
limited, given the prevailing influence of the central government. 
 
Summary and Outlook  
 
At the beginning of the 21st century, the Korean electoral system was under-
going profound changes. Since the inauguration of the Sixth Republic in 
1988, there were demands for modifications but these accelerated after the 
turn of the century. The discussion touched all aspects of the political sys-
tem, including the question of the governmental system (presidential or 
prime ministerial), the number of proportionally allocated seats in the Na-
tional Assembly and the number and size of electoral districts. As political 
parties seemed to be unable to bring substantial reform, civic groups became 
more involved in political society. The ‘negative campaign’ of 2000, where 
unsuitable candidates were blacklisted, was just one example of such initia-
tives. In addition, the Constitutional Court demanded several changes in the 
proportional allocation of seats and the size of electoral districts. 
 Although different electoral systems had been discussed by politicians, 
the media, and political scientists, no solution was reached by November 
2003. One of the problems is that the changes in the system have to be initi-
ated by the same people who are affected by them, the politicians. In the 
past, when considering political changes, politicians were concerned with 
their short-term interests rather than the long-term sustainability of the con-
stitution and the development of democracy in Korea. During the First Re-
public, President Rhee repeatedly changed electoral rules to his advantage 
and many politicians followed that tradition in the following decades. Dis-
cussions about the new constitution for the Sixth Republic were influenced 
by considerations of the likelihood of electoral success.31 This behaviour 
continued into the Sixth Republic, as the discussion about the division of 
power between president and premier showed. It looks increasingly likely 
that politicians will reach a compromise shortly before the elections; again 
trying to find a solution to their advantage.  
Elections can only represent the citizens’ will if political parties are re-
sponsible, mature and cohesive as well as independent from their leading 
personality. In Korea, the attitudes and behaviour of the political establish-
ment have changed little since 1988 and authoritarian traits continue to 
cohabit with the institutional procedures of democratic rule. A generation 
change seems the only way to indoctrinate democratic values and behaviour 
in the politicians. The end of the era of the ‘Three Kims’ (Kim Dae-jung, 
Kin Jong-pil and Kim Young-sam) in 2003 was the first step in that direc-
tion. Korea’s volatile party system based on regional cleavages remains an 
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obstacle to democratic development. Under the current electoral system 
effective and efficient political institutions, such as inclusive political parties, 
have problems in developing. Single member districts favour regionally 
based parties, strengthening an already existing trend in Korean politics. The 
process of selection by simple majority has induced a ‘winner-takes-it-all’-
mentality that fails to support compromise. Furthermore, the system favours 
personalities over parties.  
 Local elections have not fulfilled their promise after three rounds of 
elections. With the prevalence of regionalism, many elected councils have 
been dominated by just one party, leaving little room for the development of 
democratic skills such as negotiation and co-operation. The councils have 
little power compared to the head of the administration, restricting their 
ability to influence local policies. The head of the administration, in turn, is 
constrained by central government supervision and restrictions. Local 
autonomy is also limited by the lack of financial provisions. Many local 
authorities remain dependent on allocations from the central government, 
which often come with restrictions regarding their use. Without further 
decentralisation, local autonomy and local democracy are destined to remain 
an unfulfilled promise. 
 The outcome of the 2004 parliamentary elections is difficult to predict 
at the time of writing (November 2003). It appears likely that some political 
alignment within the existing party system could take place. A pro-Roh 
faction of the MDP already left the party to form a new organisation in 
November 2003. Citizens are tired of the factional fighting and thus a low 
voter turnout can be expected. Apathy and disillusionment with democracy 
were at high levels in the early 21st century. No democracy can survive 
without the support of citizens. An increase in political education could be 
useful to demonstrate to Koreans that a democratic system needs active 
citizens in both political and civil society. It seems the political establish-
ment would introduce profound changes only when they felt the persistent 
pressure of the population. The blacklist campaign in the 2000 elections was 
a step in that direction but as a negative campaign had little to offer to im-
prove democracy. The elections in 2004 will show if they have more to 
contribute. The elections will also be an indicator of the direction Korean 
democracy is taking – towards maturity or stagnation in a prolonged con-
solidation phase. 
 
Note
 
 1. In 1998, as a result of the Asian financial crisis, per capita national income 
dropped by nearly a third to US$ 6,700 but reached the US$ 10,000-mark again in 
2002. 
 2. For example Norwegian Nobel Committee (2000), Diamond, Kim 
(2000), Oh (1999). 
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 3. In the earlier democracies such as the United States and Britain, the right to 
vote was initially defined by gender, social status and the possession of property. 
Over the next 150 years, the franchise was gradually extended to include those with-
out property, farmers, and eventually even women. The struggle for the right to vote 
was important for the formation of political and civil society. 
 4. In 1988, an exception was made to allow the candidacy of Kim Dae-
jung who returned from exile in the USA only in 1985. 
 5. In 1992, it was feared that three separate election campaigns - for the National 
Assembly, the presidency and for local executives - in one year would lead to economic 
overheating, given the high costs of campaigning (Lee, 1992: 218). 
 6. In 1998, an unsuccessful local election candidate in Pusan committed suicide 
because he faced bankruptcy when his deposit was not repaid. 
 7. Shown are only countries with a similar population size to Korea; Japan and 
USA with a much higher population had higher ratios. Proportional seats were in-
cluded in the calculation for simplicity. 
 8. The relationship between elections system, political parties and electoral 
outcome has been studied widely in political science. Duverger (1964) for example 
provides a theoretical view, Rae (1967), Lijphard (1999) and Taagepera and Shugart 
(1989) are empirical works. 
 9. See Randall and Svåsand (2000) for a thorough discussion of party institu-
tionalisation. 
 10. In March 1946, there were already 134 political parties and social organisa-
tions; the number had increased to 354 by 1947 (Pak, 1980: 20). 
 11. Independents often joined the ruling party to ‘achieve more for their con-
stituency’ (personal communication with one representative). In several cases, repre-
sentatives had run as independent after not being selected for their party and were 
then convinced by their former colleagues to re-join. 
 12. See Sartori (1976) for a discussion of the relevance of political parties and 
the use of a 3% threshold. 
 13. This sum is an average of the lengths of party lifespan between December 
1987 and December 2002. If the time of existence prior to the presidential elections 
in 1987 is included the average reaches 44 months, mostly due to the Democratic 
Justice Party (DJP), the party of Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo, which was 
created in 1981.  
 14. A typical example of party formation was the ‘Korean Coalition for the 
Future’, founded by Park Geun-hae, the daughter of Park Chung-hee, in May 2002. 
Park had become disenchanted with the GNP and its leader and left to form her own 
party, taking into account her popularity in polls for the upcoming presidential elec-
tions. By November 2002, it was clear she had no chance of winning the election and 
thus decided not to stand. Park took her party back to the folds of the GNP. 
 15. For a study of different types of electioneering see Butler and Ranney 
(1992). 
 16. See Duverger for a description of caucus parties (1964: 18). 
 17. In 1996, the NKP for example stated that the monthly membership fees for 
a member of the National Assembly were more than 150,000 won (US$ 187.50 at 
the time) and a provincial governor more than 300,000 won (US$ 375). The party 
president was expected to contribute more than 1 million won per month (US$ 1250). 
Ordinary members were expected to pay 1000 won (US$ 1.20) monthly but there 
was no enforcement of payment (NKP, 1996: 443-444). 
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 18. In Ulsan, the DLP-nominee won 43.6% of the votes in the race for mayor, 
while the GNP-candidate won 53.1%.  
 19. In 1987, 27% of workers were employed in manufacturing, by 2001 this had 
dropped to 20% (data from http://laborstat.ilo.org; August 2003). While in 1987 
19.8% of workers were member of a union, the number had fallen to 12% by 2002 
(data from www.koilaf.org; August 2003). 
 20. The New Korea Party stated for example: “The NKP is not a party that 
speaks for the interests of a specific class or regions, but a national party that works 
for the interests of all the people.” (NKP, 1996: 29). The majority of its votes, howe-
ver, came from southeast Korea. 
 21. Yang provided data about the regional backgrounds of elites (1994: 515-
543).  
 22. An increase of 54% was the national average over those four decades (data 
from NSO, www.nso.go.kr; August 2003).  
 23. Data from NSO, www.nso.or.kr; August 2003. 
 24. In both cases, there was severe criticism and demonstrations against the 
legislation. Kim Young-sam had to retract his labour legislation after a general strike 
in January 1997. 
 25. In 2002, successful gubernatorial candidates spent between 277 million and 
2.2 billion won (US$ 231,000 to 1.8 million; data from NEC, www.nec.or.kr; August 
2003). These number relied on data submitted to the NEC, informal spending was 
thus not included and was probably much higher. 
 26. When a candidate for the position of prime minister was questioned in the 
National Assembly, the fact that her son held US-citizenship in addition to his Ko-
rean passport was held against her. For the same reason, there was outrage when the 
daughter-in-law of one of the presidential contenders flew to Hawaii to give birth to 
her child there, presumably to secure dual citizenship. 
 27. Park, 2000: 6, quoting Lee Gap-Yun and Lee Hyun Woo (2000) ‘Influence of 
Candidate Factor in Parliamentary Election’ (in Korean), Korean Political Science 
Review, Vol. 34, No. 2.  
 28. See also Kang (2001) for the need of generational change. 
 29. In 1999, Professor Kim Myung-ja for example was appointed Minister of 
the Environment. She had been in the Board of Directors of the Citizens’ Movement 
for Environmental Justice, which was at this time part of one of the largest civic 
groups, the Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ).  
 30. In 1987, Roh Tae-woo was elected by less than 37% of the votes, while 
Kim Dae-jung and Kim Young-sam gained 27 and 28% respectively. In 1997, the 
conservative vote was divided between Lee Hoi-chang and Rhee In-je, leaving the 
victory to Kim Dae-jung.  
 31. See Brady and Mo (1992) for a more detailed discussion. 
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Local and National Elections in Taiwan 
Christian Schafferer 
 
 
On 1 December 2001, ten million voters went to the polls in Taiwan to elect 
225 members of the Legislative Yuan, Taiwan’s law-making body, and the 
chief executives of eighteen counties and five provincial municipalities. The 
parliamentary election was a further major defeat for the Kuomintang 
(KMT), which had dominated parliament for over fifty years. President 
Chen Shui-bian’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) became the largest 
party in parliament for the first time in history, but fell short of achieving a 
majority. Nevertheless, it is expected that the DPP will in future be more 
successful in pushing through its policies than it was prior to the election. In 
local elections, the KMT did better than in the past, but failed to drive the 
DPP out of Taipei County, Taiwan’s most populated local constituency. 
 A year later, on 7 December 2002, about 1.3 million people in the city 
of Taipei and some 800.000 people in the city of Kaoshiung went to the 
polls to elect a new mayor and city councillors. In Taipei, incumbent mayor 
Ma Ying-jeou from the Kuomintang (KMT) won his re-election bid with 64 
percent of the votes cast. In the Kaoshiung race, incumbent mayor Frank 
Hsieh from the ruling Democratic Progressive Party won the election by a 
narrow margin of 25,000 votes (three percentage points). In the city council 
elections, the KMT still succeeded in remaining the largest party in the 
Taipei city council, whereas in Kaoshiung the DPP emerged as the strongest 
political group. 
 
The 2001 National and Local elections 
 
Parliamentary Election: Prior to constitutional reforms in recent years, Tai-
wan’s parliament consisted of three chambers: the law-making body, the 
Legislative Yuan, the constitution-drafting National Assembly, and a 
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watchdog organ know as the Control Yuan. Members of the former two 
bodies were elected by universal suffrage and the latter by local council 
members. The 1997 constitutional amendments excluded the Control Yuan 
from parliament and increased the number of Legislative Yuan members 
from 161 to 225. Three-quarters of these seats, 168 to be exact, are elected 
in geographic constituencies and a further eight by eight aboriginal tribes 
that account for less than two percent of the population. These 176 seats are 
elected under SNTV (Single Non-transferable Vote). The remaining 49 seats 
are allocated to those parties which capture at least five percent of the total 
votes cast for candidates of all political parties. Eight of these proportionally 
allocated seats represent the overseas Taiwanese community and 41 are “at-
large” seats. Further constitutional amendments in May 2000 turned Tai-
wan’s parliament into a semi-bicameral one, with the Legislative Yuan 
being the only chamber regularly elected by universal suffrage.1 
 Local Elections: Council members and chief local executives have been 
directly elected in Taiwan since shortly after the Second World War.2 The 
most important local elections comprise the elections of county magistrates 
and provincial municipality mayors. Taiwan has sixteen counties and five 
provincial municipalities. In addition, two counties of China’s Fukien prov-
ince are also under the jurisdiction of the Taiwan government. Elections of 
chief executives in these two counties have been held since 1993. The term 
of county magistrates and provincial municipality mayors is four years. The 
last election was held in November 1997 and was a watershed in Taiwan’s 
history, as it was the first time the DPP polled more votes in an election than 
the then ruling KMT.3 
 
Pre-election Development 
The last presidential election held in March 2000 significantly changed the 
political landscape in Taiwan: The KMT leadership under President Lee 
Teng-hui insisted on the nomination of the then Vice-president and Premier 
Lien Chan as the party’s candidate in the presidential race, which annoyed 
many hardliners and pro-China members such as James Soong, who conse-
quently left the party and ran in the election as an independent candidate. 
Chen Shui-bian of the DPP finally won the election, closely followed by 
James Soong. Lien Chan, however, came in well behind his two rivals, and 
the KMT was forced to admit a major defeat. No sooner had the fiasco been 
made public than thousands of KMT members and, ironically, supporters of 
James Soong gathered outside the KMT party headquarters demanding the 
resignation of Chairman Lee Teng-hui. Finally, Lee stepped down and Lien 
Chan was elected new KMT chairman. In the meantime, James Soong es-
tablished his own political party, the People First Party (PFP), which was 
expected to emerge as a third major political force in Taiwan politics. It was 
obvious at that point that the KMT would lose its majority in parliament in 
the upcoming election, given the fact that Soong enjoyed far greater popu-
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larity than Lien Chan. To make things worse for the KMT, numerous party 
members withdrew their support in favor of Soong’s new party.  
 Chen Shui-bian’s election victory in the presidential race was seen 
internationally as a major step towards a consolidated democracy.4 Never-
theless, the DPP faced difficulties in implementing its proposed polices as 
parliament was dominated by the blue camp, the KMT, the NP and the 
newly formed PFP. Chen Shui-bian, aware of his minority in parliament, 
chose Tang Fei of the KMT, then minister of defense, as the new premier. 
There was optimism that Tang Fei might be able to help the DPP secure a 
majority in parliament, especially as he was popular with both political 
camps.5  The first major crisis occurred soon after the new cabinet was 
formed when President Chen Shui-bian asked the minister of economic 
affairs to rethink the construction of the fourth nuclear power plant. The 
DPP had long opposed the construction of a further nuclear power plant, 
whereas the KMT had been a long-term advocate of nuclear energy.6 In 
September, the premier remarked that he personally felt there was no need 
to scrap the project and indicated that he would consider resigning if his 
opinion conflicted with that of the DPP and the presidential office. The 
nuclear debate soon caused a political stalemate and Premier Tang resigned, 
ostensibly for health reasons. Given the fact that Tang had undergone chest 
surgery a few months earlier, his decision appeared plausible to the public. 
It seems, however, that the ongoing dispute over the future of the fourth 
nuclear plant had contributed to his early resignation. Chang Chun-hsiung of 
the DPP became the new premier in early October, and at the end of that 
month he announced the government’s decision to scrap the nuclear project. 
The KMT, consequently, threatened to recall the president or to pass a vote 
of no confidence in parliament, where it had a substantial majority. Tai-
wan’s society soon polarized on the issue and on 12 November 2000 large-
scale anti-nuclear demonstrations with over 100,000 protesters were held in 
Taipei and Kaoshiung, Taiwan’s two largest cities. It was not before mid-
February the following year that an agreement between the ruling party and 
the KMT was finally reached, ending the political deadlock. The govern-
ment agreed to proceed with the construction of the fourth nuclear power 
plant but made clear its intention to phase out the three others by 2050. 
Nevertheless, the ruling DPP still faced difficulties in having its proposed 
laws passed in parliament due to the dominance of the KMT, whose mem-
bers were reluctant to cooperate with the DPP. Former president Lee Teng-
hui responded by announcing his intention to return the country to normality 
by establishing a new political party, the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU). 
Lee said that the new political party would support the Chen administration 
and help the DPP to secure a majority in parliament. At the founding cere-
mony on 12 August, Lee released the names of thirty-nine well-known poli-
ticians who had decided to run in the year-end parliamentary election under 
the banner of the TSU. None of the nominees had held a parliamentary seat 
prior to the December election. Lee Teng-hui’s move hurt the KMT badly 
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and the party responded by expelling the traitors. Taiwan’s media wel-
comed Lee’s initiative. The weekly magazine Journalist had a cover story 
calling Lee ”the father of Taiwan,” appraising his commitment to a stable 
and democratic Taiwan nation-state.7 There were high expectations that Lee 
would be able to help the ruling DPP to achieve a majority in parliament, 
especially after his announcement that there would be a number of main-
stream KMT legislators either supporting his coalition for national stabiliza-
tion or even changing camps after the election.  
 Apart from the political dispute, Taiwan’s economy was challenged by 
a recession. GDP shrank considerably throughout the year, and the nation’s 
economists spoke of the steepest GDP decline since the oil crisis of the 
1970s. Although there were several reasons for this development, they 
mainly blamed the world economy and the increase in the number of Tai-
wanese companies moving their production facilities to the People’s Repub-
lic of China, where labor costs are lower and environmental protection laws 
virtually non-existent. What worried the nation even more was the fact that 
unemployment had reached a record high of 5.2 percent. The KMT and the 
PFP used Taiwan’s poor economic performance to attack the DPP govern-
ment. Meanwhile, local media reports claimed that companies affiliated 
with the KMT had withdrawn capital and manipulated the stock market in 
order to discredit the DPP. With regard to cross-straits relations, claims of a 
destructive KMT were even made by foreign institutions. In August, for 
instance, the Center for Strategic and International Studies released a report 
citing Chinese analysts as saying that the KMT had consistently urged Bei-
jing not to engage in a dialogue with the new government in Taipei in an 
effort to weaken the position of the DPP and increase the chances of a KMT 
election victory.8  
 
Candidates and Their Affiliation 
Taiwan nationals aged 23 or older may register as candidates in parliamen-
tary elections; candidates in local elections must be 35 or older. Hopefuls 
must pay a deposit of NT$ 200,000 to the election commission, which will 
be returned if the candidate polls at least 10 percent of the quotient obtained 
by dividing the number of voters by the district magnitude.  
 Local Elections: A total of eighty-nine hopefuls stood in the election for 
the chief executives of five provincial municipalities and eighteen counties, 
60 percent of whom had been nominated by political parties. The KMT 
nominated one candidate in each of the twenty-three constituencies with the 
exception of Nantou County, where two candidates ran under the KMT 
banner. The ruling DPP also nominated one candidate in each of the con-
stituencies, except for Lienchang County. The New Party significantly de-
creased its number of candidates, having learned a lesson from the previous 
election in which none of its seven candidates was elected. This time, the 
party concentrated on Kinmen County, a tiny offshore island. The PFP and 
the Green Party took part in mayoral elections for the first time, presenting 
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six candidates and one candidate respectively. Compared with the previous 
election held four years earlier, there was a significant increase in the num-
ber of independent candidates. However, only three of these were believed 
to have chances of success: incumbent Miaoli County magistrate Fu Shue-
peng, Chen Li-chen of Chiayi City and Wang Jian-shuan, who was jointly 
nominated by the KMT, NP and PFP as their candidate in the Taipei County 
race. Two minor parties, the Taiwan Independence Party and the Society 
Reform Party, nominated no candidates at all this time.  
Table 2.1 Comparison of candidates in the 2001 and 1997 local elections 
 2001 1997 
 Affiliation Candidates % Candidates % 
Kuomintang  24 26.97 25 31.25 
Democratic Progressive Party  22 24.72 21 26.25 
People First Party  6 6.74 - - 
New Party  1 1.12 7 8.75 
Green Party  1 1.12 - - 
Independent 35 39.33 23 28.75 
Other parties - - 4 5.00 
Total  89 100.00 80 100.00 
Source: Central Election Commission, Ministry of Interior, Taiwan 
 
Parliamentary Election: In the parliamentary race 434 hopefuls contested 
168 seats in twenty-nine geographic constituencies, and 21 contested 8 seats 
in two aboriginal constituencies.  
Seven out of ten candidates were nominated by political parties. Com-
pared with the previous election, all parties nominated fewer candidates due 
both to the emergence of the PFP and to their experience in the previous 
election, which was the first after constitutional amendments had increased 
the number of parliamentary seats from 161 to 225. Moreover, there were 
five new political parties and four established parties which did not put 
forward a single candidate in this election. The latter parties are the China 
Youth Party, the National Democratic Party, the Democratic Union and the 
New Nation Alliance (see Table 2. 2). However, five former hopefuls from 
the Democratic Union stood again, two as independent candidates and the 
others under the banner of the Taiwan Solidarity Union. The New Nation 
Alliance had practically dissolved soon after its election defeat in 1998, and 
the only successful candidate, Hsu Tian-tsai, was nominated by the DPP as 
the party’s hopeful in the Tainan mayoral race (see Table 2. 3).  
The five new parties were the PFP, TSU, the Taiwan No.1 Party, the 
Wisdom Action Party and the Great Chinese Battle Line of Unification. The 
PFP nominated 61 hopefuls and the TSU 39. These candidates accounted for 
about 20 percent of the 455 participants. All other new parties did not nomi-
nate more than three candidates (see Table 2. 2), and their chances of suc-
cess were viewed as only very slight. 
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Table 2. 2 Comparison of candidates in the 2001 and 1998 Legislative 
Yuan elections  
 2001 1998 
 Affiliation Candidates % Candidates % 
Kuomintang  97 21.32 161 32.33 
Democratic Progressive Party 83 18.24 112 22.49 
People First Party  61 13.41 - - 
New Party 32 7.03 51 10.24 
Taiwan Solidarity Union  39 8.50 - - 
Nationwide Democratic  
Nonpartisan Alliance  
1 0.22 5 1.00 
Taiwan No. 1  3 0.66 - - 
Wisdom Action Party 1 0.22 - - 
Taiwan Independence Party 3 0.66 20 4.02 
Green Party 1 0.2 1 0.20 
Chinese Taiwan Aborigine 
Democratic Party 
1 0.22 1 0.20 
Great Chinese Battle Line 
of Unification 
1 0.22 - - 
Independents 132 29.01 108 21.69 
Other parties - - 39 7.83 
Total  455 100.00 498 100.00 
Source: Central Election Commission, Ministry of Interior, Taiwan 
 
Table 2. 3 Election result of political groups in the 1998 parliamentary 
election  
 Party Candidates Elected Current state 
China Youth Party 1 0 dissolving 
National Democratic Party 1 1 dissolving 
Democratic Union 25 4 dissolved 
New Nation Alliance 12 1 dissolved 
Source: Author’s own research 
 
The Campaign 
Taiwan has the most liberal election law of all democracies in East Asia, 
and restrictions on campaigning are minor. The law limits the campaign 
period for parliamentary and local elections to ten days and allows each 
candidate to spend up to NT$ 7 million on parliamentary elections and be-
tween NT$ 7 million and NT$ 26 million on local elections. Candidates may 
apply for campaign subsidies. Each candidate is subsidized to the tune of 
NT$ 30 for each ballot exceeding one-third of the votes sufficient to win in 
the respective single-seat constituency or half the votes sufficient to win in 
the respective multi-seat constituency. Political parties receive subsidies of 
NT$ 5 for each ballot exceeding 5 percent of the total number of valid votes. 
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Despite these restrictions, both political parties and individual candidates 
usually find loopholes in the law. Activities officially described as cam-
paigning, such as placing ads in the mass media, are much in evidence prior 
to the official campaign period. Moreover, hopefuls usually spend far more 
money on their campaigning activities than is legally permitted. Actual 
figures are astronomical: Candidates running in county magistrate, mayoral 
and presidential elections may spend not only millions of NT$ but billions 
on their campaign. The last presidential election in March 2000 was de-
scribed as the most expensive in the nation-state’s history, with candidates 
allegedly spending more than NT$ 3 billion on advertisements in Taiwan’s 
mass media.9 With Taiwan’s economy hard hit by the worldwide economic 
decline, big corporations, such as United Microelectronics, refrained from 
donating money to political parties and individual candidates this time. 
 
Table 2. 4 Total spending of political parties on advertisements (1998-
2001)a 
 Type of election 
 Media 1998 Parliament 2000 Presidential 2001 Parliament 
Television 115 3,127 746 
Newspaper 144 461 72 
Magazines 7 17 8 
Total 266 3,602 826 
Source: Rainmaker, tai wan di qu 1998 nian da xuan te bie bao dao [Taiwan 1998 Election 
Special Report], (Rainmaker: Taipei, 1998). Rainmaker, tai wan di qu 2000 nian da xuan te bie 
bao dao [Taiwan 2000 Election Special Report], (Rainmaker: Taipei, 2000). Rainmaker, tai 
wan di qu 2001 nian da xuan te bie bao dao [Taiwan 2001 Election Special Report], (Rainma-
ker: Taipei, 2001). 
a million NT$ 
 
Nevertheless, compared with the previous parliamentary election, the 
amount of money spent by political parties on advertisements increased 
significantly, but still only accounts for about 20 percent of the amount 
spent in the last presidential election (see Table 2. 4). The total expenditure 
by political parties on political ads in Taiwan’s media accounted for NT$ 
826 million, almost half of it was spent by the KMT, 25 percent by the PFP 
and 20 percent by the ruling DPP. 
In addition, Rainmaker, a leading local media research company, esti-
mates that in addition to the money spent by political parties, candidates in 
the local race spent another NT$309 million and parliamentary hopefuls 
NT$ 387 million on advertisements on television, in newspapers and maga-
zines.10  
In total, the KMT had nine different party political broadcasts aired, the 
DPP seven, the PFP ten short ones and the TSU three.11 Seven of the KMT 
ads were mainly designed to attack the opponent, one for image creation and 
another to rebut criticism. Three of the DPP ads were political attacks and 
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the others image-building. Half of the PFP ads were attacks and half image-
building, whereas TSU ads were image-building only. Advertising experts 
have criticized the KMT for focusing too much on originality at the expense 
of content. The DPP’s ads were said to be less original but had a clearer 
message. The good character of chairman James Soong was the major theme 
of almost all PFP ads, which reinforced the impression of the PFP being a 
one-man band.12 The internet was a less important campaign tool than in the 
previous presidential election of March 2000 and the last parliamentary 
election in 1998, when almost every candidate had his or her own website 
offering the electorate information about the candidate’s previous political 
achievements, platforms, and in several cases short movie and audio clips. 
In this election few candidates made an effort to create websites, and all 
major political parties had less information on their sites than in the previous 
elections. The PFP even considered the internet more of a kids’ paradise and 
designed its website accordingly.13 
Table 2. 5 Total spending of political parties on advertisements (2001)a 
 Media   
 Party TV Newspaper Magazine Total % 
KMT 351.13 30.99 6.79 388.91 47.07 
PFP 204.01 6.63 0.85 211.49 25.60 
DPP 153.47 9.46 - 162.93 19.72 
TSU 32.93 11.2 0.54 44.67 5.41 
NP - 12.81 - 12.81 1.55 
TAIP 4.87 - - 4.87 0.59 
TN1 - 0.57 - 0.57 0.07 
Total 746.41 71.67 8.18 826.25 100.00 
Source: Rainmaker, tai wan di qu 2001 nian da xuan te bie bao dao [Taiwan 2001 Election 
Special Report], (Rainmaker: Taipei, 2001). 
a million NT$ 
 
In spite of the economic situation, the KMT admitted to having offered NT$ 
1.5 billion in subsidies to its candidates, although estimates put the figure 
nearer NT$ 5 billion. The DPP, on the other hand, kept a low profile and is 
said to have offered its candidates NT$ 100 million.14 
 The economy was, of course, the main election issue. Opposition par-
ties took advantage of the recession and pinned the blame on the new gov-
ernment. KMT chairman Lien Chan strongly criticized the DPP and its 
economic policies. He claimed that Taiwan’s troubled economy was due 
solely to the DPP. At the beginning of November, the KMT organized dem-
onstrations in all major cities around the island to protest against the DPP 
government’s handling of the economy. It was the first time in history that 
the KMT had organized a demonstration and that Lien Chan, former vice-
president and premier, had actively supported such activities. Lien Chan 
again blamed the DPP for the record unemployment and called for a cut in 
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the unemployment rate to three percent. Tens of thousands of KMT support-
ers chanted slogans saying that a DPP government guaranteed unemploy-
ment. Most campaign speeches, newspaper and TV ads attempted to create 
the image of the nation being on the verge of bankruptcy as a direct result of 
DPP policies. Several candidates of the DPP and the Green Party in their 
speeches and campaign literature criticized Lien Chan for leading these 
demonstrations and argued that if the KMT was so worried about the unem-
ployed, it could simply use its illegally obtained assets to finance job train-
ing and educational programs and accused Lien Chan of just making big 
noise. DPP leaders even made fun of KMT chair Lien Chan and his party 
saying that the KMT should leave demonstrations to the DPP since it had 
more experience in this field.15 James Soong, chair of the PFP, joined Lien 
Chan in his argument that the DPP was to blame for the poor economy. The 
major theme of the PFP was ”save the economy, vote for Soong.” The DPP 
reacted quickly to the accusations made by the PFP and the KMT. Premier 
Chang Chun-hsiung told the media at a press conference that the DPP had 
achieved many reforms which the KMT had been unable to implement dur-
ing its fifty years in power. He said that the current government policies, for 
instance, attempted to balance the development of northern and southern 
Taiwan, while the KMT had ignored the south. The premier stressed that 
even though the opposition claimed that Taiwan’s economic performance 
had become one of the region’s worst, international surveys proved the 
opposite. Chang referred to the World Competitiveness Report, which 
ranked Taiwan eighth in terms of global competitiveness, ahead of Japan, 
South Korea and the People’s Republic of China. Another survey released 
by the World Economic Forum ranked Taiwan seventh worldwide for com-
petitiveness, up from eleventh a year earlier. Moreover, the DPP used the 
accusations of the KMT by making counter accusations a major theme in 
their advertisements and public speeches. In a series of televised ads, the 
party referred to KMT and PFP legislators as ”barbaric and irresponsible 
budget cutters.” The ads claimed that opposition legislators had impeded 
local development by cutting funds earmarked for public building, child 
welfare and computer lessons for schoolchildren. One ad even mentioned 
the names of the ”barbaric cutters”, two of whom were members of the 
KMT and one a member of the PFP. The accused politicians denied the 
allegations and filed lawsuits against the DPP. Taiwan’s media focused 
extensively on the issue and the DPP’s accusations were supported by par-
liamentary records.16 The ads also highlighted the problem of a minority 
DPP in parliament. President Chen Shui-bian and ranking officials of the 
DPP thus appealed to the electorate in emotional speeches to give the DPP a 
majority in parliament.  
The DPP also attacked the way in which the KMT had acquired its as-
sets. During its fifty years of rule, the KMT had allegedly mixed its own 
funds with government funds. The party is considered to be the world’s 
richest, with assets estimated at between US$ 7 billion and US$ 16 billion.17 
Christian Schafferer 
 
 
48
Civil groups as well as the DPP would like to see a thorough investigation 
into the legality of the party’s assets. In several newspaper ads the DPP 
described the KMT as being worse than the Communist Party of East Ger-
many, since the latter accepted a fair investigation into its assets, whereas 
the KMT has fiercely resisted attempts by the Control Yuan, Taiwan’s 
watchdog body, to set up an independent board to look into the issue.  
 TSU hopefuls raised the issue of cutting the Legislative Yuan by half in 
order to make it more efficient. While the idea was backed by the DPP, 
other parties refrained from voicing an opinion during the election campaign. 
 During the closing days of the election campaign, President Chen Shui-
bian made public his idea of a cross-party alliance for national stabilization, 
further stressing his commitment to a stable political system. His idea was 
supported by the TSU and its spiritual leader Lee Teng-hui, who had pur-
sued similar ideas. Opposition parties on the other hand continued to blame 
the government for the recession and claimed that the only way to resolve 
the crisis was to vote for them. The leaders of the PFP and KMT mentioned 
that the relationship with the People’s Republic of China had deteriorated 
under the DPP government and some candidates even claimed that there 
would soon be war should the DPP be allowed to continue ruling the coun-
try.  
 
Results and Implications 
 
Lien Chan, chair of the KMT, said during a press conference that he was 
confident his party would secure at least ninety seats. Frank Hsieh, chair of 
the DPP, predicted that his party would secure at least two seats more than 
the KMT, while the PFP said it would win more than forty seats.18 Shu 
Chin-chiang, TSU spokesman, announced that his party would poll at least 
ten percent of the votes, which is equivalent to approximately twenty seats.19 
Political analysts expected the lowest turnout in Taiwan’s election history, 
as a significant part of the electorate might not see the point of going to the 
polls again given that the last presidential election had brought about the 
long-awaited transfer of power from the KMT to the DPP.20 
 Local Elections: In the 2001 county magistrate and provincial munici-
pality mayor elections, the DPP increased its share of votes by 4 percent 
compared with the previous election held in 1997 and reached an all-time 
high of 45 percent. The KMT, on the other hand, lost 17 percent of its 1997 
share of votes and lagged ten percentage points behind the DPP, a historic 
low (see Table 2. 6). The PFP, a newcomer in local elections, polled slightly 
more than 2 percent of the votes. The Green Party’s only nominee received 
about 1,200 votes, and the only candidate of the NP some 14,000 votes, 
enough to be elected county magistrate of the tiny offshore island of Kin-
men.  
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In terms of elected candidates, the KMT could boast victory in nine con-
stituencies, one more than in the previous election. Although the number of 
votes for the DPP was higher this time, the party could not hold on to all of 
the twelve chief executive positions it won in 1997 (see Table 2. 7). It lost 
the counties of Taoyuan, the second largest constituency, Hsinchu and 
Taichung, and the cities of Keelung, Hsinchu and Taichung to the KMT. 
Table 2. 6 Election results of local elections 2001 and 1997 
 2001 1997 Change 
 Party Votes % Votes % % 
DPP 3,799,709 45.19 3,322,087 43.32 +4.31 
KMT 2,950,217 35.09 3,229,635 42.12 -16.69 
PFP 197,707 2.35 - - - 
NP 14,148 0.17 108,812 1.42 +88.14 
GP 1,299 0.02 - - - 
Independent 1,445,172 17.19 987,247 12.87 +33.50 
other parties - - 20,294 0.26 - 
Total 8,408,252 100.00 7,668,075 100.00 0.00 
Source: Central Election Commission, Ministry of Interior, Taiwan 
 
It could be argued that the DPP lost because of the economic recession and 
the KMT’s success in putting the economy on the agenda of the daily politi-
cal debates in these constituencies.21 The DPP, on the other hand, gained 
control over the previously KMT-governed counties of Changhua and 
Chiayi, and the county of Nantou, which had been previously controlled by 
an independent. The party also succeeded in defending its magistracy of 
Taipei County, Taiwan’s most highly populated magistracy. The county has 
been governed by the DPP since 1989, when the party’s hopeful You Ching 
won the election by a narrow margin of 4,000 votes. The PFP succeeded in 
ousting the KMT from the counties of Taitung and Lienchiang; and the NP 
took over the KMT magistracy of Kinmen County. 
Table 2. 7 Election results of local elections 2001 and 1997 
 2001 1997 Change 
 Party Elected % Elected % % 
DPP 9 39.13 12 52.17 -25.00 
KMT 9 39.13 8 34.78 +12.50 
PFP 2 8.70 - - - 
NP 1 4.35 - - - 
Independents 2 8.70 3 13.04 -33.33 
Total 23 100.00 23 100.00 +0.00 
Source: Central Election Commission, Ministry of Interior, Taiwan 
 
Christian Schafferer 
 
 
50
Parliamentary Election: The elections turned out to be another victory for 
the DPP and a further serious setback for the KMT. For the first time in 
Taiwan’s history, the DPP polled more votes in a national election than the 
KMT. About 33 percent of the votes went to the DPP and 29 percent to the 
KMT. Compared with the previous election held in 1998, the DPP suc-
ceeded in increasing its share by about three percentage points whereas the 
KMT suffered heavy losses. Its share dropped from 46 percent to a meager 
29 percent (see Table 2. 8). 
Public support for the NP plummeted this time, falling below the five 
percentage threshold necessary for ”at-large” seats. The PFP, on the other 
hand, was another big winner in this election, polling nineteen percent of 
votes, and the TSU passed the five percent threshold as expected. TAIP lost 
its seat in parliament and with just 1,382 votes in this election, it left the 
political stage. The future of Taiwan’s greens is not rosy either. The party 
succeeded in entering parliament in 1996 when one of its candidates was 
elected in Yunlin County. In 1998, the party had filed one candidate in 
Taipei’s second district and received about 8,000 votes, only one-third of 
the required amount. In this election, the party nominated the same candi-
date in the same district and polled only 1,000 votes. 
Table 2. 8 Result of the Legislative Yuan election 2001 and 1998 
 2001 1998 Change 
 Affiliation votes % votes % % 
DPP 3,447,740 33.38 2,966,834 29.56 +12.92 
KMT 2,949,371 28.56 4,659,679 46.43 -38.49 
PFP 1,917,836 18.57 - - - 
TSU 801,560 7.76 - - - 
NP 269,620 2.61 708,465 7.06 -63.02 
Independent 899,254 8.71 946,431 9.43 -7.67 
other party 42,474 0.41 754,420 7.52 -94.53 
Total 10,327,855 100.00 10,035,829 100.00 0.00 
Source: Central Election Commission, Ministry of Interior, Taiwan 
 
Six of the twelve political parties competing in this parliamentary election 
won at least one seat and four met the criteria for the proportional represen-
tation seats (Table 2. 9). The NP captured only one seat on the offshore 
island of Kinmen and the TN1 one in the aboriginal constituency. Independ-
ent candidates took eight seats in geographic constituencies and one in the 
aboriginal constituency.  
Compared with the 1998 election, the DPP increased its share of seats 
from seventy to eighty-seven, while the KMT lost almost one-half its seats 
and the NP ten of its eleven seats. The DPP had far more of its candidates 
elected than any other party (see Table 2. 10). The TSU is the only party to 
have intentionally nominated far too many candidates. It did so in an at-
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tempt to enhance its chances of passing the five-percent threshold necessary 
for ”at-large” seats . 
Table 2. 9 Seat distribution Legislative Yuan election 2001 
 PR-seats Constituencies  
 Affiliation  At large Overseas Geographic Aborigine Total 
DPP 15 3 69 0 87 
KMT 13 2 49 4 68 
PFP 9 2 34 1 46 
TSU 4 1 8 0 13 
NP - - 1 - 1 
TN1 - - 0 1 1 
Independents - - 8 1 9 
Total 41 8 169 7 225 
Source: Central Election Commission, Ministry of Interior, Taiwan 
 
The KMT lost the parliamentary race because of its highly unpopular leader, 
Lien Chan, and the emergence of the PFP. In addition, candidates of the 
blue camp, in general, could not benefit from the issue of cross-straits rela-
tions in this election, since the People’s Republic of China refrained from 
interfering: The Chinese media did not even report on the election.22 More-
over, the KMT electoral strategies did not work as well as those of the DPP. 
Under the current electoral system, twenty-five out of twenty-nine geo-
graphic and both of the two aboriginal constituencies are multi-member 
districts with an average seven seats. The remaining four constituencies, 
three small islands and the thinly populated county of Taitung, are single-
seat constituencies. 
Multi-seat constituencies require each political party to make an as-
sessment of how many votes it could reasonably hope to poll a certain con-
stituency. If the party nominates too many candidates in this constituency, 
party votes may be split to the extent that rival candidates take the seats 
away. By nominating too few candidates, the party runs the risk of wasting 
votes. In this election and in the 1995 election, the KMT nominated far too 
many candidates in key constituencies such as in Taipei City. Moreover, the 
party network did not support each candidate with the same degree of enthu-
siasm. It has been the KMT strategy to support party candidates with higher 
popularity ratings in opinion surveys. The DPP, on the other hand, has for a 
long time practiced the so-called pei piao system (forced vote distribution). 
Pei piao is a rational system based on the fact that the chance of someone 
being born on Monday is the same as of someone being born on Tuesday. In 
this election, for instance, the DPP nominated five candidates in the second 
district of Taipei City. The party gave each of its five candidates two single-
digit numbers, i.e. zero and one to the first candidate, two and three to the 
second and so forth. Party supporters were urged to vote for the candidate 
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whose number coincides with the last digit of their National Identity Num-
ber.23 If most DPP supporters followed the strategy, each candidate should 
receive an equal amount of votes.24 The pei piao system has been regarded 
as one of the key reasons for the party’s success in this election. Political 
analysts agree that a further factor contributing to the success of the DPP 
was President Chen Shui-bian’s promise that there would be a more effi-
cient government if the people gave the DPP a majority in parliament. 
Moreover, the electorate in general did not believe in Lien Chan’s claim that 
he would revive Taiwan’s economy, especially after a press conference 
where he had had to admit that the KMT’s economic policies did not differ 
much from those of the DPP. 
Table 2. 10 Election results Legislative Yuan election 2001 and 1998 
 2001 1998 Change 
 Affiliation seats % of hopefuls seats % of hopefuls seats % 
DPP 87 77.53 70 65.82 +17 +24.29 
KMT 68 54.64 123 73.91 -55 -44.72 
PFP 46 57.38 - - - - 
TSU 13 20,51 - - - - 
NP 1 3.13 11 19.44 -10 -90.91 
TN1 1 33.33 - - - - 
Independent 9 6.82 12 11.11 -3 -25.00 
other party - - 9 9.89 -9 -100.00 
Total 225 41.54 225 47.61 0 0.00 
Source: Central Election Commission, Ministry of Interior, Taiwan 
 
The election made the NP the ruler of Kinmen, an offshore island with a 
population of about 50,000 people, as it won the only parliamentary seat 
there and succeeded in having its candidate elected as the county’s magis-
trate. The NP emerged as a rising star in the mid-1990s, when it first took 
part in national elections and captured thirteen percent of the seats. Its sup-
port dropped considerably in the 1998 parliamentary election due to a num-
ber of internal disputes. The recent election has been a further serious defeat 
for the party. There seems to be little doubt that the party will soon disap-
pear from Taiwan’s political arena.25 
 Voter turnout averaged 66.16 percent and was two percentage points 
lower than in the previous election. In Taiwan’s two largest cities, Taipei 
and Kaoshiung, it was down to 65 percent, fifteen percentage points lower 
than in the previous election. In other areas, such as in the cities of Keelung 
and Hsinchu, it increased from about 50 percent to approximately 63 percent. 
In these two constituencies the increase was most dramatic. This phenome-
non was caused by a mass mobilization of KMT supporters. In both cities, 
the KMT consequently succeeded in ousting the incumbent DPP mayors.26 
 This parliamentary election not only marked the end of KMT domi-
nance but also ended the political careers of many long-term legislative 
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stalwarts and prominent politicians such as former DPP chair Shih Ming-teh, 
NP legislative whip Lai Shih-pao, influential Taipei County independent Lin 
Chih-jia and media star Chu Mei-fong.27 
 The election gave the green camp a so-called “working majority” of one 
hundred out of 225 seats, since former president and spiritual leader of the 
TSU announced that several independents, KMT and PFP legislators would 
support the green camp, giving it a de-facto majority in the law-making 
body. Soon after the election, the green camp elaborated on proposed consti-
tutional amendments aimed at preventing further deadlocks in parliament: 
Lee Teng-hui and the DPP leadership would like to transform Taiwan’s 
semi-presidential system into a presidential one, to halve the number of 
parliamentary seats and to introduce a single-member, two-ballot election 
system.28 There is optimism that a strengthened DPP government will be 
more likely to implement its policies this time. 
 
The Taipei and Kaoshiung Municipal Elections 2002 
 
City council elections: In 1967, the provincial municipality of Taipei was 
elevated to the status of a special municipality. Kaoshiung became a special 
municipality in 1979. Special municipalities are under the direct jurisdiction 
of the central government. First election of council members took place in 
November 1969 in Taipei and in November 1981 in Kaoshiung. Since then, 
city council elections have been held every four years. Since then, the num-
ber of seats has been increased from 48 to 52 in Taipei and from 42 to 44 in 
Kaoshiung due to population growth. In elections of city councillors the 
single non-transferable vote (SNTV) formula is applied. Under this system, 
Taipei city is divided into six geographic constituencies with a district mag-
nitude between seven to eleven (=number of seats) and one aboriginal con-
stituency with one seat only. In Kaoshiung, there are five constituencies 
with district magnitudes ranging from five to ten and one aboriginal con-
stituency with one seat. 
In this election, political parties nominated seventy percent of the 113 
candidates in Taipei, and about half of the candidates in Kaoshiung. The 
DPP nominated 27 of the 113 candidates in Taipei and only 18 of the 114 
hopefuls in Kaoshiung. The Kuomintang nominated far fewer candidates 
this time due to the emergence of the People First Party, which fielded sev-
enteen in the Taipei and nine in the Kaoshiung race (see Table 2. 11). 
Two political parties took part in city council elections for the first time: 
the People First Party (PFP) and the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU). The 
PFP was founded by James Soong after his defeat in the presidential race of 
March 2000. The new party caused a deep split within the KMT with a 
significant number of members switching sides. In the national election of 
December 2001, the PFP garnered 19 percent of votes (46 out of 225 seats). 
The party thus proved to be a new major political force in Taiwan's political 
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landscape. The Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) was founded under the 
spiritual leadership of former president and KMT chair Lee Teng-hui in 
August 2001 after Lee had announced some time earlier that a new party 
would bring back stability to Taiwan by supporting incumbent president 
Chen Shui-bian (DPP). Taiwan experienced a political deadlock that lasted 
for several months after the government made public its plan to scrap the 
fourth nuclear power plant project (see also Taiwan's 2001 National and 
Local Elections). TSU garnered 8 percent of votes (thirteen seats) in na-
tional elections held in December 2001. 
Table 2. 11 Candidates by party affiliation 2002 and 1998  
  2002 1998 
 Affiliation  candidates % candidates % 
Taipei     
Democratic Progressive Party  27 23.89 27 24.55 
Kuomintang  21 18.58 32 29.09 
People First Party  17 15.04 - - 
Taiwan Solidarity Union  7 6.19 - - 
New Party  6 5.31 16 14.55 
Green Party  1 0.88 4 3.64 
other partiesa  - - 10 9.09 
independents  34 30.09 21 19.09 
Total  113 100.00 110 100.00 
     
Kaoshiung      
Democratic Progressive Party  18 15.79 20 19.05 
Kuomintang  21 18.42 34 32.38 
People First Party  9 7.89 - - 
Taiwan Solidarity Union  7 6.14 - - 
New Party  1 0.88 6 5.71 
other partiesb  - 0.00 5 4.76 
independents  58 50.88 40 38.10 
Total  114 100.00 105 100.00 
Source: Compiled by the author; data provided by the Central Election Commission 
a other parties: New Nation Alliance (5), Taiwan Independence Party (4), China Women 
Party (1) 
b other parties: Taiwan Independence Party (5) 
 
Mayoral elections: Chief executives of special municipalities had been ap-
pointed by the premier prior to the passing of the Special Municipality 
Autonomy Law in July 1994. The first direct election of the mayors of 
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Taipei and Kaoshiung was held in 1994. Voter turnout averaged 80 percent. 
There were four candidates in Taipei and five in Kaoshiung. In Taipei, KMT 
candidate and incumbent mayor Huang Ta-chou received 26 percent of the 
votes cast, NP candidate Jaw Shau-kang 30 percent, DPP hopeful Chen 
Shui-bian 44 percent, and independent Jih Rong-ze less than 1 percent. This 
was a crucial victory for the DPP. In Kaoshiung, however, the KMT proved 
to be more successful. KMT candidate and then incumbent mayor Wu Den-
yih garnered 55 percent of the votes, DPP's Chang Chun-hsiung 39 percent, 
NP hopeful Tang A-ken 3 percent, and the other candidates 3 percent. 
 In December 1998, the second direct mayoral election took place. There 
were three candidates in Taipei. Former justice minister Ma Ying-jeou was 
nominated by the KMT, incumbent mayor Chen Shui-bian by the DPP, and 
Wang Chien by the NP. Ma won with 51.1 percent of the votes. Incumbent 
mayor Chen received 45.9 percent and the New Party's hopeful the remain-
ing 3 percent. Voter turnout was 80 percent in both Taipei and Kaoshiung, 
where four candidates contested. Incumbent mayor Wu Den-yi (KMT) re-
ceived 48.13 percent and was voted out of office by a margin of 78,000 
votes by former legislator Frank Hsieh of the DPP. The NP candidate Wu 
Chien-kuo received only 0.8 percent and independent Cheng Teh-yao 2.4 
percent of the valid votes cast. 
 In this election,  there were two candidates in Taipei. The KMT nomi-
nated incumbent mayor Ma Ying-jeou, and the DPP former political pris-
oner and legislator Lee Ying-yuan. In Kaoshiung, five hopefuls took part in 
the election. Incumbent mayor Frank Hsieh was nominated by the ruling 
DPP, and Huang Jun-ying by the KMT. Three independent candidates took 
also part in the Kaoshiung race: Chang Po-ya, Shih Ming-teh, and Huang 
Tien-shen.  
 
Election Results  
 
The mayoral election results were a foregone conclusion in Taipei and a 
small surprise in Kaohsiung. Incumbent mayor Ma Ying-jeou (KMT) won 
the race in Taipei with 64.11 percent of the votes, and in Kaoshiung incum-
bent mayor Frank Hsieh (DPP) received slightly more votes (24,838 votes) 
than his main rival Huang Jun-ying (KMT) despite opinion polls that sug-
gested Hsieh would lose the battle (see Table 2. 12). 
Ma Ying-jeou's strategy was not to talk too much about specific future 
policies nor go into details of what has been achieved during his term. In-
stead, he tried to give the voters the impression that there are many prob-
lems but there is no need to worry because there is still Ma, who cares about 
the people. His campaign ads in Taiwan's media, for instance, frequently 
focused on the issue of rising unemployment and the lack of unity among 
the electorate due to the polarization of the populace between the blue and 
green camps, urging the electorate to be united and support him. In his cam-
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paign speech on election eve, Ma spent most of his time telling the audience 
that we all work hard everyday and that life sometimes is difficult but we 
still have Ma to rely on, giving the electorate once again the impression of a 
good brother who will always be here if help is needed. Ma relied on his 
charisma whereas his opponent, Lee Ying-yuan, relied on history and on 
offering “beef,” that is more  social welfare to the residents of Taipei. His 
campaign team, for instance, placed a series of ads in Taiwan's mass media 
promising every unemployed person between 35 and 50 years of age a 
monthly subsidy of NT$10,000 for the period of one year, and every single 
mother with a child under 12 years of age a monthly stipend of NT$5,000. 
Table 2. 12 Results mayoral elections 2002 
  Votes % 
Taipei    
Ma Ying-jeou (Kuomintang)  873,102 64.11 
Lee Ying-yuan (Democratic Progressive Party)  488,811 35.89 
Total  1,361,913 100.00 
    
Kaoshiung    
Frank Hsieh (Democratic Progressive Party)  386,384 50.04 
Huang Jun-ying (Kuomintang)  361,546 46.82 
Chang Po-ya  13,479 1.75 
Shih Ming-teh  8,750 1.13 
Huang Tien-shen  1,998 0.26 
Total  772,157 100.00 
Source: Compiled by Christian Schafferer; data provided by the Central Election Commission 
 
Apart from social welfare policies, history was again a key element in the 
DPP's mayoral campaign strategy. In his campaign speeches and televised 
ads, Lee once again stressed his suffering during the white terror that lasted 
until the early 1990s. Televised ads tried to remind the voters of the dark 
times and of the fact that Lee Ying-yuan was blacklisted by the KMT gov-
ernment for his involvement in anti-KMT activities. A group of former 
schoolmates also put ads in mass-circulating daily newspapers showing a 
large photo of KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeou and claiming that he was a spy 
for the KMT government while studying in the US. The group strongly 
criticized Ma for being on the side of the dictator during the most crucial 
period of time in Taiwan's history of democratic development. Nevertheless, 
the electorate seemed to care little about Ma's alleged spying activities. It 
may be important for the people of Taiwan to discuss their history and the 
involvement of current politicians in the suffering of political opponents 
during the reign of white terror, but election campaigns are no longer the 
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right place to talk about history. People in Taipei have heard too much of 
such stories during the last 10 years and are no longer willing to talk about 
the old times. 
 The DPP's campaign strategy in the Taipei race changed compared with 
previous elections in the sense that Lee campaign team refrained from rely-
ing on traditional campaign methods such as large street rallies. There 
maybe various reasons for this, but one of the key ones is simply that voters 
do not know why they should join such rallies. The support of civil groups 
for the DPP seems to be vanishing, especially after the farmers and fisher-
men's demonstration of Nov. 23 when over 100,000 people took to the 
streets of Taipei. Numerous former civil groups that supported the DPP in 
the past turned out this time urging the electorate not to vote for DPP candi-
dates. Full-page ads in mass-circulating newspapers requesting the voters 
not to vote green were common. This all made Ma Ying-jeou's election 
victory a foregone conclusion. 
 In Kaohsiung, the election victory of DPP candidate Frank Hsieh was 
more of a surprise given the fact that claims of Hsieh's involvement in the 
Zanadau scandal seemed to do him serious harm. Apart from the scandal, 
the public in general feels discontent with current government economic 
policies. Taiwan's economy has been challenged by a recession and record 
unemployment. GDP has shrunk considerably throughout the last years 
while the nation's economists speak of the steepest GDP decline since the oil 
crisis of the 1970s. Much blame for the poor economy had been pinned on 
the DPP government. In addition, the farmer and fishermen's demonstration 
and the subsequent resignation of key government members once again 
conveyed the message of an inefficient government. Perhaps dissatisfied 
voters did not go to the polls instead of voting for the KMT. With election 
turnout averaging 71 percent, the Kaohsiung election had the lowest turnout 
ever. 
 But whatever the turnout, the KMT candidate lost the election, leaving 
James Soong  standing in the rain after his ridiculous performance in Taipei, 
when he kneeled down begging for votes in support of Ma. James Soong's 
party refrained from nominating its own candidates in the mayoral race. The 
party decided to support the KMT candidates instead. In Taipei his support 
was unnecessary since Ma Ying-yeou enjoys far higher popularity than 
Soong, and in Kaoshiung his appearance at several campaign rallies did not 
change the election mood there. Soong’s chances of becoming president in 
2004 seem to be gradually disappearing. 
In the city council elections, the DPP and the KMT received one third 
of the seats each in Taipei, and in Kaoshiung the DPP won more seats than 
the KMT for the first time in history. TSU performed poorly in Taipei and 
in Kaoshiung. In total, only two out of the fourteen candidates got elected.  
Surprisingly, the New Party had five out seven hopefuls elected. James 
Soong’s People First Party had a meagre showing in Taipei where fewer 
than half of the party’s candidates were voted into office. The Green Party 
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once again failed to get enough popular support (see Table 2. 13 and  
Table 2. 14). 
Table 2. 13 Election results city council elections 2002 and 1998 
  2002 1998 Change 
 Party  Seats % Seats % % 
Taipei       
Democratic Progressive Party  17 32.69 19 36.54 -10.53 
Kuomintang  20 38.46 23 44.23 -13.04 
People First Party  8 15.38 - - - 
Taiwan Solidarity Union  0 0.00 - - - 
New Party  5 9.62 9 17.31 -44.44 
Green Party  0 0.00 0 0.00 0.00 
other partiesa  - - 0 0.00 - 
independents  2 3.85 1 1.92 100.00 
Total  52 100.00 52 100.00 0.00 
 
Kaoshiung       
Democratic Progressive Party  14 31.82 9 20.45 55.56 
Kuomintang  12 27.27 25 56.82 -52.00 
People First Party  7 15.91 - - - 
Taiwan Solidarity Union  2 4.55 - - - 
New Party  0 0.00 1 2.27 -100.00 
other partiesb  - - 0 0.00 - 
independents  9 20.45 9 20.45 0.00 
Total  44 100.00 44 100.00 0.00 
Source: Compiled by Christian Schafferer; data provided by the Central Election Commission 
a other parties: New Nation Alliance, Taiwan Independence Party, China Women Party. 
b other parties: Taiwan Independence Party. 
 
It is interesting to note that the KMT for the first time practised the forced 
vote distribution system (pei piao). In previous elections, it had been the 
party's strategy to support those candidates with higher popularity ratings in 
opinion surveys and to neglect the others. The KMT obviously has learned 
from its previous election defeats. Only one of the 21 KMT candidates in 
Taipei was not elected. In this election, for instance, the KMT nominated 
five candidates in the third district of Taipei. The party gave each of its five 
candidates two single-digit numbers, i.e. zero and one to the first candidate, 
two and three to the second and so forth. Party supporters were urged to 
vote for the candidate whose number coincides with the last digit of their 
National Identity Number (shenfenzheng zihao). If most KMT supporters 
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followed the strategy, each candidate should receive an equal amount of 
votes. In other districts, the KMT nominated two, three or four candidates. 
In these cases, the party instructed the supporters to cast their votes accord-
ing to the month in which they were born. 
Table 2. 14 Election results city council elections 2002 and 1998 (votes) 
  2002 1998 Changes 
Party  Votes % Votes % % 
Taipei       
Democratic Progressive 
Party  383,905 28.52 455,613 30.96 -7.87 
Kuomintang  431,830 32.08 589,907 40.08 -19.96 
People First Party  236,418 17.56 - - - 
Taiwan Solidarity Union  50,015 3.72 - - - 
New Party  121,399 9.02 273,195 18.56 -51.41 
Green Party  1,807 0.13 22,274 1.51 -91.13 
other partiesa  - - 37,838 2.57 - 
independents  120,734 8.97 92,966 6.32 41.99 
Total  1,346,108 100.00 1,471,793 100.00 - 
 
Kaoshiung       
Democratic Progressive 
Party  191,913 25.03 211,954 26.81 -6.66 
Kuomintang  197,506 25.76 357,163 45.18 -42.99 
People First Party  91,903 11.98 - - - 
Taiwan Solidarity Union  51,500 6.72 - - - 
New Party  4,807 0.63 30,363 3.84 -83.68 
Taiwan Independence 
Party - - 14,707 1.86 - 
independents  229,189 29.89 176,308 22.30 34.01 
Total  766,818 100.00 790,495 100.00 - 
Source: Compiled by the author; data provided by the Central Election Commission 
a other parties: New Nation Alliance (27,282), Taiwan Independence Party (9,633), China 
Women Party (923). 
  
Notes
 
 1. The term of all National Assembly members expired on 19 May 2000. With 
effect from that date, 300 Assembly members will be elected within three months of 
the expiration of a six-month period following the public announcement of a pro-
posal by the LY to amend the Constitution or to alter the national territory, or within 
three months of a petition initiated by the LY for the impeachment of the president 
or the vice-president. Elected members have to convene of their own accord within 
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ten days after the confirmation of the election result and have to remain in session 
not longer than one month, with the term of office expiring on the last day of the 
convention.  
 2. For a detailed analysis on Taiwan’s local elections see: Christian Schafferer, 
The Power of the Ballot Box: Political Development and Election Campaigning in 
Taiwan  (Lanham: Lexington, 2003). 
 3. For a detailed analysis on this election see: Christian Schafferer, The Power 
of the Ballot Box: Political Development and Election Campaigning in Taiwan 
(Lanham: Lexington, 2003). 
 4. Freedom House upgraded its rating on Taiwan in its latest annual report 
(political rights: 1; civil rights: 2) and thus gave Taiwan the same ratings as most 
member states of the European Union, such as Germany, France and Italy. Moreover, 
it outperformed the European Union member state of Greece in terms of civil liber-
ties (political rights: 1; civil liberties: 3). By international standards, Japan (political 
rights: 1; civil liberties: 2) and Taiwan are thus East Asia’s most democratic coun-
tries (Freedom House, “Freedom in the World,” 
<http://216.119.117.183/research/freeworld/2001/table1.htm> (4 December 2001). 
 5. There are two main political ‘camps’ in Taiwan: the blue and the green. The 
name derives from the main color in the party flag of the KMT and the DPP respec-
tively. The blue camp comprises the KMT, PFP and NP, the green camp the DPP 
and TSU. The blue camp is pro-unification, whereas the green camp is not interested 
in unifying with the PRC. 
 6. See Christian Schafferer, “Taiwan’s Nuclear Policy and Anti-nuclear Move-
ment,” in Understanding Modern Taiwan, ed. Christian Aspalter, (Ashgate: Alder-
shot, 2001), pp. 97-126. 
 7. Journalist, 6 September 2001. 
 8. Bonnie Glaser, “China’s Taiwan Policy: Still Listening and Watching,” 
<http://www.csis.org/pacfor/pac0133.htm> (20 November 2001). 
 9. Rainmaker, tai wan di qu 2000 nian da xuan te bie bao dao [Taiwan 2000 
Election Special Report], (Rainmaker: Taipei, 2000). 
 10. Rainmaker, tai wan di qu 2001 nian da xuan te bie bao dao [Taiwan 2001 
Election Special Report], (Rainmaker: Taipei, 2001). 
 11. Chen-Chia Huang, “xuan zhan wen xuan de mi mi” [The Secrets of Election 
Propaganda], Brain, December 2001, pp. 30-35. 
 12. Tsu-leong Cheng, “hu zhi ni ba, bu jian niu rou” [Mudslinging, no Beef in 
Sight], Brain, December 2001, pp. 24-29. 
 13. see www.pfp.org.tw 
 14. Liberty Times, 29 November 2001; Taipei Times, 17 November 2001 
 15. Liberty Times, 11 November 2001 
 16. Huang, “xuan zhan wen xuan de mi mi,” pp. 30-35. 
 17. Taipei Times, 17 November 2001; Liberty Times, 17 November 2001 
 18. Taipei Times, 30 November 2001 
 19. Taipei Times, 21 November 2001 
 20. United Daily News, 29 November 2001 
 21. United Daily News, 2 December 2001 
 22. In past elections, China’s state media warned about dire consequences 
should the DPP or other pro-independence figures gain substantial popular support.  
 23. Similar to the social security number in other countries. 
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 24. The NP used the same system in the 1995 parliamentary election in the city 
of Taipei and in the counties of Taipei and Taoyuan. Twelve out of their fourteen 
candidates were elected as a result. (Cheng-hao Pao, “xin dang ping jun  pei piao ce 
lüe jiao jie zhi yan jiu: yi ba shi si nian li fa wei yuan xuan ju wei li,” [The Effec-
tiveness of the New Party’s Strategy of Forced Vote Distribution in the 1995 Legis-
lative Election],” Journal of Electoral Studies 5, no. 1 (May 1998): pp. 95-138).  
 25. Journalist, 12 December 2001 
 26. Journalist, 12 December 2001 
 27. .Taipei Times, 2 December 2001 
 28. Liberty Times, 9 November 2001; Taipei Times, 20 November 2001 
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3 
Elections and Political Development  
in Mongolia 
Hollis S. Liao 
 
 
Mongolia, a land locked country, occupies a vast territory of 1.56 million 
square kilometers and has 2.4 million inhabitants in this vast open land. 
 In the thirteenth century, the Mongols formed a steppe empire and be-
came the emperors of theYuan dynasty in China. It wasn’t until early in 
1921, that part of the Mongols, the Khalkha Mongols, established their own 
country again and declared the independence of Mongolia. At that time, 
Mongolia was ruled under a constitutional monarchy system led by a reli-
gious head, the 8th Jebtsundamba Khutukhtu, who passed away in May 1924. 
On November 26, 1924, Mongolia’s first constitution was adopted, the 
country’s official name became “People’s Republic of Mongolia” (PRM), 
and Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party (MPRP) became the ruling 
power. 
 Mongolia was the second country after the Soviet Union to establish a 
communist system, and it was the first communist country in Asia. As a 
satellite of the Soviet Union, Mongolia did not enjoy complete independ-
ence until 1990. 
 The Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party was the only political 
party and had the sole power in its hands. It controlled the legislative, ad-
ministrative, and juridical systems until the late 1980s, when large-scale 
demonstrations and hunger strikes forced the MPRP Politburo to resign and 
to legalize a political opposition. During the process of democratization that 
started in 1990, Mongolia’s achievements are manifold. The country began 
to pursue an independent foreign policy and successfully established ties 
with far more countries than during communist rule. As to the domestic 
political environment, the Party Law was passed in 1990, forcing the then 
Hollis S. Liao 
 
 
64
ruling MPRP to give away its privileges and to compete with other political 
parties for political power. The legislative body, Ulsiin Yehe Khural (na-
tional great assembly, hereafter the State Great Khural or Khural) is com-
posed of the representatives elected by be people in open, free, and equal 
elections held every four years. The government and all government officers 
are responsible to and checked by the legislative body. All these changes 
have without doubt given Mongolia a completely different political life if 
compared with that of previous years. 
 
Mongolia and Democracy 
 
From the Greek period to the present time, the definition of democracy has 
changed. David Held summarizes the theories of democratic development 
into nine categories, and considers that in the twentieth century competitive 
elites, multi-ism, legislative democracy, democratic autonomy, and global 
democracy are the most important of these categories.1 It is understood that 
the political life in a democratic society has at least the following features: 
 
(a) There are two or more political parties, which compete 
fairly in elections.  
(b) The political system in the country is guided by party 
politics. 
(c) In addition, there is a check and balance function between 
the legislative, administrative, and juridical branches. 
Therefore, capable professional elites take the responsibil-
ity of policy-making and also abide by the rules outlined 
in constitution and other laws. 
 
From this point of view, the newly established democracies in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s all intended to establish a constitutional democracy, and 
Mongolia is no exception here. Former minister of foreign affairs, N. Tuya, 
mentioned in her speech at the 54th UN General Assembly meeting in De-
cember 1999 that in the past ten years, Mongolia had taken certain measures 
to build up a democratic system. She said that the preliminary achievements 
of Mongolia in the development of democracy were its market oriented 
economic system and its cooperation with the international community.2 
However, democratization means more than changes in economy and 
foreign relations. As a matter of fact, the political system plays an important 
role. This paper looks into the Mongolia’s constitutional changes, legislative 
initiatives, and government administration as to give the reader an idea 
about Mongolia’s political changes. 
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A New Constitution: From Socialist to Democratic 
 
After the collapse of the communist regime in the early 1990s, Mongolia’s 
ruling party, the MPRP agreed to a peaceful transition to democracy and in 
doing so ended seventy years of one party rule. In 1990 the first democratic 
general election was held. The MPRP gained the majority of seats in both of 
the houses of parliament: 84.6 percent in the Great Khural, and 61.7 percent 
in the Baga Khural. The elected Great Khural passed a new constitution on 
13 January 1992. This was the fourth constitution of Mongolia. The first 
constitution was passed on 26 November 1924.  The second was enacted on 
30 June 1940 and amended subsequently in 1944, 1949, 1952, and 1959.3 
The third Constitution was adopted on 6 July 1960. 
The major difference between the 1992 Constitution and the previous 
ones is the diminishing importance of communist ideology and role of the 
MPRP. For instance, the phrase “the guiding and directing force of society 
and the state in the MPR is the Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party, 
which is guided in its activity by the all-triumphant Marxist-Leninist the-
ory”4 in the preamble of the 1960 Constitution was removed. The new con-
stitution consists of six chapters and seventy articles, in which there are 
special chapters dealing with human rights issues, the power of the president, 
the constitutional court, and other issues relevant to democratic rule. 
 Over four hundred members of the People’s Great Khural took part in 
the discussion of a new constitution in 1990 and a semi-presidential system 
was preferred. 5  The concept of administrative, legislative, and juridical 
separation was taken from the western idea of constitutional spirit. Accord-
ing to the new constitution, government officials are required to submit 
reports to the State Great Khural and answer questions raised by its mem-
bers. This is the check and balance mechanism usually found in democracies. 
In Mongolian history, the semi-presidential system was a new experience. 
According to this system, legislative power resides in the parliament, 
whereas the president and the government share administrative power. H. 
Hulan, a former member of the Khural, considers this semi-presidential 
system a compromise between the democratic forces and the MPRP. The 
new system satisfied the conservative wing in the MPRP who insisted on a 
presidential system, and also included the democratic ideas of human rights 
and personal property demanded by progressive forces within the party.6 A 
semi-presidential system gives the president the right of vetoing any law 
passed by the State Great Khural. If there is, however, a two-thirds majority 
in the Khural rejecting the veto, the law has to be accepted by the president. 
The president is also granted the right to negotiate with the prime minister to 
resolve the State Great Khural in accordance with the consent of two thirds 
of the members of the Khural. The president in Mongolia does not have 
ultimate and unlimited power. Since 1997, certain disagreements have oc-
curred between the president and the State Great Khural, especially when 
the majority of the Khural and the president had different party affiliations. 
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The Democratic Coalition government was asked to resign three times in the 
first three years in power. There was also an awkward situation when the 
president kept rejecting the nominees for the position of prime minister, who 
were proposed by the State Great Khural in 1999. 
 There is also a new phenomenon in Mongolia’s political domain that 
has to do with the constitutional court that was established to solve any 
arguments or to clarify the true meaning of all articles comprising the 
constitution. As a matter of fact, since the new constitution went into force, 
there have occurred several situations not accounted for in the original ver-
sion of the constitution. Thus, there has been the necessity of amending the 
constitution. According to the constitution, government officials and organi-
zations that enjoy the right of legislative initiative may initiate amendments 
to constitution. (Article 68). Two thirds of the members of the State Great 
Khural have to support such an amendment (Article 69). 
As can be seen in the case of the tug of war between the president and 
the Khural in the nomination of the Prime Minister in 1999, the 1992 Mon-
golian Constitution does have imperfections. It fails to provide clear expla-
nations for various unforeseeable situations that could come up in future. 
One problem lies in the unclear division of power between the president and 
the Khural. Another question left unanswered is whether the members of the 
Khural may concurrently serve as cabinet members. 
 On 16 January 1998, the Democratic Coalition proposed an amendment 
to the constitution in order to allow the members of the Khural to concur-
rently hold government positions, but the proposal was rejected. The dispute 
continued and two years later an agreement was reached. The Khural passed 
the draft of an amendment to the Constitution on 13 December 2000.7 The 
content of the amendment is that the prime minister and one third of the 
government officials may be members of the Khural. The State Great 
Khural and the constitutional court approved the amendments but the presi-
dent vetoed the amendment giving his reasons by quoting Article 22 #1, 
Article 33 #1-2, and Article 27 of the Constitution.8 The State Great Khural 
did, however, not accept the presidential veto. Thus, the president had no 
choice but accept the amendment. From this case it can seen that the Mon-
golian president wields restricted power. It seems possible that further con-
flicts between the president and the State Great Khural may arise on other 
issues in future. It can be seen as a shortcoming of the 1992 Mongolian 
Constitution that the document fails to give anyone or any organization the 
authority to resolve disputes between the president and the State Great 
Khural. 
Forming a Multi-party System 
 
Like other communist countries, Mongolia had a one party-state system 
before 1990. The MPRP was the only legal party in the country. With de-
mocratization changes occurred. The government mouthpiece Unen (lit. 
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truth), for instance, became the organ of the party. Moreover, many privi-
leges that party leaders obtained from the state were abolished. All symbolic 
signs propagandizing the party were removed from many public sites. Nev-
ertheless, the most important change was the promulgation of the Part Law, 
which allows the formation of opposition parties. 
 In a democratic political system, political parties have the following 
characteristics: being an enduring organization, having the aim of ruling the 
country; and obtaining public support through elections.9 
 The Party Law was adopted and became effective on 10 May 1990. 
Within one year, there were several new parties formed: The Mongolian 
National Development Party (MNDP), the Mongolian Free Labor Party 
(MFLP), the Mongolian Democratic Party (MDP), the Mongolian Social 
Democratic Party ( MSDP), and the Mongolian Green Party (MGP).10 They 
all stated that their aim was to search for ways to enhance political reform, 
to unify Mongolia and to develop a humanistic and democratic society. The 
MPRP was the only party to insist on the creation of a socialist society 
rather than a democratic one. 
 In the first half of 1994, nine more parties registered.11 Party competi-
tion became a phenomenon in Mongolia. This competition can be best ob-
served during elections. Since 1990, Mongolia has held three elections at the 
national level (the Khural) in 1992, 1996, and 2000, three presidential elec-
tions in 1993, 1997 and 2001, and two local elections in 1997 and 2001, 
respectively. Many newly founded parties took part in these campaigns. The 
new parties lost in the first State Great Khural election and realized that they 
would not be able to compete with the MPRP without forming a coalition. 
Therefore, they started to cooperate with each other since then and finally 
merged. Between 1992 and 1996, the Republican Party, MFLP, and the 
right wing of the MDP merged and became the Party of Unity. Later the 
Party of Unity, MDP, the Mongolian Renaissance Party, and the Mongolian 
National Development Party merged and became the Mongolian National 
Democratic Party. The Mongolian Peasants and Herders United Party, the 
Mongolian Independent Party, and Mongolian Owners of Private Property 
United Party merged into the Mongolian Traditional Unity Party.12 Some-
times, parties merged into a big party for a while then for some reason sepa-
rated from each other again. For example, the Republic Party and the Party 
for Mongolia merged in May 1999,13 but in early 2000 they decided to be-
come independent parties again.14 In late February of 1998, the chairmen of 
the MSDP and MNDP sent out an invitation appealing for a merger of the 
two parties.15 Nevertheless, influential party members did not support their 
plans.16 Although the merger would have turned Mongolia’s political system 
into a two-party one, the majority of party members still supported the cur-
rent party system with two plus one—two big powerful parties and one 
small party.17 
Thus, the issue of party mergence was put aside until the “Democratic 
Coalition” lost the campaign in the election of 2000. The general secretary 
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of the MNDP B. Delgermaa admitted that their failure came from the split 
of the democratic forces.18 In view of the votes that the MPRP members 
obtained were just little over 50%, but the MPRP got 94.7% of the seats in 
the State Great Khural, the chairmen of these two parties again appealed for 
a party merger.19 In October, a preparatory work team including representa-
tives from the MNDP, the MSDP, the Mongolian Religious Democratic 
Party, the Mongolian Democratic Party, and the Mongolian Democratic 
Renaissance Party was formed. After two months of preparation, the MNDP 
and the MSDP held party congresses respectively and decided on the leader-
ship and whom to nominate for presidential race of 2001.20 On 6 December 
2000, the great convention of the five parties mentioned above was held in 
Ulaanbaatar. One thousand five hundred representatives from these five 
parties attended the meeting. After chairmen of the parties gave speeches, G. 
Gankhuyag who chaired the convention declared the merger of the parties. 
The Democratic Party, the new party, registered under the original registra-
tion number and emblem of the MSDP, and the flag of the MNDP. All 
properties of the five parties were transferred to the new party.21 
Apart from party mergers, there are also new parties established from 
time to time. In 1998 and 1999, eight more political parties were registered. 
They are the Mongolian Democratic Social Party, the Youth Party, the 
Mongolian New Democratic Social Party, the Mongolian Countryside De-
velopment Party, the Mongolian Communist Party, Local Development 
Party, the Mongolian Democratic Party (was merged into the MNDP in 
1992 but in early 2000 registered as an independent party again), and the 
Civil Will Party.22 
 The number of political parties cannot be considered a variable to 
evaluate the quality of democratization in a country. In the early 1990s, 20-
30 people could form a political party in Yugoslavia, therefore there were a 
couple of hundred political parties but none of them protected democracy 
and human rights. In the case of Mongolia, at the inception of Party Law, 
many newly founded parties only had 801 members to meet the basic re-
quirement to form a party. In view of the Mongolian population being only 
2.4 million, it is unnecessary to have this many political parties to function. 
From the standpoint of the party platforms and plans, there is actually not 
much difference between the parties. Many parties appeal for social needs 
rather than seek a political goal. As to the names of the parties, the words 
‘democratic’, ‘social democratic’, ‘democratic social’, and ‘new democratic 
social’ have become mainstream. In terms of political ideology, there is no 
difference among all parties. The multi-party system in Mongolia encour-
ages political and social community based on various appeals to form politi-
cal parties. In more than ten years, political parties in Mongolia number 
more than ten.  In future, new parties may emerge via either new establish-
ment or mergers. As scholar S. Bold mentioned, although Mongolia has a 
new multi-party system, the standpoint of the ruling party and major opposi-
tion parties are not stable and concrete. Thus, conflicts among them are 
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problematic and enormous, which will have a negative impact on the social 
and economic development. He therefore suggests that all parties negotiate 
to make concessions and to cooperate for the sake of national interests. Only 
then may the democratic seeds planted in the 1990s be harvested.23 Here are 
the problems that Mongolia has to face in the process of political democrati-
zation and multi-party development. 
 
Composition and Performance of the State Great Khural 
 
The State Great Khural is the legislative body at the national level. It had the 
former name of the Yehe Khural (big assembly) and was renamed Ardiin 
Yehe Khural (people’s great khural) in 1951. Since 1992, it has a new name: 
Ulsiin Yehe Khural and its functions are similar to parliaments in western 
countries. 
The first Mongolian Constitution overruled the electoral rights of secu-
lar and ecclesiastical feudal rulers, permanent residents of temples and mon-
asteries, moneylenders, and those who lived on the labor of others.24 The 
second Constitution (1940) was amended in 1949 to introduce direct elec-
tions, a secret ballot and universal suffrage, but the candidates had to be 
approved by the MPRP.25 According to article 21 of Mongolia’s 1960 Con-
stitution, citizens of the MPR were given rights to elect the representatives 
to the People’s Great Khural, but prior to 1981, the Khural elections were no 
more than a rubber stamp as the candidates were all chosen by the mono-
party, the MPRP. In mid-March 1990, the eighth plenum of the MPRP’s 
Nineteenth central committee, under pressure from the democracy move-
ment, decided to hold a general election for the People’s Great Khural later 
that year. On June 16, the Presidium of the Khural decided to amend the 
new Election Law to allow for direct elections. The first poll was postponed 
from early June to July 8, and then to July 22. The MPRP won 85% of the 
seats in the People’s Great Khural and was able to retain its position as 
ruling party. 
 The first State Great Khural election was held after the new democratic 
Constitution became effective in 1992. There were twelve parties enrolled 
for the campaign. The MPRP still won the election and obtained seventy out 
of seventy-six seats in the State Great Khural. By the time of the election in 
1996, there were twelve legal political parties and 14,5000 people had regis-
tered as party members in Mongolia.26 In the Khural election of 1996, there 
were candidates from 11 parties to run for seats. Parties either campaigned 
independently or joined forces with each other. The Democratic Coalition 
won fifty seats of the State Great Khural, but the MPRP obtained only 
twenty-five seats, which made it pass the ruling power to the opposition 
forces. This was the beginning of a new era in the democratic development 
of Mongolian political life. 
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According to the Mongolian Constitution, the State Great Khural is the 
highest organ of State, and legislative power shall be vested solely therein 
(article 20). It has one chamber and consists of seventy-six members. Mon-
golian citizens reaching the age of twenty-five have the right to run for seats 
in the State Great Khural on the basis of universal, free, direct suffrage by 
secret ballot for the term of four years (Article 21). According to Article 25 
of the Constitution, the State Great Khural has several powers. These in-
clude adopting, supplementing and amending laws; determining the basis of 
the State’s domestic and foreign policies; determining and changing the 
structure and composition of the Standing Committees of the Parliament, the 
Government and other bodies directly accountable to it under the law; pass-
ing a law validating the election of the President and recognizing his powers, 
releasing him from his duties or recalling him; appointing, replacing or 
removing the Prime Minister, members of the Government and other bodies 
responsible and accountable to the Parliament as provided for by law; issu-
ing acts of amnesty; ratifying and denouncing international agreements to 
which Mongolia is a party, establishing and severing diplomatic relations 
with foreign States at the suggestion of the Government; declaring a state of 
war in the event that sovereignty and independence of the State are threat-
ened by armed actions of a foreign power, and ending it; and declaring a 
state of emergency or martial law. The Parliament convenes regular sessions 
every six months, and each session shall not be less than seventy-five days 
(Article 27). The Khural seems to be given a great deal of responsibilities 
besides rights. It is also clear that the members of Khural have to attend 
session meetings about half a year.  In the transition of “being ruled by 
party” to “being ruled by law”, the Khural seems to be playing a very im-
portant role. Since 1992, the members of the Khural have been occupied 
with passing and amending laws, which are demanded to accommodate the 
situation of transition. Between 1992 and 1996, the Parliament approved one 
hundred fifty new laws, amended one hundred twenty laws, invalidated 
fifty-two laws and declared three hundred thirty-one orders.27 
 When the Democratic Coalition became the majority in the State Great 
Khural in 1996, there were several manifestations that deserve to be men-
tioned. The members of the Khural were highly educated and young (their 
average age was about forty-one). More than two thirds of them were 
elected to the Khural for the first time. The ratio of male to female members 
was 69:7. The structure of the State Great Khural had been expanded and 
the groups of majority and minority were formed under the regulation of law 
for the first time.28 In terms of its performance, the second State Great 
Khural focused on amending laws other than passing laws. The speed of 
amending laws was also amazing. For instance, the Law for the Rights of 
State Great Khural Representatives was approved in one session, but the 
following session had it amended. We also notice that the Law of Casino 
was passed but then became null and void even before it was ever carried 
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out. The second State Great Khural was also criticized for the very low 
attendance of its members.29 
 In the year of 2000, the MPRP won an overwhelming victory in the 
State Great Khural election. In seventy-two constituencies, the average 
ballots the MPRP attained was 52.94%.  Moreover, in those four constituen-
cies that the party lost, the number of votes that the MPRP candidates ob-
tained were second to the elected ones. In twenty constituencies of Ulaan-
baatar city, the MPRP won nineteen and the average number votes ac-
counted for 53.16%.30 The MPRP obviously won more than half of the 
voters’ support. The victory in Ulaanbaatar changed the stereotyped image 
of the MPRP only being able to mobilize in the countryside. 
 The MPRP thus again became the majority party in the State Great 
Khural. According to the Law of the State Great Khural, a party with more 
than eight seats may form a party group in the State Great Khural. The op-
position forces only won two seats in the Khural and were unable to form 
any alliance. The function of check and balance in the State Great Khural 
certainly dwindled. On the positive side, the law making and amending will 
be passed without prolonged debating because any law with the approval of 
two thirds of attendant members will be enacted. The MPRP members in the 
Khural are beyond this number. Any boycott effort by the opposition against 
the majority of the Khural seems difficult. However, when a party becomes 
a mighty power in the Khural, the party interests may be considered prior to 
anything else. After the members of the Khural took oaths, the MPRP mem-
bers were asked by the party to sign an agreement, which requires all of 
them not to disobey any decisions of the baga khural (regular meeting) and 
the “guiding committee”. The latter, consequently, became the absolute 
decision making body, and the MPRP members were no longer the repre-
sentatives of the electors.  
Forming New Type of Government 
 
Before March 1990, Mongolia was a communist state model of Soviet po-
litical structures. The highly centralized governmental structure was divided 
into three major parts: the executive branch, presided over by the Council of 
Ministers; the legislative branch, represented at the national level by the 
unicameral People’s Great Khural; and the judicial branch, with a supreme 
Court presiding over a system of law administered by courts and by an Of-
fice of the Procurator of the Republic. 
 In the 1992 Constitution the highest executive body of the state is called 
‘government’ instead of the Council of Ministers. Before the new Constitu-
tion was adopted, the first free, multiparty, multi-candidate election was 
held on July 22, 1990. The MPRP won 85% of the seats in the Khural and 
60% of the party preference votes.31 The MPRP had a majority in the Khural 
and retained its position as ruling party. For the first time in Mongolian 
history, the chairman of the MPRP invited the opposition parties to join the 
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MPRP in a coalition government. Chairman of the MSDP Radnassurengiyn 
Gonchigdorj became the first vice president in Mongolia. 
 Prime Minister Deshiyn Byambasuren proposed in a meeting of the 
Little Khural32  that Mongolia should establish a multi-party government 
which would reflect the views of all parties concerning the country’s future 
development and the interests of all sectors of the population. It would take 
the form of a cabinet, in that all its members would share responsibility for 
policy; if that policy should fail, the entire government would step down. He 
also added that the cabinet would set up highly specialized organizations 
and make efforts to maintain steady and harmonious relations with the 
Khural, while retaining its independence. Government policies would reflect 
public opinion and the party affiliation of government members would not 
matter.33  The whole idea about the formation of government became the 
basic content of chapter three in the 1992 Constitution. 
 Streamlining the structure of government was also a major concern of 
the coalition government. First of all, the number of ministries was cut from 
twenty to eleven, plus one national commission. Cabinet membership was 
also reduced to sixteen: the premier, three deputy premiers, eleven ministers, 
and the chairman of the national commission.34 The three deputy premiers 
were from the MPRP, the MDP, and the National Progress Party respec-
tively. Among eleven ministers, there were only four from the MPRP. Shar-
ing power with the opposition parties was a good gesture by the MPRP that 
showed its commitment to democratization in Mongolia. Nevertheless, in 
the cabinet there was only one member from the MDP, the most powerful 
opposition party. Some observers considered that the MPRP did this based 
on the strategy of isolating its major rival by giving favors to the minor 
parties. 
 Most of the high-ranking members in the coalition government were 
young technocrats between the ages of thirty and fifty; half of them had a 
college education. The main task set out for the new government was to 
recover from the economic decline. The performance of these technocrats 
would have impacted the social, political and economic development in 
Mongolia. 
 Nevertheless, before the second government formed in 1992, the coali-
tion government only had about two years to implement its policies. During 
this crucial transition time, in terms of economic development the govern-
ment policy of privatization was one that should win the coalition govern-
ment praise. 
  In 1992, the MPRP retained its ruling power. It was also the time to 
show its strength to lead the country as it marched forward toward democ-
racy. Facing a totally different situation from that in the period of time ruled 
by communist ideology, the MPRP was on its own to rule the country now. 
How to solve the economic recession in the country? How to carry out an 
independent foreign policy, which puts the national interests as the first 
priority? Although the MPRP had experiences of ruling a country for more 
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than seventy years, without the assistance of the Soviet Union and Eastern 
European countries, these tasks became a great challenge to the MPRP. 
After four years in power the MPRP was still unable to increase its reputa-
tion because the lagging economy did not improve too much; unemploy-
ment increased; the crime rate was soaring. The inflation rate in 1993 was 
183%. Although it fell to 53% in 1995, there was still 25% of the population 
living below the poverty line (ten dollars of monthly income). All these 
social and economic problems made people lose their confidence in the 
MPRP. The result was the MPRP’s loss in the 1996 election of the State 
Great Khural. 
 The Democratic Coalition won the election and formed a new govern-
ment in July of 1996. The young democrats for the first time had an oppor-
tunity to rule the country and had the ambition to improve the economic and 
political situation of the country in terms of democratization. As soon as he 
became the first Prime Minister of the new government, M. Enkhsaikhan set 
out a ‘shock therapy’ policy to shape government organizations and to ac-
celerate economic reforms. The original fourteen ministries of the govern-
ment were reduced to nine. The radical policies included zero customs for 
imported goods, housing privatization, and speeding privatization of na-
tional enterprises. However, the government was unable to lower the infla-
tion rate and the numbers of unemployed and the poor increased. In addition 
to this the Mongolian currency was devalued. In October of 1997 the State 
Great Khural asked the Enkhsaikhan government to take responsibility for 
the failure of government policies and resign but did not succeed. As the 
government did not change its policies, Enkhsainkhan was asked in April of 
1998 to resign for the second time. This time he was not as lucky as before.  
Ts. Elbegdor replaced Enkhsaikhan but was not in the position too long 
before he was asked to resign in July 1998. This resulted from his concealed 
decision to merge the state owned Sergen Bank into a commerce bank, 
Golomot Bank. After he resigned, he still served as a deputy for five months 
until president Bagbandi finally approved the new Prime Minister nominee. 
President Bagbandi had rejected the nominee Da. Ganbold who was pro-
posed by the Democratic Coalition group in the State Great Khural seven 
times. 
 Finally, the former Ulaanbaatar city mayor J. Narantsatsralt took the 
position of Prime Minister in December of 1998. He certainly did not fore-
see that he would become the third Prime Minister in the Democratic Coali-
tion government to resign. He stepped down as he was criticized for his 
wrongdoings on the issue of privatizing the Mongolia and Russia joint ven-
ture, the Erdenet Company. 
The frequent replacement of Prime Ministers is unusual in democratic 
countries even if it is a sign to show the officials’ responsibility for their 
policies or decisions. In the case of Mongolia, it reflected the instability in 
politics at that period of time or at least some foreign investors in Mongolia 
considered it so. 
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When the MPRP became the ruling party again in 2000, N. Enkhbayar be-
came the Prime Minister and started the task of restructuring his government. 
Nine ministries were expanded into eleven, 35  in which the Ministry of 
Economy and the Ministry of National Development were newly established. 
The Ministry of Infrastructure was divided into Ministry of Mineral Re-
sources and Ministry of Transportation and Communication.36  Agencies, 
which had affiliations with the government, were reduced from fifty-seven 
to forty-seven.37 In addition, there were some shifts in job assignments in 
some ministries. Nevertheless, it didn’t have much significance except as a 
sign that the current government differed from the previous government in 
appearance. 
 In terms of education and work experiences, the cabinet members were 
all well educated and possessed professional specialties. The oldest minister 
was fifty-seven; the youngest one was only thirty-six. Their former profes-
sions included economist, engineer, lawyer, teacher, physician, veterinarian, 
and professional diplomat. In view of the MPRP campaign commitment, the 
economic and social problems would be their priority to deal with. This 
commitment also became the work plan of the government. In the past two 
years, the Enkhbayar government has been making efforts at improving 
economic development. To attract foreign investment in Mongolia, a forum 
for foreign investors was held in Ulaanbaatar in August 2002. The govern-
ment also provided several tax deduction policies for long-term foreign 
investors. As many favored policies in the economic field are released, there 
are also signs of political stability in the MPRP government. In view of this, 
if the economic and political situations in the country are getting better, the 
chance for opposition parties to regain power to rule the country in 2004 
seems slim. 
Conclusion 
 
After having been ruled by the communists for over seventy years, Mongo-
lia chose a different path in its political life in the 90s. The great signifi-
cance of political development in Mongolia since 1990 is its reform pace 
and depth of democratization both in its economy and its politics. A new 
democratic constitution paves the path for Mongolia to march to democracy. 
The State Great Khural as a legislative body has been making new laws to 
meet the situation of being ruled by law. Performances of the governments 
administered by different parties deserve credit, because they all tried to find 
the best for the Mongolian people. Nevertheless, it is a fact that the ultimate 
goal of being ruled by law has undergone severe challenges during the past 
twelve years. 
 While the rest of world appraises the achievements of Mongolia in the 
field of politics, we all have to give credit to the reformers and the opposi-
tion to the MPRP. Nevertheless, if we notice the significance of the nine-
teenth congress of the MPRP which paved the path of renewal in Mongolia, 
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we will understand that without the awareness of the MPRP that it was 
necessary to reshape the political system, as well as society’s social and 
intellectual life, democratization in Mongolia certainly would not have been 
undertaken this smoothly. 
Because of its communist background and the fact that the MPRP was 
still under attack for its political ideology and viewpoints, the party chair-
man N. Enkhbayar declared openly right after the party’s victory in the 2000 
election that the MPRP is not a communist party anymore. The loss of the 
MPRP in 1996 election and the loss of the Democratic Coalition in 2000 
election clearly indicate that the Mongolian voters certainly do know what 
they want from their government. They want further reform and democrati-
zation in social, economic and political aspects and these may be the only 
alternatives that Mongolian politicians have to choose from in the future. 
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4 
Northeast Asia: The Less than Liberal Peace 
Kay Möller 
 
 
The breakdown of global bipolarity and a lack of multilateral security re-
gimes notwithstanding, Northeast Asia has been at peace since the “end of 
history.“ Latent conflicts in the Taiwan Strait and on the Korean Peninsula 
have not turned acute. (Neo-) Realists have explained this with the existence 
of stable subregional power balances. (Neo-) Liberals have pointed to an 
ever increasing economic interdependence. Reflectivists have emphasised 
shared norms and identities. 
 Most of the same observers would concur that the peaceful impression 
could be misleading. Social disorder in China could fuel tensions in the 
Taiwan Strait. A continued meltdown of the North Korean state could lead 
to war on the peninsula. Competing nationalisms in China and Japan could 
provoke conflict. Much as in other parts of the world, the disappearance of 
bipolarity has had the double effect of increasing the domestic impact of 
globalisation while projecting certain domestic dynamics on the regional, if 
not international screens.  
 This analysis proposes to test the ‘inside-out’ proposition in the Taiwan 
Strait, on the Korean Peninsula, and in China-Japan relations, and to thus 
contribute to the contemporary debate on the interrelationships between 
actor and system, relative and absolute gains.  
 
Trade, Democracy, and Conflict 
 
Granted some overlap, classical Liberal approaches to questions of war and 
peace can be roughly divided into a Manchester School (the trading state 
peace proposition) and a Kantian School (the democratic peace proposition). 
Whereas the former has been somewhat modified in analyses of early twen-
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tieth century intra-European relations1 and the latter has been criticised, 
among other things, for postulating the kind of mature democracies that 
hardly exist outside North America and Western Europe,2 both have been 
revived and refined since the early 1970s in a Liberal-Institutionalist context. 
Foremost among the “descendants“ of the Manchester School is Richard 
Rosecrance who believes that incentives to wage war are absent under con-
ditions of high interdependence.3 Dale Copeland has suggested that trade 
expectations rather than actual trade act as constraints upon states.4 Robert 
Keohane and Joseph Nye further elaborated on the theme by arguing that the 
effects of economic interdependence depend not so much on how much two 
states trade, but on how affected their respective policies are by price and 
income developments in other states, as well as by those states’ policies. 
When the costs of avoiding the consequences of interdependence are too 
high, “it may seem more sensible, rather than changing its level, to alter its 
form, i.e., to institute a joint decision-making structure or procedure.”5 Neo-
Realists have adopted the opposite approach in arguing that asymmetric 
interdependence actually raises the likelihood of war because the more de-
pendent state will try to break out of it.6 
 Whereas the abovementioned scholars have focused their analyses on 
the systemic level, proponents of the “democratic peace proposition“ have 
frequently referred to the importance of domestic institutions and norms. 
Michael Doyle, for instance, has argued that free speech, electoral cycles, 
and the public policy process act as restraints on the ability of democratic 
leaders to apply force vis-à-vis fellow democracies.7 At the same time, ac-
cording to mainstream representatives of the proposition, democracies are 
more prone to apply force vis-à-vis non-democracies for both normative and 
institutional reasons.8 And lastly, transitions from authoritarianism to de-
mocracy can frequently result in assertive, if not aggressive, nationalism.9 
 Whereas both trading state Liberals and democratic Liberals by and 
large tend to view their respective states as a black boxes, others have pro-
posed to differentiate between domestic structure (i.e. the nature of state 
institutions, societal characteristics, and institutional and organisational 
arrangements linking state and society) on the one hand and coalition-
building processes (i.e. non-institutional policy networks that link the soci-
ety to the political system) on the other. Whereas ‘structure’ would be the 
major criterion to distinguish strong from weak states (the latter having 
fragmented political institutions and lending themselves to pressure by so-
cial interest groups), coalition-building focuses on policy networks that help 
political actors to create an intra-elite consensus in support of their poli-
cies.10 A combined approach would then assume that “[p]olitical decisions 
are being modified and substantiated...through domestic processes taking 
place among the political systems (on the one hand) and their societal 
environments (on the other) that transform domestic requirements.”11 In this 
context, Gourevitch has recommended to analyse (1) the nature of political 
institutions and their degree of centralisation, (2) the structure of society, 
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and (3) the nature of the coalition-building processes (state-dominated, 
societal control, or democratic corporatism, i.e. continuous bargaining proc-
esses among political and societal actors).12  
 At the same time, the complexity of the model would preclude any easy 
conclusions with regard to the issue of interstate conflict resolution. 
Whereas one is tempted to assume, for example, that a high degree of insti-
tutionalised market liberalisation would be conducive to a trading state 
peace, this would largely depend on the domestic impact potential losers 
could make through institutions and networks (the same would apply to 
states opting for a non-institutionalised export orientation which tries to 
isolate the internal from the external economy). 
 This study proposes to test (Neo-) Liberal and (Neo-) Realists assump-
tions about national approaches to conflict in the Taiwan Strait, on the Ko-
rean Peninsula, and across the East China Sea at both the systemic and actor 
levels. It suggests that the two paradigms, rather than contradicting each 
other, are mutually conditional. 
 
Zero-Sum in the Taiwan Strait 
 
Through their respective constitutions, both the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) and the Republic of China on Taiwan (ROC) claim jurisdiction over 
the entire Chinese territory.13 Technically, both sides remain in a state of 
civil war. Since 1971, the PRC claim has been recognised by a majority of 
states, and Peking has replaced Taipei in the UN General Assembly and 
Security Council. In the early 1990s, Taiwan effectively abandoned its claim 
by, for example, establishing unofficial relations with countries that had 
recognised the PRC as the sole representative of China. Previously (in 1954, 
1958, and 1962) both sides had engaged in armed conflict (i.e. artillery 
shelling) that was most of the time provoked by the Taiwan side. In the 
1970s, Peking offered the island negotiations on a unification involving 
certain privileges while ruling out equality (i.e. basically the one country-
two systems formula that was later applied to Hong Kong). At the same time, 
however, the PRC preserved an option to resort to force should Taiwan 
formalise its de facto-independence (over time, other scenarios were added, 
among which Taiwan developing nuclear weapons, third party interference, 
internal chaos in Taiwan or—most recently—Taipei’s persistent refusal to 
engage in negotiations on unification). Between 1993 and 1995, several 
rounds of informal cross-Strait negotiations, while resulting in agreement on 
certain technical issues, did not achieve progress on the unification problem. 
Once Taiwan had started asserting its own separate identity on the interna-
tional scene, Peking twice (in 1995 and 1996) tried to influence Taiwanese 
elections through large-scale manoeuvres and missile tests.  
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Trading State Peace? 
Since allowing indirect trade (mostly via Hong Kong) with the PRC in the 
late 1980s, Taiwan’s overall trade surplus has been increasingly rooted in 
the island’s mainland trade, which in 2001 reached a volume of US$ 247 
billion.14 By 2000, Taiwan‘s China-trade dependency had reached 16.9 per 
cent on the export side and 4.4 per cent on the import side (corresponding 
shares for China were 2 per cent on exports and 12.1 per cent on imports.) 
At the same time, Taiwanese firms had invested approximately US$ 45 
billion in the PRC, the greatest share of which was associated with the pro-
duction of electronics and electrical appliances.15  
Cross-Strait economic relations have not been a one-way street. During the 
1990s, Taiwan was China‘s most important source of foreign investment, 
and it was only through this investment that the PRC succeeded in overtak-
ing the island as the world’s number three exporter of information technol-
ogy hardware. Furthermore, the mainland has served as a reexport-base for 
many Taiwanese companies. These trends are expected to intensify follow-
ing the accession of both sides, in late 2001 and early 2002, respectively, to 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO). At the same time, Taiwan’s recent 
recession has shown that the island’s economic future is on the world mar-
ket for hightech products rather than on a Chinese market that remains 
dominated by low and medium technologies.  
 Since the mid-1980s, Peking has tried to make use of the new interde-
pendency with a view to promoting its national unification agenda. In this 
framework, the PRC has repeatedly tried to mobilise the Taiwanese business 
community against their own government.16 In the 1990s, the Lee Teng-hui 
administration (1988-2000) proposed to counter the trend by imposing ceil-
ings on individual investment in the mainland, prohibiting such investment 
in certain “strategic“ sectors and promoting Southeast Asian countries as 
alternative destinations. Whereas the latter initiative was hampered by the 
1997/98 East Asian crisis,17 the former has met with criticism since the 
beginning of the global downturn in e-commerce and Taiwan’s 2001 reces-
sion. 
 Following his victory in the March 2000 presidential elections, Presi-
dent Chen Shuibian responded to the resulting dilemma by lifting (or offer 
to lift) certain restrictions on cross-Strait economic relations while shifting 
the dispute with Peking to the political arena. In 2001, Taipei thus launched 
the so-called “three mini-links“ in trade, transport, and postal services be-
tween its islands of Kinmen and Matsu and the nearby mainland coast. The 
following year, direct trade was legalised as a matter of principle, and 2000 
agricultural and industrial PRC-products were cleared for import. Since 
August 2002, Taiwan companies can invest in the mainland without the 
involvement of subsidiaries in third countries. Remaining restrictions relate 
to total investment and security-sensitive technology transfers. In 2002, both 
sides made (thus far inconclusive) proposals for the establishment of direct 
trade, transport, and postal links.18 
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As a matter of principle, the trading state peace proposition would thus 
appear to apply to the Taiwan Strait case as far as both present trade and 
medium-term trade expectations are concerned. If, nevertheless, politics 
regularly interfere with this mechanism and keeps evoking the possibility of 
armed conflict, this would not come as a surprise to mainstream proponents 
of the rival democratic peace proposition. 
 
Democratic Peace? 
According to recent assessments made by the US non-governmental Free-
domhouse organisation,19 Taiwan was rated 2.2 (free) and China 7.6 (non-
free) with 1 representing the highest possible rating. Economic opening 
notwithstanding, the PRC remains an authoritarian one-party state, whereas 
Taipei has introduced democratic liberties since the late 1980s which today 
make the Republic of China one of the freest countries in East Asia. It is the 
resulting antagonism, or, in the words of François Godement, ‚competition 
for legitimacy‘20 which keeps irritating cross-Strait relations while prevent-
ing an optimisation of economic interdependence. It was thus that President 
Lee Teng-hui, while paying lip-service to the one-China-principle, and 
launching a semi-official dialogue in 1992, introduced a “special state-to-
state“ formula in 1999. His successor Chen Shuibian on the one hand has 
ruled out both a declaration of independence and a return to Lee’s formula, 
yet on the other has constantly refused to accept the one-China-principle as 
a basis for cross-Strait negotiations.  
 At the same time, Chen has continued his predecessor’s policy of low-
intensity provocations designed to consolidate Taiwan’s distinct identity and 
to test the island republic‘s cross-Strait and international margin of maneou-
vre. Among the latter were unsuccessful annual bids to return to the UN 
General Assembly, a 2002 unsuccessful bid to join the World Health Or-
ganisation (WHO) as an observer, and the decision, to print “issued in Tai-
wan” on the covers of passports issued by the Republic of China. Also in 
2002, a historical territorial claim to Mongolia was dropped, and Vice 
President Annette Lu met Indonesian cabinet members in Bali. In August 
2002, Chen reacted to persistent PRC attempts to restrict Taipei’s interna-
tional space by publicly speculating about a future referendum on the inde-
pendence issue. It is particularly the hopeless UN-exercise that emphasises 
the linkage with domestic considerations (not least related to the president’s 
own Democratic Progressive Party [DPP], the constitution of which stipu-
lates a formalisation of independence). As a matter of principle, the poten-
tially conflictual elements of a democratic-authoritarian dyad have worked 
against a better cross-Strait relationship. It was thus that in a 2000 public 
opinion poll, 60.89 per cent of local respondents agreed that Taiwan should 
be an independent country if peace can be maintained, whereas 56.07 per 
cent favoured unification provided that both sides became politically, eco-
nomically, and socially compatible.21 In practice, this combination supports 
the status quo and its present (reluctant) guarantor Chen Shuibian, as could 
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be seen in the December 2001 parliamentary elections, when the DPP, a 
severe recession notwithstanding, won a majority of seats. 
 On the other side of the Strait, the Peking leadership had sufficient 
confidence in the growing attraction of the mainland market to ignore Chen 
and his administration while engaging in dialogue with the Taiwanese busi-
ness community and the opposition Nationalist (Kuomintang) and People 
First Party (PFP). Nevertheless, this confidence was not strong enough to 
accept the latters’ proposals for common markets or confederations, and it 
was certainly not strong enough to desist from repeatedly threatening use of 
force and occasional sabre rattling. It was thus that the PRC has insisted on 
negotiating direct trade and other links outside the WTO22 and on the basis 
of the one-China-principle and that Chen’s speculating about future referen-
dums has been answered with more military threats. Whereas Peking has 
realised, for the time being, that large-scale demonstrations of military 
power are counterproductive with the island’s electorate23 and has so far not 
repeated its March 1996 missile tests and manoeuvres, less visible threats 
(such as the increase in short-range missiles deployed in the PRC‘s south-
eastern provinces and incursions into Taiwan’s airspace) have continued. At 
the same time, occasional overtures made towards Chen and his party by 
leading PRC politicians have been regularly modified at lower administra-
tive levels.24 
 It would thus appear that whereas both the trading state peace proposi-
tion and the (mainstream) democratic peace proposition apply as a matter of 
principle, they tend to mutually neutralise each other in output terms with 
the result that the Keohane/Nye scenario has not materialised. As a next step, 
one would have to ask whether this phenomenon can be further analysed at 
domestic levels.  
 
Domestic Structure and Coalition Building 
Given the antagonism between the economic and political imperatives in 
export-dependent Taiwan, one would expect the kind of continuous bargain-
ing processes that characterise democratic-corporatist states such as Ger-
many.25 As a matter of fact, due to the country’s fragmented industrial struc-
ture and a weak civil society,26 state institutions during the 1990s ‚displayed 
a relatively high degree of organisational cohesion‘ and have ‚guaranteed 
that the play of particularist interests could be minimised and the scope for 
rent-seeking activities curtailed.‘27 Among the results were an at least partly 
effective reform of the financial sector,28 as well as encouragement of a 
separate Taiwan identity that at some stage could be translated into assertive 
nationalism.29 
 In terms of outcome, Chen Shui-bian’s combination of less restricted 
trade and no one-China has become political mainstream and would pre-
clude rising cross-Strait tension, were it not for the uncertainties on the other 
side (and, to some extent, at the DPP grassroots). PRC politics are character-
ised by highly centralised political institutions and a weakly organised and 
Northeast Asia: The Less than Liberal Peace 
 
 
83 
fragmented society. Coalition building is restricted to political elites and by 
and large excludes both societal actors and public opinion. At the same time, 
a significant part of China’s growth in the 1980s and 1990s was domesti-
cally generated, a commitment in principle to market liberalisation has met 
with resistance among central and local elites, and resulting deficits in le-
gitimacy could lead to the kind of institutional failure that was characteristic 
of South Korea in the 1990s (see below). If that happens, the economic 
imperative thus far applied to cross-Strait relations would be severely dam-
aged, and probably even more so in a context of incipient democratisation. 
 
Relative Gains on the Korean Peninsula 
 
North and South Korea are technically at war. Since 1953, the military 
status quo on the Korean peninsula has been guaranteed by an armistice 
agreement signed by the American commander-in-chief of a UN-mandated 
alliance (but not by South Korea30) and his counterparts from North Korea 
and the PRC. In 1954, Washington and Seoul signed a mutual defence treaty. 
Pyongyang followed suit with defence agreements concluded with the 
USSR (1961, abrogated in 2000) and China (1961). Up to this day, the pen-
insula remains effectively divided along the 38th parallel which has emerged 
as the most fortified border in the world. Because of the global and regional 
Cold War settings, attempts at engagement and reconciliation failed in the 
1970s and 1980s. 
 Both the Republic of (South-) Korea (ROK) and the Democratic 
People’s Republic of (North) Korea (DPRK) have publicly upheld the vision 
of a united peninsula. In 1991, they simultaneously joined the UN and 
signed two basic treaties, one on non-aggression and reconciliation, the 
other one on the denuclearisation of both sides. In June 2000, their bilateral 
dialogue culminated in a historic visit by ROK-President Kim Dae-jung 
(1998-2002) to Pyongyang. Upon assuming office in 1998, Kim had launch-
ed what became generally known as his sunshine diplomacy, an attempt at 
confidence building through economic cooperation and societal contacts. 
 The preceding normalisation process had not been linear and could 
hardly be described as détente at all. The 1991 agreements had been sus-
pended by Pyongyang after US intelligence had made public suspicions in 
1993 that the DPRK was secretly developing nuclear weapons, and after 
Kim Dae-jung’s predecessor Kim Young-sam (1993-97) had once again 
raised the pressure on the North. Having negotiated a nuclear agreement (the 
so-called Agreed Framework) with the US in October 1994 Pyongyang, 
under the new leadership of Kim Chung-il, did its best to preserve the Cold 
War on the peninsula through propaganda and armed provocations. Eventu-
ally, a continuously deterring economic situation, culminating in the starva-
tion of 1-2 million people and complicated relationships with the US and 
Japan led the North to accept Kim Dae-jung’s offer. This acceptance of 
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sunshine diplomacy has remained conditional, however. Whereas the DPRK 
permitted temporary reunions of families separated by the Korean War and 
took first steps to reconnect road and railway links through the Demilita-
rised Zone (DMZ) on both sides of the 38th parallel, it would not let itself be 
engaged in the very military confidence and security building that was the 
ultimate goal of Kim Dae-jung’s initiative. In the meantime, Pyongyang 
launched complex military, diplomatic, and propagandistic manoeuvres 
designed to play Seoul against Washington or vice versa and, at a second 
level, Russia against China, China against Japan, etc. It was only after the 
Bush Jr. administration had decided to treat North Korea with a benign 
neglect and, after some 20 months of stagnation in North-South relations 
that the DPRK, in July 2002, made new overtures towards Seoul and Tokyo 
that increasingly threatened to isolate the US. At this point, Washington had 
made a resumption of contacts contingent upon an agenda that would in-
clude Pyongyang’s testing and exporting of missiles, the concentration of 
conventional forces along the DMZ and, most importantly, inspections of 
suspected nuclear sites by the International Atomic Energy (IAEA) as stipu-
lated in the 1994 Agreed Framework. North Korea refuted these demands as 
preconditions and, in October 2002, officially informed the US about its 
nuclear weapons programme, thus making the 1994 agreement obsolete as a 
matter of principle. 
 
Trading State Peace? 
Nascent dependence would be a better term than interdependence to de-
scribe intra-Korean economic relations at the turn of the century,31 and the 
main motivation for Pyongyang to return to the negotiation table during the 
1990s was an increasingly critical economic situation. During that decade, 
North Korea’s economy shrank by one third, and today it represents only 
about five per cent of the size of the southern economy. Whereas total 
North-South trade remained insignificant at US$ 400,000 in 2001 and did 
not create major dependencies on either side,32 sizeable foreign investment 
in the DPRK has increasingly come from the ROK,33 has often been politi-
cally motivated and thus loss-making.34  Precluding a Chinese-style eco-
nomic opening, this situation is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. 
 Speculations about such an opening have been rampant since July 2002, 
when the DPRK apparently substituted sectoral markets for food, clothing, 
fuels, and housing for its traditional rationing system. Ailing state enter-
prises were allegedly instructed to survive without subsidies. The parallel 
devaluation of the won, while benefiting potential foreign investors, risks to 
even further shift the country’s economic burden to consumers through 
rising inflation and growing income disparities. Immediately after the intro-
duction of the new measures, consumer prices allegedly increased by at least 
50 per cent. The government tried to alleviate the burden by raising salaries, 
with soldiers and civil servants benefiting most. 
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In the absence of a consumers‘ lobby, it is from the latter quarters that resis-
tance against a consequent marketisation can be expected. Even if such 
resistance could be overcome, however, Kim Chung-il is unlikely to follow 
the Chinese lead. First of all, economic opening would nurture a new class 
of local entrepreneurs and technocrats that would at some point challenge 
the present oligarchy. Secondly, conditions in Kim’s North Korea differ 
from Deng Xiaoping’s 1978 China in several important respects. Most im-
portantly, the DPRK economy is dominated by heavy industry with only 
about 20 per cent of the workforce employed in the agricultural sector, 
which provided the first growth impulses in the PRC.  
 In the general framework of sunshine diplomacy, the DPRK has re-
ceived substantial southern assistance, most of which rice and fertiliser 
made available as humanitarian aid. Furthermore, Seoul has been the major 
contributor to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organisation 
(KEDO), charged under the 1994 Agreed Framework to build two light 
water reactors in North Korea which produce less weapons-grade plutonium 
than the DPRK’s present conventional reactors. Although South Korea is 
not the only international donor, there have been signs of fatigue among 
others, with the ROK continuing to be the most reliable source of foreign 
assistance. 
 Under such circumstances, and even when taking future developments 
into account, the current situation in the Korean peninsula can hardly be 
described as a trading state peace. If the North-South dialogue has neverthe-
less survived plenty of provocations and setbacks, thus suggesting a win-
win situation as a matter of principle, the explanation would have to be 
found elsewhere. 
 
Democratic Peace? 
The 1999/2000 Freedomhouse rating for North and South Korea are 7.7 
(“non-free”) and 2.2 (“free”), respectively.35 The DPRK constitutes one of 
the last totalitarian regimes worldwide. In Pyongyang’s propaganda, the 
ROK remains a puppet of US imperialism, and the people of South Korea 
should be liberated from capitalist oppression. Prior to sunshine diplomacy, 
there were only two occasions (in 1974 and 1990, respectively), when North 
Korea, for reasons related to change in its international environment (see 
below), appeared ready to engage in serious dialogue with the South. 
 Much as Taiwan, South Korea went through a top-down democratisa-
tion process from the late 1980s onwards. In 1988, the first freely elected 
president in more than 25 years assumed office and subsequently launched a 
détente initiative which, in analogy to Germany’s 1970s Ostpolitik, became 
known as ‘Nordpolitik.’ Similar to the later sunshine diplomacy, the objec-
tives were the establishment of economic and social contacts, encouraging 
the establishment of economic relations between Pyongyang and third par-
ties, an end to confrontative diplomacy, tying the DPRK into the interna-
tional community, and facilitating contacts between North Korea and Japan. 
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Pyongyang at the time insisted on the withdrawal of all American troops 
from the ROK as a precondition for negotiations, thus effectively precluding 
a dialogue. Two years later, an increasingly critical economic situation and 
new international challenges brought the DPRK to the negotiating table, 
until the same factors inspired another change of mind in the North (see 
below). 
 ROK President Kim Young-sam was the first civilian president since 
1961 to be elected on the ruling party’s ticket. He began his term with a 
commitment to Nordpolitik, and lifted restrictions on direct intra-Korean 
business contacts, but increasingly tried to pressure the North both militarily 
and rhetorically once Pyongyang’s economic problems and nuclear brink-
manship had come to the open. It was only when the leader of the opposi-
tion, former dissident and political prisoner Kim Dae-jung took over in 1998 
that détente was conceptualised and comprehensively implicated to the point 
that the (new) opposition accused the president of giving away more than 
receiving, thus compromising national security. Kim had been awarded the 
Nobel peace price in 2000 and, in defending his achievements, had come 
close to bargaining away certain aspects of South Korea‘s democracy by 
stifling criticism of the more sinister aspects of DPRK policies. Towards the 
end of Kim’s term, with an opposition takeover appearing increasingly 
likely, Pyongyang surprisingly returned to the negotiating table it had left 
when the Bush Jr. administration had raised the ante on North Korea in 2001 
(see below). It is generally expected that any new South Korean administra-
tion, while trying to ensure a better balance of mutual concessions, will 
maintain sunshine diplomacy as a general framework.  
It would thus appear that neither the trading state proposition nor the 
mainstream democratic peace proposition apply in the Korean case and that 
the emergence of joint structures or procedures can be ruled out for the 
foreseeable future. On the one hand, this could strengthen the argument of 
scholars who believe that democracies, by definition, hesitate to apply force 
in solving their conflicts. On the other, it could underline the necessity of 
distinguishing different types of democracies. 
 
Domestic Structure and Coalition Building 
Since assuming power upon the death of his father in 1994, Kim Chung-il 
has increasingly relied on the military leadership rather than the Korean 
Workers‘ Party (KWP) as a power basis. Military expenses consume about 
one quarter of Pyongyang’s annual budget, and highranking officers have 
enjoyed privileges such as better housing, better education for their children, 
and business opportunities. It is believed that major parts of international 
humanitarian aid made available in the second half of the 1990s were di-
verted to the armed forces. The development of weapons of mass destruc-
tion, armed forays into the ROK’s territory and coastal waters, as well as a 
constantly high level of bellicose propaganda can be attributed to military as 
much as civilian political influences. At the same time, the regime has been 
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cynically oblivious to the fate of ordinary North Koreans. To the extent that 
there were coup attempts in the past, they have been isolated and unsuccess-
ful.36 
 South of the DMZ, the picture is obviously different in terms of eco-
nomic and political systems. At the same time, a highly localised party sys-
tem and instances of presidential authoritarianism signal the survival of 
older patterns. If the ROK’s democracy appears less mature than, for in-
stance, the Taiwanese, then because of a long tradition of institutional fail-
ure, including dependence of the bureaucracy on vested economic and po-
litical interests. The result was that public-private interactions deteriorated 
into rent-seeking networks and that the reform process was subject to recur-
rent intervention and corruption. Together, these problems severely com-
promised policy-making coherence and efficiency and generated highly 
detrimental effects on financial stability and economic performance37 during 
the 1990s. Financial liberalisation, launched primarily in response to exter-
nal pressures, was captured by domestic elites as a vehicle for pursuing 
particularistic interests.38 
 Given the dominant role of politically-connected conglomerates in 
South Korea’s economy, emerging middle classes and entrepreneurial 
classes have had problems to make themselves heard and have generally 
chosen to tread carefully among the established players. In the early 1990s, 
following German unification, they thus more or less accepted the emerging 
elite consensus that the potential costs of reunification could, after all, be 
unacceptable.39 A few years later, Kim Dae-jung’s sunshine diplomacy was 
mostly welcomed as a means to defer such an event as well as its potentially 
conflictual ramifications. At this point, the Asian financial crisis had com-
pelled Seoul to ask the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for emergency 
assistance. With representatives of the middle classes being most affected 
by the crisis, they had reason to view reunification as an even less attractive 
option. 
 It was thus South Korea’s civil society as organised in trade unions, 
student associations, and churches became the standard bearer of a new 
(pro-unification, anti-IMF) nationalism. These social strata had become 
stronger than its Taiwanese counterparts, if only because of a long history of 
anti-establishment struggles. Relations between the relatively strong civil 
society and the strong state have frequently been contentious. Until the end 
of the Cold War, the state prevailed both through developmentalism and 
anti-communism. In the second half of the 1990s, both instruments had 
suffered serious blows. The resulting weakening of the old elite and the 
emergence of a new nationalism once again made sunshine diplomacy look 
as a win-win situation, even if it required material sacrifices, and even if 
representatives of business and civil society lent their support for the oppo-
site reasons. 
The obvious problem in this calculus was North Korea itself. With Kim 
Chung-il remaining reluctant to risk his own demise even for the sake of the 
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redefined nation, and the DPRK thus requiring ever increasing assistance 
while offering ever smaller concessions, Kim Dae-jung, at the end of his 
term, had come close to losing both big business and middle classes while, 
through economic liberalisation prescribed by the IMF, alienating important 
sectors of civil society. The opposition, although ready to turn the clock 
backwards in many respects, could not ignore the power of the new nation-
alism that had already started affecting relations with Tokyo and Washing-
ton. Rather than win-win, the result in terms of North-South relations thus 
increasingly looked like a stalemate. 
 
Suspense across the East China Sea 
 
Since the end of the Pacific War, China-Japan relations have been character-
ised by a mixture of mutual admiration (for China’s civilisational impact 
and Japan’s economic success, respectively) and lingering suspicion (caused 
by Japan‘s war atrocities and China’s military modernisation in the 1990s.) 
Tokyo’s 1954 mutual defence assistance agreement with the US, although 
initially directed against the PRC as much as against the USSR, became 
increasingly acceptable to Peking as a means to prevent Japanese military 
unilateralism after Richard Nixon’s 1972 visit to Shanghai (which had come 
as a shock to the Japanese government and had prompted it to establish 
diplomatic relations with China shortly afterwards.) In the early 1980s, the 
PRC went as far as encouraging Tokyo to assume a higher military profile 
with a view to jointly opposing the Soviet Union. As far as Peking was 
concerned, the 1978 Sino-Japanese friendship treaty committed Japan to 
China‘s own anti-hegemonial (anti-Soviet) struggle. This policy was aban-
doned after 1982, with China declaring an independent (equidistant) stance 
between Moscow and Washington. Since then, Peking has repeatedly criti-
cised militaristic tendencies in Japan, a critique that gained new momentum 
following the revision of US-Japan guidelines for bilateral defence coopera-
tion in 1997. In the new guidelines, Tokyo assumed greater responsibilities 
in cases of conflict in the areas surrounding Japan, a region that China in-
stinctively associated with the Taiwan Strait. To further fuel the suspicion, 
Tokyo in 1998 agreed to jointly develop a regional missile umbrella with the 
US in response to North Korea’s test of a long-range ballistic missile. China 
viewed Japan’s increasing participation in UN peacekeeping activities rather 
critically and only grudgingly accepted the Japanese Self Defence Force’s 
(SDF) participation in operation ‘Enduring Freedom’ after 11 September 
2001. 
Japan had become China’s most important trading partner in the early 
1960s and occupied an almost monopolistic position in the PRC’s foreign 
trade until Deng Xiaoping opened the Chinese market to the world. In the 
1990s, bilateral trade picked up once again, due to increases in Japanese 
investment and a high degree of competitiveness of suppliers on both sides 
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that has been explained, among other things, with the latters‘ political con-
nections.40 It was only in 2000 that it was overtaken by the US as the PRC’s 
most important export destination.  
In the early 1990s, Japan had started to voice its concerns about China’s 
military modernisation and to use this development as a justification for 
building up power projection capacities of its own. Between 1995 and 1997, 
Tokyo cut its development aid in response to the PRC’s continuing nuclear 
tests. A bilateral security dialogue, launched in 1993, has so far not resulted 
in greater mutual transparency. 
 In February 1992, China had passed a maritime law defining, among 
other islands, Taiwan and the Diaoyutai as parts of its territory and thus as 
points of departure for the definition of coastal waters and contingent zones. 
This initiative almost foiled the first visit of a Japanese emperor to the PRC. 
The (uninhabited) Diaoyutai (jap. Senkaku) archipelago in the East China 
Sea had been annexed by Japan together with Taiwan in 1895 and had been 
returned to Tokyo by the US together with Okinawa and the Ryukyu chain 
in 1972. Since then, both China and Taiwan have repeatedly dispatched 
civilian boats to the area to be regularly driven away by the Japanese coast-
guard. In 1993, Peking and Tokyo agreed on the joint exploitation of natural 
resources in certain sectors of the adjacent waters, with Japan acknow-
ledging PRC sovereignty over some maritime areas, albeit not over the 
islands proper.  
 In 1998, China’s president Jiang Zemin returned the emperor’s visit, 
warning Tokyo not to support Taiwan and (unsuccessfully) insisting on a 
written apology for warcrimes of the past. At the same time, PRC research 
vessels repeatedly intruded into Japan’s coastal waters. In 2001, the Japa-
nese finance minister called for cuts in assistance to “rising military powers” 
such as China41 (subsequent cuts were explained with Japan’s own eco-
nomic problems rather than Peking’s armament). Shortly afterwards, the 
Chinese ambassador to Tokyo commented that bilateral relations had 
reached their lowest point in thirty years.42 
 
Trading State Peace? 
Among the dyads presented here, Japan and China come closest to what has 
been termed as a trading state peace. Their economies have been highly 
complementary and mutually beneficial, with Japan, both through foreign 
direct investment (FDI) and official development assistance (ODA) contrib-
uting to China’s industrial modernisation and thus to bilateral trade.43 It is 
expected that Peking’s WTO membership will give economic relations an 
additional boost. In 1999, Japan was China’s third most important source of 
FDI after Hong Kong and the US. Up to this day, Peking remains the largest 
recipient of Japanese ODA. In 2000, Japan depended on the Chinese market 
(excluding Hong Kong) for 5.6 per cent of its exports and 13 per cent of its 
imports. Conversely, the PRC‘s dependency rate was 14 per cent on exports 
and 20 per cent on imports. It will take decades rather than years of high 
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economic growth until China’s comparative advantage lies in the sphere of 
capital-intensive or skill-intensive products.44 turning the PRC into an eco-
nomic challenge. Nevertheless, the recent increase in manufacturing imports 
from China has already stimulated protectionist sentiments in Japan, leading 
to a brief trade war in early 2001.45 These frictions are signs of Japanese 
domestic problems (see below) rather than arguments against the trading 
state peace proposition. According to Western observers, however, “...as 
long as the mutual relations remain ambiguous and unresolved conflict 
elements linger on, the full potential of the economic relationship will not be 
realized.”46 
 
Democratic Peace? 
The Japanese society stands out as basically pacifist, risk-averse, and non-
patriotic.47 Japan is a constitutional monarchy and has received high marks 
(1.1) in recent Freedom House rankings. Since 1955, the country has never-
theless almost constantly48 been governed by the conservative Liberal De-
mocratic Party (LDP) which consists of personal networks and bases its 
power on vested interests in the bureaucracy, agriculture, and construction 
industry. Since the late 1980s, when Japan‘s bubble economy finally burst, 
these lobbies have successfully opposed structural reforms. At the same 
time, the freedom of individual citizens vis-à-vis the state 49 has not resulted 
in major domestic tension. 
 During the 1980s, a still self-confident Japan offered China cooperation 
as a kind of junior partner in East Asian regionalism.50 Following the June 
1989 massacre on Tiananmen Square, Tokyo was the first G-7 member to 
renounce sanctions and to try mediating between China and the West. Japan 
subsequently played an important role in Peking’s accession to the Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and other regimes on proliferation and disarma-
ment.51 In the framework of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), 
both sides opposed US demands for a fast and comprehensive trade liberali-
sation. The emperor’s 1992 visit was meant to focus the bilateral relation-
ship on a common future while terminating the debate on Japan’s wartime 
record. 
 Unfortunately, PRC nationalism, prompted by double-digit growth, was 
also on the rise, and Peking appeared increasingly frustrated in its attempt to 
lure Tokyo out of the US embrace.52 When, in 1994, several LDP-politicians 
publicly uttered revisionist views about the war and the occupation of China, 
the response was straightforward. In October 1995, Jiang Zemin, speaking 
in South Korea, said that the quality of the future bilateral relationship 
would depend on Tokyo “adopting a correct view of its former militarism” 
and on the extent to which a “militarist minority in Japan” would gain in 
influence. 53  Two months earlier, and almost exactly 50 years after Hi-
roshima, the PRC, a moratorium by other nuclear powers notwithstanding, 
tested another atom bomb, thus provoking (rather symbolic) cuts in Tokyo’s 
development assistance. Also in 1995, Peking launched the first in a series 
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of large-scale military manoeuvres to impress the Taiwanese electorate (for 
both historical and strategic reasons, Taiwan has occupied a special place in 
Tokyo‘s informal foreign relations.) Since then, Japan‘s economic stagna-
tion has dampened hopes for a more prominent role in regional and interna-
tional affairs, and Chinese nationalism and Japanese conservatism have been 
mutually reinforcing. At the same time, Tokyo opted for upgrading its mili-
tary relationship with the US which, nevertheless, had come to view the 
PRC as the more promising candidate for regional leadership. 
 Jiang Zemin’s 1998 visit was a “public relations disaster” and inspired 
an increasing disaffection of the Japanese public with its giant neighbour.54 
Both governments subsequently tried to limit the damage, with Japan ac-
tively supporting Peking’s WTO-bid. However, when Tokyo in 1997 sug-
gested to create an Asian Monetary Fund (AWF) to be financed from mostly 
Japanese sources, the PRC joined the US in opposing the initiative. Since 
then, Japan and China have been competing for a leading role in projects of 
East Asian regionalism. 
 After assuming office, the Bush Jr. administration, in the broader con-
text of undoing ist predecessor’s policies, promoted Tokyo to cornerstone of 
its Asia-Pacific strategy55 while continuing to urge revisions to Japan’s 1947 
peace constitution.56 The government of Junichiro Koizumi, while initially 
irritated, subsequently made use of the offer to relaunch a discussion on 
collective defence57 and to assume a higher military profile following Sep-
tember 11, 2001. At that point, China had no choice but to accept the SDF’s 
participation in ‘Operation Enduring Freedom,’ but Jiang Zemin did not 
miss the occasion to remind Koizumi of the suspicions harboured by the 
Asian countries.58 
 Whereas a majority of the Japanese public remains opposed to revising 
article 9 of the constitution which prohibits the country from possessing war 
potential,59 Koizumi’s approval ratings further increased following his No-
vember 2001 decision to dispatch warships to the Arabian Sea and to thus 
go beyond the 1997 formula ‘areas surrounding Japan.’60  
 Earlier, Sino-Japanese relations had suffered a further setback when the 
Japanese ministry of education had approved the use of revisionist textbooks 
at junior highschools, Koizumi had visited the Yasukuni shrine where, 
among others, Japanese war criminals are being honoured, and Tokyo had 
issued a visa to Taiwan’s former president Lee Teng-hui. When China and 
Japan, in the absence of their leaders, celebrated thirty years of diplomatic 
relations in September 2002, their relationship remained in suspense. For the 
time being, trading state peace has prevailed over (mainstream) democratic 
peace, and joint decision-making or procedure remains limited to a few 
technical issues, sometimes debated at the regional level. Given the slow 
pace of Japan’s economic and political reforms, nationalism will only grow 
in the framework of a US-Japan alliance that China, also for the time being, 
has come to view as a given. As far as the PRC itself is concerned, Peking 
leaders have learnt from history that the mobilisation of anti-foreign, in this 
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case anti-Japanese resentment can easily turn against themselves for as long 
as words are not being followed up with deeds. For this state of affairs to 
change, China would have to witness a major socio-economic meltdown. 
 
Domestic Structure and Coalition Building 
At the micro-level, the a.m. findings are confirmed by the dominance of the 
ministry of finance over both the ministry of foreign affairs and the defence 
agency, reflecting “the predominance of economic over defence issues in 
Japanese foreign policy. While the Japanese parliament...plays only a minor 
role in foreign affairs, the...LDP...is among the most important actors in 
Japanese foreign policy.”61 Thomas Risse-Kappen mentions a corporatist 
model, in which the importance of consensus building among relevant play-
ers accounts for the impression of slow moving and low key...A firm na-
tional consensus including all relevant elite factions, the opposition, and 
society insures that Japanese security policy has been first and foremost a 
matter of foreign economic policy.62 
 At the same time, Risse-Kappen points to a cleavage between the public 
at large and the LDP’s conservative leaders on issues of foreign and security 
policies, with the public exerting constraints on policy implementation dur-
ing much of the 1980s. This gap somewhat narrowed during the following 
decade, with the result that Koizumi has been trying to capture rightwing 
support, mostly through symbolical acts such as repeated visits to the Yasu-
kuni shrine. At the same time, Japanese conservatives remain the most pro-
American element in Japanese society.63 Whereas present trends therefore 
suggest ongoing irritations with Tokyo’s neighbours, including China, they 
do not signal the kind of unilateralism that could spark military conflict. 
 
Inside-Out and Outside-In 
Our analysis of the relevance of (Neo-) Liberal theories for international 
relations in Northeast Asia would imply that neither the trading state peace 
proposition nor the mainstream democratic peace proposition, while apply-
ing in principle, and while suggesting a possibility of future conflict, can 
sufficiently account for the present absence of conflict either in the Taiwan 
Strait or on the Korean Peninsula. If, in contrast, Japan-China relations 
basically reflect a economic imperative, then not least because of the ab-
sence of far-reaching territorial claims and the perseverance of an economic 
win-win-situation. Even in the latter case, however, the absence of either 
deep or broad joint structures or procedures remains a reason for concern. 
 At the same time, examination of domestic structure and coalition 
building, including the nature of different nationalisms, would suggest that 
‘weak-strong’ dyads (such as between South Korea and North Korea) are 
more conducive to peace than ‘strong-strong dyads’ (such as between Tai-
wan and China, with Japan-China coming in somewhere in between), but 
here again a final verdict remains to be passed.  
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Structure and coalition building are themselves outcomes of history, both 
domestic and external. The picture therefore becomes clearer when external 
factors are introduced into the equation in an attempt to reconcile Liberalism 
and Realism. Arguably, Taiwan’s relative institutional cohesion, relatively 
open economy, and democratisation can also be attributed to the persistence 
of the mainland threat, and arguably, the quality of cross-Strait relations has 
been significantly influenced by the quality of the regional and international 
environments. Peking first sought a dialogue with Taiwan following Richard 
Nixon’s visit to Shanghai in 1972 and made concrete proposals for unifica-
tion once the US had derecognised Taiwan in late 1978. Taipei opened up 
its political system and losened restrictions on mainland visits after Michail 
Gorbachev had committed himself to bury the Sino-Soviet conflict in the 
late 1980s. Both sides engaged in informal contacts once the West and Ja-
pan had started revoking post-Tiananmen sanctions in 1992. Peking aban-
doned the talks after President Lee had visited the US in 1995, and Lee 
himself became more assertive after the Clinton administration in 1996 had 
dispatched two carrier groups to prevent PRC manoeuvres from escalating 
into aggression. Whereas external inputs have occasionally motivated both 
Taiwan and China to test the resolve of the American intermediator, good or 
relatively good Peking-Washington relations have normally made the PRC 
more assertive and the ROC more cautious.  
 On the Korean peninsula, the outside-inside linkage has been even more 
obvious with Seoul compensating for its weak output vis-à-vis the DPRK by 
drawing third parties into the equation. Among the latter, the American ally 
has obviously been the most important, but Washington’s global security 
considerations have frequently clashed with the ROK’s narrower security 
interests, and democratisation in South Korea, while benefiting from the end 
of the global Cold War, has complicated this relationship even further.  
 At the time of the Sino-Soviet conflict, North Korea had been rather 
more successful in playing a similar game, because both Peking and Mos-
cow were eager to win the DPRK over to their respective sides. However, 
this ‘fence-sitting’ had its limitations, too. It was thus that in 1974, when the 
US and the USSR as well as the US and the PRC were engaged in détente, 
Pyongyang appeared willing to enter into dialogue with Seoul. The initiative 
eventually failed because Seoul was called back by Washington. In 1990, 
the US encouraged North-South reconciliation while both Moscow and 
Peking were cutting assistance to the DPRK and seeking relations with 
Seoul. If these influences, from 1992 onwards, produced the opposite result, 
then because of the strong nature of the North Korean state. Since then, 
Pyongyang has accepted dialogue with Seoul at least partly because Wash-
ington had accepted dialogue with Pyongyang, because these two and others 
could be played against each other, and because of the PRC’s resumption of 
aid, viewed by the DPRK leadership as a last resort in future conflictual 
senarios.64 If, in the Taiwan Strait, the Bush Jr. administration has been 
partly successful in disentangling itself from triangular games and domestic 
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dynamics by spelling out a de facto-security guarantee for Taipei,65 respec-
tive efforts have failed on the Korean Peninsula with the result that the US, 
at least for the time being, has revoked earlier threats to attack the DPRK.66 
In Korea, we thus continue to deal with an ad hoc and issue-specific concert 
relationship aimed at defusing high-level tensions.67 
Oscillations in Japan’s foreign and security posture have frequently 
been a reflex of its alliance with the US, with regionalist ambitions increas-
ing when Tokyo felt confident enough to confront Washington over bilateral 
trade issues as during the early 1990s. At the same time, with neighbours 
such as China, both Koreas, and Russia trying to benefit from this kind of 
alienation and adopting an arrogant stance of their own, Japan has regularly 
mended its American links with the alliance remaining the defining frame-
work for Tokyo’s foreign relations, if not domestic politics. Koizumi’s pre-
sent attempt at incremental change still relies on the US umbrella to ac-
commodate both the rightwing minority and the pacifist majority. 
 Whereas Realists would explain the present peace in the Taiwan Strait, 
on the Korean Peninsula, and in the East China Sea with rather stable power 
balances at both the subregional and international levels, they would proba-
bly not view this as a lasting state of affairs, giving the dynamics prevalent 
in both regional and international relations since the end of history. Sup-
posed that these dynamics, as has been shown, are increasingly being fu-
elled by domestic developments, the complementary character of Realism 
and Liberalism becomes obvious. Should China try to avoid institutional 
failure by turning aggressively nationalist, this would increase the risk of 
conflict in the Taiwan Strait and with Japan while provoking a military 
response by a US trying to preserve the regional, and thus the international 
balance of powers. Should China continue to play on time while reforming, 
and thus initially weaken its institutions, incentives for cross-Strait détente 
and improved relations with Japan would increase on all sides, with joint 
structures and procedures eventually resulting. Should North Korea try to 
avoid institutional failure by striking more deals with either the US or South 
Korea at the expense of either of the two, the regional, and thus the interna-
tional balance of powers would be ultimately changed in the absence of 
meaningful (in this case transregional) joint structures and procedures. 
Should North Korea try to avoid institutional failure by turning even more 
aggressively nationalist, the US would be tempted to bring the DPRK to its 
knees but would be restrained by a regional coalition trying to contain the 
secondary effects of an unavoidable change in the regional, and thus the 
international balance of powers. At the same time, the regional coalition 
would be pressured to bring about a change of regime in Pyongyang through 
non-military means. It is such a scenario that dramatically improves the 
perspectives for creating joint structures and procedures. In the meantime, 
today’s Northeast Asian peace remains less than Liberal, and thus precari-
ous. 
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